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Summary 
In the first part of this thesis, we examine the influence of green and producer 
lobbies on the determination of the trade and environmental policies adopted by 
large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution. In 
Chapter 2, we show that the impact of green lobbying on the relative efficiency of 
unilateral and cooperative environmental policy outcomes depends crucially on the 
magnitude of the 'pollution leakages' and on the type of trade policy regime. Our 
analysis suggests that environmental policy coordination might be more beneficial 
under a free trade regime. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the case where both producer and environmental 
groups are organized. We find that the nature of the relationship between the two 
lobbies and the relative efficiency of alternative policy outcomes depend on the 
type of policy regime, whether governments act unilaterally or cooperatively, and 
the size of the 'pollution leakages' and the emission spillovers. 
The second part of the thesis looks at the formation of international trade and 
environmental agreements. In Chapter 4, we describe a model of multi-dimensional 
international negotiations, where countries can enter separate agreements with dif- 
ferent partners along different policy dimensions. We examine the implications of 
negotiation tie-in-the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimen- 
sions of interaction-for the viability of multilateral cooperation, when countries 
are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show 
that, while in some cases a tie-in rule has either no effect or can make multi- 
lateral cooperation more viable, in others it can make an otherwise viable joint 
multilateral agreement unstable. 
In Chapter 5, we examine international trade negotiations when markets are 
imperfectly competitive and governments use import tariffs and export subsidies 
to alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms. Using a simple model 
of intra-industry trade between three ex-ante symmetric countries, we find that 
partial agreements involving the coordinated use of both tariffs and subsidies might 
be stumbling blocs against multilateral trade cooperation. We show that the in- 
troduction of an international ban on export subsidies might help to sustain global 
free trade. Chapter 6 contains some concluding remarks. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Two debates have been at the centre of the international agenda since the early 
1990's: the interaction between trade and environmental policy and the relation- 
ship between regionalism and multilateralism. This thesis seeks to make a contri- 
bution to both. 
The renewed interest in the linkages between trade and the environment' can be 
explained by two key developments of the last decade: the growing awareness of the 
global dimension of problems such as ozone depletion, climate change and wildlife 
conservation, reflected in the increasing number of international environmental 
agreements (IEAs)'; and the rapid dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
throughout the world, both at the regional and multilateral level. 
Two general concerns surround the debate on trade and the environment. On 
one side, there is the fear that the economic boost imparted by freer trade can 
have a negative impact on the environment. This raises a set of questions: is 
there a direct link between trade liberalization and environmental degradation? If 
so, how should trade liberalization strategies incorporate this cost? Should trade 
policy be used to meet environmental objectives? On the other side, the recent 
'The debate over the relationship between trade and environmental protection is hardly new, 
having already received attention at the Stockholm UN Conference on Human Development in 
1972. 
2More than one hundred environmental agreements are currently in force, including the Mon- 
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Ramework Convention on 
Climate Change. See Newell and Whalley (2000) for a summary of the features of the main 
1EAs. 
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revitalization of concern for environmental quality has generated many questions 
about the impact of environmental regulations on trade patters and gains from 
trade. There are concerns that higher environmental standards in one country 
lend competitive advantage to another. It is argued that, if this is the case, some 
intervention is needed, either a specific trade policy measure, or an international 
environmental standard. Should the World Trade Organization (WTO) revise its 
rules to accomodate the specific trade measure suggested? How can the WTO 
ensure that the environmental objective is not a guise for a trade barrier? 
In this thesis, we focus on two specific aspects of the trade and environment 
nexus. Firstly, we investigate the role of interest groups in the determination of 
trade and environmental policies (Chapters 2 and 3). Taking into account the 
influence of citizens groups at the national and supra-national decision-making 
level can help us to explain, for example, the delays in the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse emissions or the recent breakdown of the Seattle 
round of GATT/WTO negotiations. Secondly, we study the interactions between 
trade and environmental issues at the level of international negotiations (Chapter 
4). 
The second debate to which our analysis is related-the relationship between 
regionalism and multilateralism-has been stimulated by the recent surge in the 
number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) .3 Despite the successful conclu- 
sion of the Uruguay Round and the consequent strengthening of the multilateral 
trade regime, there is still some concern that increased regional integration may 
result in the fragmentation of the world economy into competing trade blocs. The 
risk is that "countries that join trading blocs will be more protectionist towards 
countries outside the blocs than they were before, so that the world as a whole will 
be hurt more than helped by moves that at first seem to be liberalizing in intent. " 
(Krugman, 1991, p. 9). Chapter 5 of the thesis addresses this concern, examin- 
3According to natzsher (1996), 94% of world trade is conducted within or between the Euro- 
pean Union (EU), the North American Ree Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) - In the period 1948-1994, GATT contracting parties notified 
118 preferential trade agreements relating to trade in goods, of which 38 in the five years ending 
in 1994. Since the completion of the Uruguay Round, 80 additional PTAs covering trade in goods 
and services have been notified. See Whalley and Hamilton (1996) and Sampson (1996) for more 
information about the recent increase in the number of preferential trade agreements. 
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ing whether PTAs are stepping stones or stumbling blocs towards the attainment 
of multilateral trade cooperation, when markets are characterized by imperfect 
competition. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we outline the structure of the 
thesis and provide a brief summary of the two debates it relates to. 
1.1 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided in two parts, each containing two main contributions. The 
first part looks at the impact of interest groups on the political determination of 
trade and environmental policies, while the second part looks at the formation of 
international trade and environmental agreements. 
1.1.1 The Influence of Green and Producer Lobbies on the 
Determination of Trade and Environmental Policies 
Recent events in the United States have enlightened the extent to which citi- 
zen groups condition trade and environmental policies, both at the national and 
multilateral level. On the trade side, the creation of the North American Free 
Uade Agreement (NAFTA) initially encountered the resistance of business, labor 
and environmental groups. By pledging in an environmental side agreement, the 
White House was able to win the support of at least some environmental groups 
and obtain the fast track authority to negotiate the trade agreement without a 
line-by-line veto from Congress. More recently, environmental groups have joined 
forces with protectionist industries and labor groups to launch a fierce campaign 
against further trade liberalization, which has caused the breakdown of the new 
round of GATT/WTO negotiations in Seattle. ' Industry and green lobbies have 
been extremely influential also on the environmental side, participating actively in 
'See The EconomZst, December 11,1999. 
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the debates on domestic environmental standards' and multilateral emission cuts. ' 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the impact of green lobbying on the determina- 
tion of unilateral and cooperative policies. We focus our analysis on two large 
countries that are linked though trade flows and transboundary pollution. In this 
scenario, unilateral efforts to reduce pollution by one country shift the comparative 
advantage of producing 'dirty' goods in favor of the other country. This implies 
an increase in foreign emissions, which the domestic residents dislike as well. 
To describe the relationship between environmental groups and policy-makers, 
we employ the common agency model pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) 
and applied to trade policy by Grossman and Helpman (1994,1995a, b). National 
green lobbies confront a national or supra-national government with contribution 
schedules, namely functions describing their political contributions contingent on 
the chosen economic policies. These can be interpreted, depending on the context, 
as legal campaign contributions, support demonstrations, or simply as bribes. The 
timing is that first lobbies simultaneously commit to contribution schedules, and 
then governments, having observed these schedules, set trade and environmental 
policies in a unilateral or cooperative manner. The implicit objective of incumbent 
politicians is to be re-elected. They trade off the political support that comes from 
heeding interest groups' demands against the alienation of voters that may result 
from the implementation of socially costly policies. 
We show that the existence of 'pollution leakages' reduces the incentives of 
environmental groups to lobby for higher domestic pollution taxes. If the pollu- 
tion leakages and the emissions spillovers are large enough, green lobbies could 
even support domestic tax reductions. The main result of our analysis is that the 
impact of green lobbies on the comparative efficiency of unilateral and cooperative 
'For example, both producer and green lobbies have demanded compliance of foreign legis- 
lation with American environmental standards on incidental catching of dolphins set out in the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
6 On one hand, green lobbies have exercised "considerable influence on the negotiations" at the 
Kyoto Conference in favor of multilateral reductions in greenhouse emissions (Financtal Times, 
December 11,1997). On the other hand, a broad coalition of large corporations and unions has 
organized "one of the most intensive campaigns ever mounted on a single political issue, seeking 
to convince that American curbs on greenhouse gas are unfair and damaging to the economy` 
(FinancZal Times, September 10.1997). 
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environmental policies depends on the type of trade regime and on the magnitude 
of pollution leakages. In the absence of pre-existing international trade agree- 
ments, the presence of green lobbies always biases pollution taxes upwards. In this 
case, if the size of the lobbies is large enough, uncoordinated pollution taxes are 
closer to the efficient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated taxes. 
If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbying 
could bias unilateral pollution taxes downwards. In this case, environmental policy 
coordination is unambiguously efficiency enhancing. 
In Chapter 3, we extend the analysis to the case where both producer and 
environmental groups are organized. We characterize the policy outcomes and the 
relationship between lobbies in three alternative policy regimes: when governments 
control both trade and environmental policies; when they are restrained to the use 
of environmental policy by an existing free trade agreement; and when trade policy 
is the only available instrument. 
We find that the nature of the relationship between the two lobby groups depends 
on three factors: the type of policy regime, whether the decZsZon-making process is 
centralized or decentralized, and the magnitude of the 'pollution leakages'. 
If trade and environmental policies are selected unilaterally and in isolation, 
and the resulting leakages effects are large enough, environmental and producer 
groups will be allied against a unilateral increase in domestic pollution taxes and 
in favor of protectionist trade policies. 
In a regime in which both policy instruments are available, governments can 
eliminate pollution leakages by combining the use of pollution taxes (to reduce 
domestic emissions) and import tariffs (to avoid increasing foreign emissions). In 
this case, green and producer groups will unambiguously be allied over trade policy 
and competing over environmental policy. Our analysis also predicts that the 
interests of green and producer lobbies will always be divergent in international 
environmental negotiations, and that they will be convergent in international trade 
negotiations-when these are unaccompanied by efforts to reduce pollution. 
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the only attempt to examine the 
joint determination of trade and environmental policies. 7 In our setup, trade and 
7 See Section 1.2.6 for a discussion of the existing literature on the political economy of trade 
and environmental policies. 
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environmental policies are fully linked: environmental regulations affect the pat- 
tern of comparative advantage; trade can generate adverse environmental effects, 
but at the same time provides a mechanism for mitigating them. 
1.1.2 11-ade and Environmental Negotiations 
International relations involve multiple dimensions of interaction. Even when these 
dimensions are not directly interdependent-in the sense that the effects of choices 
along one dimension are dependent on choices along the others-there can still be 
cross-issue negotiation linkage: by exchanging concessions across different policy 
dimensions, countries may be able to achieve cooperation in situations where there 
would otherwise be no scope for mutual gains to be attained. Although this idea 
is not new, 8 its implications have so far only been examined in the context of 
bilateral negotiations, not multilateral negotiations. 
The literature on international agreements has primarily been concerned with 
whether single-issue multilateral agreements are immune from the possibility of 
deviations by a subset of countries. Consistently with the single-issue nature of 
the problem it studies, this literature has built upon theories of coalition formation 
whereby members of a coalition coordinate all of their actions with other mem- 
bers. 9 Simply extending the concept of coalition structure to a multi-dimensional 
framework in order to characterize the viability of multilateral cooperation arrange- 
ments can be misleading, because it does not account for the fact that countries can 
(and often do) form selective arrangements with different partners over different 
issues. 
In Chapter 4 of the thesis, we present a model of international policy co- 
ordination choices where countries can enter mto selective and separate binding 
agreements with different partners along different policy dimenstons. International 
relations are described as a two-stage game, in which agreements are formed in 
the first stage and policies are selected in the second stage, cooperatively among 
countries participating in an agreement and noncooperatively between countries 
belonging to separate agreements. In this model, a stable agreement structure is 
-'The point was first stressed by Raiffa (1982) and Sebenius (1983). For a recent application 
to North-South trade and environmental policy cooperation, see Abrego et al. (1997). 
9For an extensive survey of this literature, see Bloch (1997). 
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reached if no subset of countries can credibly object to it. 
The model is then used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in-the 
requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction-for 
the viability of multilateral cooperation, when countries are linked by emission 
spillovers and international trade under perfect competition. We show that, while 
in some cases a tie-in constraint has no effect or makes multilateral cooperatzon 
more viable, in others it makes a viable jotnt multilateral agreement unstable. 
In Chapter 5, we use the model of multi-dimensional agreement formation 
developed in the previous chapter to study the formation of international trade 
agreements, when markets are imperfectly competitive and governments use two 
trade policy instruments (import tariffs and export subsidies) to affect the inter- 
actions between oligopolistic firms. 
We employ a simple three-country model of intra-industry trade to examine 
whether preferential trade agreements are stepping stones or stumbling blocs to- 
wards the attainment of multilateral trade cooperation. We describe international 
trade relations as a three-stage process. In the first stage, countries decide whether 
or not to form cooperative trade agreements. These might take three forms: 'pure' 
customs unions (CUs), in which member countries eliminate tariffs among them- 
selves and set a common external tariff to maximize their joint welfarelo; agree- 
ments to coordinate the use of export subsidies only; and 'impure' CUs, involving 
the coordinated use of both policy instruments. " In the second stage, tariffs and 
subsidies are selected-cooperatively among countries participating in an agree- 
ment and non- cooperatively between countries belonging to separate agreements. 
In the last stage, firms compete in quantities. 
Rom the analysis of the welfare implications and the stability of alternative 
agreement structures, we obtain the following results: (i) three factors determine 
whether preferential trade agreements pose a threat to the multilateral trading sys- 
tem: which policy instruments are available, the degree of industry concentration, 
and the extent of product differentiation; (ii) when both import tariffs and export 
"An example of a 'pure' CU is provided by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). 
"The European Union can be considered an example of an 'impure' CU: its state aid policy 
restricts the capacity of national governments to support their firms and delegates to the Com- 
mission the task of ensuring that all subsidies granted within the EU are compatible with the 
single market objectives (Cini and '-\IcGowan, 1998). 
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tariffs are available, and the traded goods are homogeneous, 'impure' CUs are 
always stumbling blocs towards multilateral trade cooperation; (iii) when both 
policy instruments are available and firms sell nationally differentiated products, 
multilateral cooperation is sustainable only if the degrees of product differentia- 
tion and industry concentration are large enough; (iv) if policy-makers are banned 
from using export subsidies, the only stable negotiation outcome is global free 
trade. These findings provide a rationale for the recent attempts to strengthen 
international rules against the use of export subsidies. 
Conclusions 
Chapter 6 presents some concluding remarks and suggests some possible exten- 
sions to our work. Three broad themes emerge from the thesis. The first is that 
international relations involve two distinct stages of strategic interaction: in the 
first stage, political competition between the different interests determines the gov- 
ernment's policy preferences; then the negotiations between national governments 
determine the international equilibrium. We believe that more research is needed 
to examine how economic policies, including trade and environmental policies, are 
determined by political and economic interests. 
The second theme is that international relations involve the possibility of partial 
cooperation, in between the extremes of full cooperation and no cooperation. In 
our opinion, more attention should be devoted to study of the confficts that are 
likely to emerge both between and within coalitions of countries. 
Finally, our analysis points out that international negotiations involve multiple 
dimensions of strategic interactions, since they involve different policy issues (e. g. 
trade and environment) and policy instruments (e. g. import tariffs and export 
subsidies). Our analysis shows that focusing on single issues might be mislead- 
ing, i. e. might result in drawing incorrect conclusions about the outcome of the 
negotiations. 
1.2 The Debate on '11-ade and the Environment 
The starting point of the current trade and environment debate was the 'Earth 
Summit' in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and a series of environment-related trade 
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disputes, especially the 'tuna-dolphin' dispute between Mexico and the United 
States. 12 Following these disputes, a GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the 
Environment was established at the 1994 Marrakesh meeting that concluded the 
Uruguay Round (see Whalley, 1996). 
In this section, we briefly outline what we regard as the seven main issues in 
the trade and environment debate-" The research carried out in this thesis is 
mainly related to the last three issues. 
Trade Liberalization and Environmental Quality 
During the last decade, the moves towards to extending trade liberalization, such 
as the creation of the EC 92 internal market, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, have stim- 
ulated an intense debate about the impact of the removal of trade barriers on the 
environment. 
Some studies have argued that, unless corrective policies are taken, trade lib- 
eralization generates an increase in production and consumption activities. This 
damages the environment, through the associated increase in pollution and loss of 
natural resources (see, for example, Shrybman, 1990). 
On the other hand, trade liberalization can improve environmental quality 
through three different channels: by raising incomes, so that there is more interest 
in, and more money to spend on, environmental protection; by providing countries 
with the access to new and cleaner technology; and by enhancing the allocative 
efficiency of environmental resources. 
Among the papers which have expressed a more positive view of the linkage 
between trade openness and the environment is Antweiler et al. (1998), which 
12 The dispute was over the extra-territorial application of the US Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, which requires steps to be taken to curtail the incidental killing of marine mammals by 
commercial fishermen. In 1988 the US government introduced an import ban on tuna harvested 
in a way that did not satisfy the standards for the protection of dolphins applied to domestic 
fishermen. In 1991 a panel requested by Mexico ruled that the US ban was a violation of 
GATT article III, and that the Article XX exceptions in GATT could not be applied on an 
extra- territorial basis. 
13Extensive reviews of the trade and environment debate include Anderson and Blackhurst 
(1992), Dean (1992), Carraro (1994). and Ulph (1999). 
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develops a theoretical model to divide trade's impact on pollution into scale. tech- 
nique and composition effects. Using data on sulfur dioxide concentrations, they 
find that international trade creates relatively small changes in pollution concentra- 
tions when it alters the composition, and hence the pollution intensity, of national 
output. Their estimates of the associated technique and scale effects created by 
trade imply a net reduction in pollution from these sources. Combining estimates 
of scale, composition and technique effects, they conclude that trade liberalization 
appears to be good for the environment. 
Empirical studies suggest that environmental policies and trade policies are not 
as interdependent as some appear to believe. Specifically, trade policy seems to 
have a very limited impact on the welfare effects of environmental policy (Perroni 
and Wigle, 1994). 
A recent study by the WTO (1999) argues that there is no basis for the sweeping 
generalizations that trade openness is either bad or good for the environment. 
The environmental effects of trade liberalization are theoretically and empirically 
ambiguous, and depend on three interacting factors: (i) trade induced changes in 
industrial composition, and hence the pollution intensity of national output; (ii) 
changes in the overall scale of economic activity; and (iii) changes in production 
technology. Therefore the net outcome is a priori undetermined. 
1.2.2 M-ade Policy, Growth and the Environment 
An important question relates to the more dynamic aspects of the relationship 
between trade liberalization and environmental quality. 14 Some empirical evidence 
suggests the existence of an environmental Kutznets curve (EKC), implying that 
pollution increases at the early stages of development but decreases after a certain 
income level has been reached. However, Barbier (1997) shows that the EKC 
hypothesis may be valid for some types of pollutants (e. g. urban air pollution and, 
to some extent, freshwater pollutants) but not for others (e. g. C02 emissions). 
Grossman and Kreuger (1991) study the environmental impact of NAFTA, 
pointing out that a reduction in trade barriers will affect the environment in three 
ways: by expanding the scale of economic activity, by altering the composition of 
14For an extensive review of the literature on the linkages between trade liberalization, growth 
and the environment, see WTO (1999). 
The Debate on YMde and the Environment 11 
economic activity, and by bringing about a change in the techniques of produc- 
tion. They present empirical evidence to assess the relative magnitudes of these 
three effects as they apply to further trade liberalization in Mexico. They also 
use comparable measures of three air pollutants in a cross-section of urban areas 
located in 42 countries to study the relationship between air quality and economic 
growth. They find that for two pollutants (sulfur dioxide and "smoke") concentra- 
tions increase with per capita GDP at low levels of national income, but decrease 
with GDP growth at higher levels of income. 
Coopeland and Taylor (1994) develop a simple static model of North-South 
trade to examine linkages between national income, pollution, and international 
trade. Two countries produce a continuum of goods, each differing in pollution 
intensity. The authors show that the higher income country chooses stronger 
environmental protection and specializes in relatively clean goods. By isolating 
the scale, composition, and technique effects of international trade on pollution, 
they show that freer trade increases world pollution; an increase in the rich North's 
production possibilities increases pollution, while similar growth in the poor South 
lowers pollution; and unilateral transfers from North to South reduce global pol- 
lution. Coopeland and Taylor (1995), examine the interaction between pollution, 
income levels, and the patterns of trade in a general equilibrium setting. They 
find that free trade raises world pollution if incomes differ substantially across 
countries. 
1.2.3 Migration of "Dirty" Industries 
Another concern related to the trade-environment nexus is the so-called "pollution 
haven" hypothesis. The idea is that low environmental standards in developing 
countries compared to industrialized nations will lead "dirty" industries to migrate 
to these less developed countries (LDCs). In addition, LDCs may intentionally 
undervalue the environment in order to attract new investment. 
Low and Yeats (1992) find that a more rapid growth of dirty industries in 
lower income countries. This may relate to several considerations, such as relative 
labor costs or natural resource endowments. Another possible explanation is that 
particular kinds of industries, which happen to be relatively dirty, predominate in 
early stages of industrial development. 
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Lucas et al (1992) find that stricter regulation of pollution intensive production 
in OECD countries "has led to significant locational displacement, with consequent 
acceleration of industrial pollution intensity in developing countries. " However., 
Grossman and Kreuger (1993) find that the sectoral patterns of trade between 
the United States and Mexico have not been influenced by differences in pollution 
abatement costs. 
A study by the WTO (1999) argues that little evidence seems to support the 
claim that polluting industries tend to migrate to LDCs to reduce environmental 
compliance costs. This is also in line with earlier studies surveyed by Pearson 
(1988). 
1.2.4 Strategic Environmental Policy and International 
Trade 
Another frequently expressed concern about open trade is that it will lead to com- 
petitive deregulation and least common denominator environmental standards or 
"eco-dumping" (Rauscher, 1994). The argument is that, if markets are imperfectly 
competitive, governments have incentives to relax their environmental policies to 
try to shift rents from foreign to domestic producers. 15 
Issues of strategic environmental policies have been introduced by Ulph (1992), 
who develops a three-stage model in which governments choose environmental 
policies in the first stage, and firms choose output levels and capital stocks in the 
second and third stages. He shows that, if governments behave strategically, they 
will use quantity standards instead if pollution taxes, since these allow firms to 
produce lower outputs, and thus earn higher profits. 
Other studies have assumed that governments use emission taxes (Conrad 
(1993a, b) and Kennedy (1994) or emission standards (Barret, 1994a). Barret 
(1994a) focuses on two governments and their respective industries who sell their 
output in a third market. He shows that, if the two firms compete in quanti- 
ties, each government has incentives to impose a "weak" environmental standard, 
such that the marginal damage from pollution exceeds the marginal cost of abate- 
ment. However, if the firms compete in prices, countries have incentives to impose 
15For an extensive survey of the literature on strategic environmental policies, see Ulph (1999). 
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"strong" environmental standards, such that the marginal damage from pollution 
abatement is less than the marginal cost of abatement. 
Ulph and Ulph (1996) have analyzed a situation in which firms can make pre- 
commitments for strategic purposes-such as investing in R&D designed to influ- 
ence their costs in the market game. Firms' strategic behaviour can substitute in 
part for governments' strategic behaviour, but it also provides another avenue by 
which governments can use environmental policy to influence the market. " 
1.2.5 Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness 
Environmentally motivated taxes, subsidies, standards and other regulations can 
alter patterns of production and trade through their impact on international com- 
petitiveness. Theoretically, countries with more stringent environmental regula- 
tions could experience loss in comparative advantage (see Siebert, 1985). This 
explains the charge of "unfairness" which is often leveled against countries that 
derive a comparative advantage from lower environmental standards (see Nichols, 
1997). However, most empirical studies suggest that the competitiveness effects of 
environmental regulations are minor for most industries (see Low [1992] and WTO 
[1999]). 
Assuming that countries have identical production, pollution and abatement 
functions for a particular good, with free trade one would expect the country 
with relatively larger assimilative capacity to specialize in the production of the 
pollution intensive goods. That is, it is assumed that in autarky, the country richly 
endowed with assimilative capacity will have a price advantage in the pollution 
intensive good. 
Unilateral imposition of environmental regulations by the environmentally rich 
country will impose some costs on its producers, thus eroding the price advantage 
relative to the foreign country. We should therefore expect a shift in specialization 
where the environmentally scarce country increases production of the pollution- 
intensive good. Thus, unilateral regulations not only change the patterns of trade, 
but also increase pollution in the other country - even when no transnational 
16 R&--D investment has two effects: the direct rent-shiffing effect, which unambiguously leads 
governments to relax environmental policy, and the Z*ndz', rect strategzc investment effect, in that 
governments try to manipulate the R&D decisions of the firms. The overall effect is ambiguous. 
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pollution exists (cc pollute thy neighbor via trade"). 
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As discussed above, in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis we show that, when 
countries are large and pollution is transboundary, more stringent domestic envi- 
ronmental regulations imply that domestic firms experience a loss in comparative 
advantage; this leads to an increase in foreign emissions which the domestic resi- 
dents dislike as well. To avoid these 'pollution leakages', a country must be able 
to combine the use of trade and environmental policy instruments. 
1.2.6 The Political Economy of Trade and Environment 
There exists an increasingly vast literature looking at the influence of interest 
groups on trade and environmental policy-making. 
Some studies examine this issue from an empirical point of view. For example, 
VanGrasstek (1992) undertakes an analysis of the voting behaviour in the United 
States Senate. His econometric study establishes that voting on trade issues and on 
environmental issues can be linked to identifiable constituency interests. Senators 
are more likely to support trade restrictions which seek to protect the environment 
and environmental regulations that protect domestic producers. The evidence 
suggests that environmental considerations tend to increase the votes in favor of 
trade restrictions, so linking trade with environment would seem to make legislators 
more likely to support protectionist policies. The European experience explored 
by Klepper (1992) does not permit the kind of precise analysis of voting behaviour 
undertaken by VanGrasstek (1992) as a means of assessing the significance of the 
environment-trade link. This is because fewer issues are voted upon in European 
institutions and also because there is less transparency in decision-making than in 
the United States. 
Most theoretical studies consider only one policy instrument. For example, 
Hillman and Ursprung (1992,1994) investigate how environmental concerns might 
affect international trade policy. Another strand of the literature, which includes 
Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Grossman and Helpman (19947 1995a, b) and --, \, Iitra 
(1999), examines how trade policy is affected by the presence of producer lobbies. 
Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998) examine the effect of lobbying by green and 
producer groups on the determination of environmental policy. 17 Similarly to our 
17FYedriksson (1997) incorporates into his model a pollution abatement subsidy, showing that 
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analysis, the last two studies use a common agency model of lobbying. However. 
since they focus on local environmental problems in a small open economy, they 
leave aside the issues of pollution spillovers, terms of trade effects and the need for 
international cooperation, which are central to our analysis. 
As far as we know, the analysis contained in Chapters 2 and 3 of this the- 
sis, described in Section 1.1.1 above, is the only attempt to examine the role of 
green lobbies on the joint determMatton of trade and environmental policies in the 
context of large open economies. 
1.2.7 The Linkage between Trade and the Environment in 
Multilateral Negotiations 
Much of the literature on international policy cooperation has separately exam- 
ined cooperation over trade policies and over environmental policies. Riezman 
(1985), Krugman (1991), Bond and Syropoulos (1993), and Yi (1996), among 
others, have focused on the creation of customs unions (CUs), while Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993a, 1994), Barrett (1994b) and Chander andRilkens (1992), among 
others, have focused on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The 
broad theme emerging from this literature is that the presence of spillovers be- 
tween coalitions (positive in the case of environmental coalitions, negative in the 
case of trade coalitions) makes global cooperation difficult to sustain, and that 
partial cooperation, restricted to subsets of countries, is more likely to emerge. 
Coopeland and Taylor (1995) suggest that there are strategic reasons for linking 
trade and envtronmental pohcZes in multilateral North-South negotiations. The 
asymmetric structure and distributions of the gains and losses across high and 
low income countries associated with each of these policy dimensions can make 
global cooperation easier to sustain when pursued through linked negotiations. 
On one hand, global environmental externalities provide developing countries with 
strategic leverage over the use of trade restrictions by developed countries against 
their own exports. On the other hand, developed countries can use trade policy 
pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate. Aidt (1998) assumes that a 
production externality arises from the use of a factor input. His analysis generalizes Bhagwati's 
principle of targeting to distorted political markets: the most efficient instrument to internalize 
the externality is a tax on the polluting input factor, which aims directly at the source. 
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threats to achieve improved environmental management in developing countries 
(Abrego et al., 1997). 
In this context, it has been suggested that multilateral cooperation could be en- 
hanced by formally combining different issues with the aim of joint settlement. The 
implicit, informal presumption in the policy debate seems to be that tie-in could 
"help" cooperation, by forcing asymmetric countries to trade concessions across 
different issues and by offsetting free-riding incentives. For example, Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1994) point out that free-riding incentives could be offset by making 
the signing of agreements entailing positive excludable externalities restricted to 
signatory countries (e. g. trade or R&D agreements) conditional on environmental 
cooperation. This argument is often heard in the policy debate. " It should be 
stressed, however, that the prevalent position in policy circles seems to be that 
the WTO should just accommodate the aims of the parties to multilateral envi- 
ronmental agreements JEAs). This would require a new interpretation of WTO 
rules, or possibly even textual amendments to them, so as to legitimize the use 
of trade restrictions in accordance with IEAs such as the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer" or the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse 
gas emissions. 20 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis we describe a multi- dimensional agreement formation 
game. To our knowledge, this is the only attempt to study the implication of issue- 
linkage in the context muffilateml negotiations. " We describe a three-country 
model of international trade with transboundary pollution to formally examine 
the question of whether negotiation tie-in across trade and environmental policy 
"For example, the idea that trade cooperation should be made conditional on environmental 
cooperation is implicit in the proposal for an International Agreement on Trade and Environment 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1996). 
19The Montreal Protocol is a famous example of an multilateral environmental agreement 
which allows the use of trade sanctions as a way to deter environmental free-riding (see Barret, 
1997). 
IOThis latter approach is reflected in several speeches made at the WTO High Symposium on 
Trade and Environment held in Geneva from 15-16 March 1999, which are available on the WTO 
web site. For a discussion of issues related to the integration of IEAs within the GATT/WTO, 
see Esty (1994) and Brack (1997). 
21 The idea of issue-linkage was first stressed by Raiffa (1982) and Sebenius (1983) in the context 
of bilateral negotiations. 
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issues would help or hinder multilateral cooperation. We show that, while in some 
cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation 
more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint 
multilateral agreement unstable. 
1.3 The Debate on Regionalism versus Multilat- 
eralism 
The question of 'regionalism', defined broadly as preferential trade agreements 
among a subset of nations, poses two sets of questions: 
What are the welfare implications of the formation of PTAs for member and 
non-member countries as well as for world welfare? 
Will regionalism lead to non-discriminatory multilateral free trade for all 
I'll countries, through the continued expansion of PTAs or will it fragment the 
world economy? 
Most studies have focused on the question of the static impact effects of PTAs. 
This was first addressed by Viner (1950) who, distinguishing between trade diver- 
sion and trade creation, showed that customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas 
(FTAs) were not necessarily welfare improving, either for member countries or 
for world welfare. In contrast to the Vinerian approach, Kemp and Wan (1976) 
make the external tariff structure endogeneously determined for the CU such that 
it improves the CU member's welfare while maintaining the outsiders' welfare 
unchanged. This restores the pre-Vinerain intuition that CU should be welfare- 
improving. However, as underlined by Richardson (1995), the result obtained 
by Kemp and Wan (1976) hinges on the assumption that countries behave non- 
optimally. If non-member countries optimally respond to the common external 
tariff (CET), CU members might be worse off than in the pre-union scenario. 
The second question posed by regionalism has received much attention since 
Krugman (1991) suggested that the enlargement of CUs would lead to an increase 
in protection against countries outside each bloc, so that the world as a whole 
would be hurt by what appears to be a liberalizing step of promoting (preferential) 
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free trade. " To answer the so-called 'dynamic time-path question' it is necessary 
to examine whether forming a particular trade agreement is in the interest of 
the member states. Riezman (1985) was the first to model how states choose 
their agreement partners and analyze the structure of a stable CU. Using the 
Core as a solution concept but precluding the possibility of interstate tranfers", 
he concluded that global free trade might not be a stable outcome. The same 
conclusion is reached by Kennan and Riezman (1990), Kose and Riezman (1999)24 
15 and Burbidge et al. (1997). All these studies are based on the assumption that 
trade occurs under perfect competition. 
There has been little attempt to look at trade bloc formation in models of 
strategic trade policy. Sinclair and Vines (1994), have extended Brander and 
Spencer (1984)'s tariff model to consider the impact of the creation of CUs and 
free trade areas (FTAs) on the Nash equilibrium tariffs. However, they have not 
considered the welfare implication of trade bloc formation. In an infinitely repeated 
version of Brander and Spencer (1985)'s export subsidy game, Collie (1993) has 
shown that free trade can be sustained by the threat of retaliation with the Nash 
equilibrium export subsidies, provided that countries are similar and the discount 
factor is sufficiently high. A multi-country version of this model is employed by 
Collie (1997) to study the effects of trade bloc enlargement. Differently from 
our analysis, these studies treat the trade agreement structures as given, without 
22 In a monopolistically competitive framework in which provinces are divided into symmetric 
CUs, Krugman (1991) shows that a reduction in the number of CUs raises the Nash equilibrium 
tariff set by each bloc, and the world welfare is minimised when the world is divided into three 
symmetric blocs. 
23MOSt theoretical studies on trade bloc formation rule out international income transfers. A 
notable exception is represented by Kowalczyk (1994). 
24Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Kose and Riezman (1999) construct a pure exchange general 
equilibrium model with three countries and three goods, in which trade patterns are determined 
by comparative advantage considerations. Using simulation techniques to compare optimal tar- 
iffs and welfare gains in alternative agreement structures, they show that for certain endowment 
distributions CUs can pose a threat to the multilateral trading system, since, due to the im- 
provement in their terms of trade, member countries can obtain larger welfare gains than at the 
free trade. 
25 Burbidge et al. (1997) describe an explicit model in which states choose their coalition 
partners and show that, with more than two states, incomplete federation might be the unique 
equilibrium, even allowing for cooperation and transfers within CUs. 
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modelling how states choose their agreement partners. 
As discussed in Section 1.1.2, in Chapter 5 of this thesis we examine the endoge- 
nous formation of trade blocs under the assumption that markets are imperfectly 
competitive. We focus on the case of three ex-ante symmetric countries and as- 
sume that governments can use two trade policy instruments (import tariffs and 
export subsidies) to affect the interactions between firms. We find that preferen- 
tial agreements involving the coordinated use of both import tariffs and export 
subsidies pose a threat to the sustainability of multilateral trade cooperation. 
Our analysis presents some similarities with Yi (1996), who employs a multi- 
country extension of Brander and Spencer's (1984) tariff model to describe endoge- 
nous trade bloc formation under imperfect competition. He addresses the issue of 
the sustainability of global free trade under alternative rules of CU formation. 26 
However, Yi (1996) assumes that import tariffs are the only available instrument 
and can thus reach a more optimistic conclusion about the sustainability of mul- 
tilateral trade cooperation in the case of three ex-ante symmetric countries. 
The issue that international tariff negotiations might be affected by the ex- 
istence of alternative policy instruments has been raised in a number of studies. 
For example, Coopeland (1990) has analyzed the general case of bilateral tariff ne- 
gotiations when there exist non-negotiable domestic policy instruments. Gatsios 
and Karp (1992) look at the imperfect harmonization of trade and industrial poli- 
cies and note the possibility of welfare reducing preferential trade agreements when 
members coordinate only the use of tariffs. A similar result is obtained by Richard- 
son (1994), who shows that the uncoordinated use of domestic taxes/subsidies can 
render a 'pure' CU unattractive. More recently, Richardson (1999), focusing on 
the interaction between trade and competition policies, finds that the formation of 
a CU improves members' welfare only if it goes beyond mere trade coordination. 
However, none of these studies has examined the endogeneous formation of trade 
blocs and the issue of the sustainability of multilateral trade cooperation. 
26yi (1996) finds that CUs are stepping stones towards global free trade if membership of a 
trade agreement is open to all players, but they might be stumbling blocs towards free trade if 
the formation of a trade bloc requires the agreement of all potential members and the number of 
negotiating countries exceeds a critical value. In the case of three countries, he finds that global 
free trade is alivays sustainable. 
Part I 
The Political Economy of Trade 
and the Environment 
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Chapter 2 
Can Green Lobbies Replace 
Environmental Policy 
Cooperation? 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine how the presence of green lobbies can affect the deter- 
mination of trade and environmental policies when countries are linked through 
trade flows and transboundary pollution. 
'Ransboundary environmental problems involve pollution which is released in 
one country but causes damage in at least one other country. Some pollutants have 
a global geographical impact, like chlorofluorocarbons (CFC), halons and carbone 
dioxide (C02), which contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer and to climate 
change. Other pollutants have a regional impact, like sulphur dioxid, which is 
considered the main cause of acid rain. 
In the presence of pollution spillovers, it is widely recognized that uncoordi- 
nated environmental regulation at the national level is associated with market fail- 
ures and that efficiency requires environmental policy cooperation. In the absence 
of cooperation, there is a presumption that green lobbies might act as a partial 
remedy, by exerting political pressure in favor of higher domestic pollution taxes. 
In recent years, green lobbies have grown in size' and have become increasingly 
'For example, in 1998 in the United States the Environmental Defense Fund had 151 perma- 
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important actors in environmental politics 
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They exercise pressure on national 
governments as well as on supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization or the EU (Charter and Delýage, 1998). They are also 
active participants in all international trade and environmental negotiations. 2 
In this chapter, we argue that, when applied to large countries, the presump- 
tion that green lobbies increase the efficiency of unilateral environmental policies 
could be misleading. The main argument is that a unilateral increase in emission 
taxes, if unaccompanied by an increase in import tariffs, will shift the compara- 
tive advantage of producing 'dirty' goods in favor of trading partners, leading to 
an increase in their emissions. The indirect effect of domestic policies on foreign 
emissions is known in the literature as "pollution leakage" (Copeland and Taylor, 
2000). We show that, when emissions cross borders, the existence of pollution 
leakages reduces the incentives of environmental groups to lobby for higher domes- 
tic pollution taxes. If the pollution leakages and the emission spillovers are large 
enough, green lobbies could even support domestic tax reductions. 
The objective of our analysis is to examine the impact of green lobbies on 
the determination of unilateral and cooperative policies in two different scenarios: 
when governments can use both trade and environmental policies; and when they 
are restricted to the use of environmental policies by existing international trade 
rules. 
For this purpose, we employ a common agency model of politics of the kind 
introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994). The bulk of our analysis is focused 
on the case in which governments are influenced by national green lobbies, but 
we also consider the case of an international green lobby. Lobbies confront in- 
cumbent politicians with contribution schedules, namely functions relating their 
binding promise of political support to the selected policies. Governments are 
nent staff and an annual budget of $23 m, Greenpeace (US) had 250 and $12 m, and the Natural 
Resource Defense Counsel 165 and $18 m. 
2 For example, at the Kyoto Conference on greenhouse emissions in December 1997, several 
green NGOs were represented (Greenpeace alone sent a 18-strong delegation). They "had con- 
siderable influence on the negotiations 
(and) served as sounding-board to assess how proposals 
would be received at home" 
(FinancZal Times, December 11,1997). More recently, influential 
environmental groups such as Fhends of the Earth launched a fierce campaign against the new 
round of GATT/WTO negotiations in 
Seattle (The Economzst, December 11,1999). 
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semi-benevolent, in that they choose trade and environmental policies so as to 
maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and total political contributions. 
We focus our analysis on the case of two symmetric countries. This simplifi- 
cation allows us to abstract from the bargaining problems that would normally 
arise in the determination of the cooperative policies. It also enables us to com- 
pare the relative efficiency of unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes. The 
efficiency benchmark is represented by the adoption of Pigouvian taxes and free 
trade, i. e. the policies that would be selected by benevolent politicians acting in a 
cooperative manner. Since symmetric countries will always adopt identical import 
tariffs-which are equivalent to free trade- we are able to focus our analysis on 
the relative efficiency of the environmental policy outcomes, which we measure in 
terms of their distance from the optimal Pigouvian taxes. 
We show that, when governments can use trade barriers to counteract the leak- 
age effects of environmental policy, green interest groups would always lobby for 
higher pollution taxes. In this case, the comparative efficiency of unilateral and 
cooperative environmental taxes depends on the relative size of the green lobbies 
and the emission spillovers. However, if international trade rules restrain the possi- 
bility of trade intervention at the national level and the leakage effects of unilateral 
emission cuts are large enough, the impact of green lobbying on the environmental 
policy outcomes is ambiguous. In this case, the comparative efficiency of unilat- 
eral and cooperative environmental taxes depends on the relative size of the green 
lobbies, the terms-of-trade effects, and the emission spillovers. 
Does the presence of green lobbies weaken the need for environmental policy 
cooperation? Our analysis suggests that the answer to this question depends 
crucially on the size of the pollution leakages and emission spillovers and on the 
degree of existing trade cooperation. At the international level, our results imply 
that the existence of a strong World Týade Organization (WTO) might require the 
need for a World Environmental Organization (VV-EO). 
' At the regional level, our 
analysis hints at the need for environmental cooperation among the members of 
preferential trade agreements such as the European Union, the North American 
Free 'Rade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market (, \IERCOSUR) 
For a discussion of the arguments in favor of the creation of a WE0, see Newell and Whallev 
(2000). 
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or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The possibility of emission leakages has received attention in the policy debate' 
and in various empirical studies on transboundary pollution. How important is 
the problem of the environmental policy leakages? The empirical literature is di- 
vided on this issue. Some simulation-based studies find that unilateral actions to 
curb C02 emissions would have relatively small adverse effects on other countries' 
emissions. ' Other studies find that the emission leakages could be significant. 6 
The reasons behind these contradictory results lie partly in the different assump- 
tions about supply and demand elasticities, and partly in the general difficulties 
encountered in estimating actual emission spillovers. ' 
In spite of this debate, surprisingly, the theoretical literature on transboundary 
pollution' has largely ignored the problem of emission leakages. ' In early work in 
this area, Markusen (1975a, 1975b) considers a model of two trading countries 
linked by a bilateral production externality. He characterizes optimal unilateral 
and cooperative trade and environmental policies, but does not consider the fact 
that, by unilaterally taxing its domestic firms, a country can encourage foreign 
production and emissions. More recently, Coopeland and Taylor (1995) have ex- 
amined the interactions between pollution, income levels, and the patterns of trade 
in a general equilibrium setting. The bulk of their analysis is carried out under the 
assumption that countries are small, but they also consider the case of large coun- 
'For example, the attempt to mitigate the adverse effects of unilateral emission abatement 
has been the main reason for the proposal of tax exemptions on energy intensive industries by 
the European Commission (CEC, 1992). 
5This is the conclusion reached, for example, by Olivera-Martins et al. (1992) and by a study 
of the Clinton Administration (1998) on the effects of the Kyoto Protocol. For a discussion, see 
Barret (1998). 
6For example, Bernstein et al (1998) find that, for every 100 tons of carbon abated by the 
Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions in the other countries could rise by 5-10 
tons. Significant leakage effects are also predicted by Nordhaus and Boyer (1998) and Manne 
and Richels (1998). An earlier study by IPCC (1996) finds that pollution leakages could be more 
substantial. 
7 See Missfeldt (1999) on this point. 
'See Missfeldt (1999) for an extensive review of the game- t heoret ical literature on transbound- 
ary pollution. 
9Exceptions are Merrifield (1988), Anderson (1992), and Copeland and Taylor (2000). 
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tries. However, since they ignore geographical considerations' 0, they disregard the 
existence of pollution leakages. 
In our analysis, trade and environment are fully linked: trade can generate 
adverse environmental effects, but at the same time provides a mechanism for 
mitigating them. In the vast literature on transboundary pollution, there is little 
work examining the extent to which trade regimes affect the link between opti- 
mal trade and environmental policies. The importance of the interaction between 
trade regimes and stringency of environmental regulation has been recognized in 
a number of studies. For example, Raucher (1994) shows that, if traditional trade 
policy instruments are not available, "ecological dumping" may arise: a country 
may have incentives to use too-lax environmental legislation as an instrument to 
shift the terms of trade in its favor. Fredriksson (1999) studies how environmental 
and industry lobbies can influence the determination of pollution taxes in sectors 
protected by tariffs. Taking the level of protectionism as given, " he finds that the 
level of political conflict on environmental policy falls with trade liberalization. 
Schleigh (1999) examines the joint determination of trade and environmental poli- 
cies, assuming that the government has a single or a variety of domestic and trade 
policy instruments to address production or consumption externalities and to ob- 
tain political contributions from producer lobby groups. He shows that, in the 
presence of both trade and environmental distortions, inefficient trade policies can 
lead to higher environmental quality than more efficient domestic policies. Differ- 
ently from our analysis, all these studies focus on a small economy and on local 
environmental problems and thus do not address the problem of pollution leakages. 
Our analysis also contributes to an increasingly large political economy liter- 
ature which examines the influence of interest groups on policy-making. To our 
knowledge, ours is the only study looking at the role of green lobbies on the jotnt 
determination of trade and environmental policies in the context of large open 
economies. Most studies consider only one of the policy instruments. For exam- 
ple, Hillman and Ursprung (1992,1994) investigate how environmental concerns 
1OCoopeland and Taylor (1995) assume that the environment is a pure good and that pollution 
is global, i. e. all countries are equally exposed to a given unit of emissions, regardless of 
its source. 
1IRedrikkson (1999) compares an initial scenario which exogenously given tariffs with a free 
trade scenario. As noted by the author, this analysis only applies to small open economies with 
a negligible impact on multilateral trade 
talks. 
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might affect international trade poliCy, 12 while Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998) 
examine the effect of lobbying by green and producer groups on the determina- 
tion of environmental policy. " Similarly to our analysis, the last two studies use 
a common agency model of lobbying. However, since they focus on local envi- 
ronmental problems in a small open economy, they leave aside the issues of the 
emission spillovers, the leakage effects of environmental policy and the need for 
international cooperation, which are central to our analysis. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
model. Section 2.3 examines the relative efficiency of unilateral and cooperative 
environmental policies in the absence of preexisting international trade agreements. 
Section 2.4 considers the case in which governments are bound by international 
trade rules and can only select environmental policies. In Section 2.5 we derive the 
unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes in the case where national governments 
are influenced by an international green lobby. Finally, Section 2.6 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
2.2 The Model 
2.2.1 The Economy 
We begin by describing a simple model of international trade and transbound- 
ary pollution in which two countries, denominated home (no *) and foreign (*), 
produce and trade multiple goods. We will focus on the political and economic 
structure of the home country; the structure of the foreign country can be derived 
symmetrically. 
There are N+I sectors, i= 0) 1) N, where 0 denotes a numeraire good. 
All goods are produced with conventional constant returns to scale technology and 
12Another strand of the literature, which includes Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Grossman 
and Helpman (1994,1995) and Mytra (1999), among others, looks at how trade policy 
is affected 
by the presence of producer lobbies. 
13Redriksson (1997) incorporates into his model a pollution abatement subsidy, showing that 
pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate. 
Aidt (1998) assumes that a 
production externality arises 
from the use of a factor input. His analysis generalizes Bhagwati's 
principle of targeting to 
distorted political markets: the most efficient instrument to internalize 
the externality is a tax on the polluting input factor, which aims directly at the source. 
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sold in perfectly competitive markets. The numeraire good is traded freely across 
countries and is produced using labor alone. We choose units so that its world 
and domestic price are equal to one. We assume that aggregate labor supply, L, 
is large enough to be able to produce a positive amount of good 0. This implies 
that in a competitive equilibrium the wage rate equals unity. The output of each 
non-numeraire good is given by the following production function: 
Yj = F(Li, ki), (2.1) 
where Li indicates the amount of labor used in the ith sector and ki is a sector- 
specific capital, which is available in fixed supply. 
Domestic consumer and producer prices of a non-numeraire good are given by 
qj and pi, respectively. International prices are denoted by 7j. With a wage rate 
equal to unity, the aggregate rent accruing to the specific factor in sector i depends 
only on the producer price of the good, i. e. Ili (pi) - By Hotelling's 
Lemma, industry 
supply is given by Yj(pi) = OllilOpi, where OYilOpi > 0, and OYjlOpi < 0. 
For simplicity, we assume that the production of the numeraire good is 'clean', 
while production of a non-numeraire good i generates pollution emissions Ej 
OjYj, where Oi is an exogenously given emission coefficient. 
The economy is populated by H individuals, h= 07 1) *-7H, who 
have iden- 
tical preferences. Preferences are quasilinear and additively separable. Individual 
h's utility can be written as 
N 
Uh(COi ---i CNi 
Z) 
= CO +Z ui(ci) - 
i=I 
(2.2) 
where co and ci represent consumption of the numeraire and non-numeraire goods 
and u(ci) is assumed to be twice-differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. 
The term Z captures total environmental damage, which is a function of domestic 
and foreign emissions: 
14 
[(l 
- Oi)Ei(pi) + OiEi*(p*)], z(P, p*) 
(2.3) 
141n some cases, the concern about foreign emissions could derive 
from physical spillovers 
and be motivated by self-interest 
(e. g. ozone depletion, or carbon dioxide emissions); in other 
cases, it could derive 
from psychological spillovers and be motivated by aesthetic. altruistic or 
paternalistic reasons 
(e. g. foreign activities that endanger some species). 
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where p and p* are vectors of producer prices, and (I - Oj) and Oi are the relative 
weights associated with domestic and foreign emissions in sector i. respectively. 
This specification captures different types of externalities: global environmental 
problems, whereby all countries are equally exposed to a given unit of pollution 
(Oi = Oj* = 1/2); regional environmental problems (0 < Oi < 1/2; 0<0, * < 1/2); 15 
local environmental problems that generate no transboundary pollution (Oi = Oj* = 
0). 
The government sets trade and environmental policies, which are restricted to 
two policy instruments: specific import tariffs or subsidies (-r), and environmental 
taxes or subsidies (t). 16 
The demand function for good i can be expressed as a function of price alone, 
i. e. Di(qj). The indirect utility function corresponding to (2.2) can be obtained as 
follows: 
NhININ 
Vh (q, p, p*) Lh + EAilli(Pi)+ I: tiyi(pi)+-Yri[Di(qi)-Yi(pi)] HH 
i=l i=l 
N 
u 
(Di (qi)) qi Di (qi) -Z (p, p*). (2.4) 
The first three terms represent income, which consumer h receives from three 
sources. First, she supplies her endowment of labor to the competitive market, 
receiving the wage income Lh- Second, she owns a share Ah i of a specific capital 
in sector i. Third, she receives IIH of environmental and trade revenues, as a 
lump sum transfer. The next two terms represent consumer surplus and the last 
is environmental damage. 
IYade and environmental policies drive a wedge between consumer and pro- 
ducer prices and between domestic and international prices, respectively. Con- 
sumer prices are thus equal to qj = 7ri + -Fi, while producer prices are given by 
pi = 7ri + -ri - ti. Net imports of good i in the home country are Mi = Di (qj) - Yj (pi), 
and those in the foreign country are Mj* = Dj* (qi*) - Yj* (pi*). World product markets 
15 Some regional environmental problems, such as pollution of river systems, are unidirectional, 
i. e. emissions produced by "upstream" countries negatively effect "downstream" countries, with- 
out any significant reverse emission 
flows (see Silva, 1997). 
16Then tj >0 (ti < 0) represents an environmental tax (subsidy) on good z, and -ri >0 
(, ri 0) indicates an import tariff (subsidy). 
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clear when 
Mi (7ri 
1'Fi 2 
ti) + Mi* (7ri 
, 7i* ý 
ti*) - 0. ii (2.5) 
From (2.5) we can derive an expression for world equilibrium prices as a function 
of the policies in the two countries, i. e. 7i (ti 7 Tit*, T*). 
2.2.2 The Political Arena 
In order to isolate the impact of green lobbying on the determination of trade 
and environmental policy, we assume that only a fraction s' of the citizens, the 
ý environmentalists', are organized in an interest group. 17 
We shall also assume that green lobbies are functionally specialized, i. e. their 
members are ideologically motivated and are only concerned with environmental 
protection. 18 
In the bulk of our analysis, we will consider a scenario in which environmental- 
ists are organized in two national lobbies that act non-cooperatively. The case in 
which national lobbies coordinate their actions, acting as one international green 
lobby, is considered in Section 2.5. 
Lobbies influence government action by setting a contribution schedules Ci (ti, Ti) 
that link their political support to the selected policies. Contributions should be 
interpreted broadly as bribes, campaign funds, or support demonstrations, to re- 
flect different strategies used by green lobbies (Charter and Deleage, 1998). The 
contribution schedules will not be formal contracts, nor will they be explicitly 
announced. However, the government will know that an implicit link exists be- 
tween the way it treats the environmentalists and the contributions it can expect 
to receive from that group. 19 
17 In the next chapter, we extend the analysis to the case in which both green and producer 
lobbies influence the determination of trade and environmental policies. 
18 Aidt (1998) distinguishes between functionally specialized interest groups and interest groups 
with multiple goals. 
19The implicit assumption is that the lobby keeps its promise. It is hard to achieve this 
commitment in a one-shot game, but in a 
dynamic context reputation considerations could 
enforce it. 
The Model 30 
The gross (of contributions) welfare of the national green lobby is 
N 
WNE (t t* r*) B _, SE * *) + Oi Ei* (ti*, i* t 7, ) H 
(1 - Oi) Ei (ti,, Ti, 
ti, -ri 
i=l 
iii Til li 
1. 
(2.6) 
where B is a constant. The green lobby submits contribution schedules Ci (ti, Ti; ti*, Ti*) 
that maximize 
N 
WNE(t,, r, t*,, r*) = WNE ( t, -r, t* , -r*) - 
Ci(ti,, Ti; ti*, -ri* (2.7) 
The implicit objective of incumbent politicians is to be reelected. " This implies 
that they care about the utility level achieved by the median voter, particularly 
if voters are well informed about the effects of government policy and base their 
vote partly on their standard of living. Incumbent politicians also value political 
contributions for financing future campaigns and deterring competitors. Týade 
and environmental policies are thus chosen so as to maximize 
aW(t, -r, t*, -r*) Ci(ti7 Ti; ti I Ti)7 > 07 (2.8) 
where a is the government's weighting of social welfare compared to campaign con- 
tributions. 21 Domestic welfare is defined as aggregate domestic income, including 
tax and tariff revenues, plus total consumer surplus minus environmental damage: 
NNN 
L+Elý-(tj, 7, j, tj*, 7-j*)+ 
E tiyi (ti, Ti, ti, Ti) +E Ti. A Ii (ti, Ti, ti , 7i 
i=l i=l i=l 
NN 
+H u 
(Di (ti, Ti, ti*, Ti*)) qiDi (ti, Ti, ti*, Ti*)] - HZ(t,, r, t*, -r*) 
(2.9) 
In order to derive the equilibrium cooperative policies, we also need to 
define 
the objective function of a mediator or supra-national government. 
As discussed 
20See Grossman and Helpman (1996) for an explicit treatment of the electoral stage. 
2'As noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994), the welfare 
function of the government could 
be written as (ý = aiC + a2(11" - C), where a, represents the weight 
that the politicians attach 
to campaign contributions and a2 is the weight attached to net social welfare. 
Maximizing (ý is 
equivalent to maximizing G in 
(2.8) with a= a2/(al - a2)7 provided a, > a2. 
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by Grossman and Helpman (1995a), the outcomes of international negotiations 
must have the efficiency property that G could not be raised without lowering 
G*. This implies that the cooperative policies are chosen so as to maximize the 
weighted sum 
-fW 
=aG+aG* a*a[W(t, -r, t, T*)+W*(t*, 7, *, t, T)]+ 
NN 
a* Ci (ti, -ri, ti*, -ri*) +a Cj* (ti) Tj I ti ý Ti). 
(2.10) 
Thus the equilibrium policies are the same that would arise if a single decision 
maker had the preferences given on the right hand side of (2.10) and the organized 
green lobbies bid to influence this agent's decisions. 
Equation (2.10) stipulates that cooperative policies must be efficient for the two 
governments without specifying how the surplus will be divided between them. In 
general, the determination of cooperative trade and environmental policies will 
involve a conflict of interest between the two countries. To determine which utility 
pair (G, G*) will be selected on the straight line described by (2.10), a bargaining 
procedure must be introduced. " 
We model political competition as a two-stage common agency game. In the 
first stage, green lobbies unilaterally or cooperatively confront politicians with their 
contribution schedules, which are assumed to be continuous and differentiable, at 
least around the equilibrium. In the second stage, governments (unilaterally or 
cooperatively) set trade and environmental policies and receive the corresponding 
political contributions. The problem is solved by working backwards, from the last 
stage to the first. 
An equilibrium of a common agency game must be efficient for both the prin- 
cipals (green lobbies) and the agent (the incumbent national or supra-national 
government). The existence of such an equilibrium has been demonstrated by 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986). We leave out its derivation, which can be found 
in Grossman and Helpman (1994,1995a), Dixit (1996) and Fredriksson (1997). 
Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we focus on 'truthful' equilibria, 
where lobbies make contributions up to the point where the resulting change 
in 
220ne could adopt the Nash bargaining solution or, as in Grossman and Helpman (1995a), 
the Rubinstein's bargaining solution. In Sections 2.3-2.5, we will assume a-ývay the existence of 
bargaining problems by focusing on the case of two symmetric countries. 
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economic policies is exactly offset by the marginal cost of the contributions. " For 
the derivation of unilateral and cooperative equilibrium policies, see Appendix A. 
2.2.3 The Problem of Pollution Leakages 
The model described above is characterized by the existence of terms of trade 
and emission spillover effects. We now want to show that these effects combined 
generate the problem of pollution leakages: by increasing world prices, a unilat- 
eral increase in domestic pollution taxes will shift the terms of trade in favour of 
the non-implementing country, leading to an increase in its emissions, which the 
domestic residents dislike as well. 
Formally, an increase in ti" has the following impact on the international price 
yp 
at M/ + M*/ 
(2.11) 
where MI == Dq - Yp, with Yp = OY10p and Dq= OD10q. Notice that 0<6< 17 
i. e. higher domestic pollution taxes imply an increase in world prices and a shift 
in the terms of trade in favour of the foreign country. In this case, an increase in 
domestic environmental taxes has an ambiguous effect on domestic pollution: 
oz 
*Y*6. 
-- 
-(I - O)OYP(6 - 1) + 00 p at 
(2.12) 
The first term in (2.12) captures the environmental benefits associated with the 
fall in domestic emissions; the second term represents the environmental costs due 
to the increase in transboundary foreign emissions, which are increasing in the 
size of the emission spillovers and the pollution leakages. Therefore a unilateral 
increase in pollution taxes, if unaccompanied by the use of import tariffs, can only 
reduce domestic pollution at the cost of increased foreign pollution and is thus 
potentially damaging to the environment. 
As it will emerge from the remainder of the chapter, the impact of green lob- 
bying on the environmental policy outcomes will be ambiguous in the presence 
23Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that only truthful contributions yield coalition-proof 
Nash equilibria. 
24Since consumer utility is quasilinear and additively separable, the N+1 sectors do not 
interact with each other, i. e. consumers do not substitute between goods from different sectors. 
We can then focus our analysis on a representative sector i of the economy. 
For notational 
simplification, in the remainder of the chapter we omit the sectoral subscript. 
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r ot pollution leakages. Since pollution leakages can be eliminated either through 
the use of import tariffs or through environmental policy coordination, the role of 
green lobbying will depend crucially on whether or not governments are bound by 
free trade rules, and on whether they act in a unilateral or cooperative manner. 
2.3 M-ade and Environmental Outcomes 
In the following two sections, we examine the policies that emerge when govern- 
ments act under the influence of national green lobbies. In this section, we consider 
the case where governments can set both trade and environmental policy, while 
in the next section, we will examine the case where, having already committed to 
free trade, they can only select environmental policies. 
We focus on the case of two symmetric countries. This simplification presents 
two main advantages: it makes it possible to abstract from the bargaining problems 
that would normally arise in the determination of the cooperative policies; and it 
allows us to compare the relative efficiency of alternative policy outcomes. 
The efficiency benchmark is represented by the policies that would be chosen 
cooperatively by benevolent politicians. Under the assumption of symmetry, these 
are given by 
T-7*=0, (2.13) 
tp = t* = OH. p 
(2.14) 
Thus the social optimum requires free trade and the adoption of the efficient Pigou- 
vian taxes tp. It is important to notice that, when the two countries are symmetric, 
they will always select identical import tariffs. Consequently, in equilibrium there 
will be no trade, independently of the policies adopted. 
Domestic prices, world 
prices and industry outputs will be the same as in 
free trade and there will be 
no allocative distortions other than those associated with uninternalized external- 
ities. This allows us to focus on the comparative efficiency of the environmental 
policy outcomes, which we characterize 
in terms of their distance from the optimal 
Pigouvian taxes. 25 
25jf the policies lie on the same side of the optimum, the 
distance from the Pigouvian taxes 
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2.3.1 Trade and Environmental Wars 
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Let us first consider the case where governments set their policies independently. 
Substituting the partial derivatives obtained from (5.2) and (2.6) into the first- 
order conditions for non-cooperative political equilibria, we can derive the following 
expressions for unilateral policies: 
SE)oy 
TNC -T 
OH(a +p (2.15) Nu 
a(Yp - 
Dq) 
and 
ßH(a + SE) (1 _ 0) tNC 
-::::::: 
tNU 
-1 (2.16) 
Notice that, as green lobbies become larger and more influential (as SE increases 
and a decreases), both equilibrium tariffs and pollution taxes increase. The fol- 
lowing result follows immediately from (2.16): 
Lemma 2.1 In the case of two symmetric countries that are not bound by a free 
trade agreement, uncoordinated environmental taxes are socially optimal if and only 
if s' - aO/(l - 0). In this case, the domestic political distortion (green lobbyzng) 
exactly offsets the international environmental distortion (emission spillovers). 
PROOF: Given sE= a0/(I - 0), unilateral environmental taxes coincide with the 
Pigouvian taxes, i. e. tNC= tp = OH. Q. E. D. 
2.3.2 Trade and Environmental Talks 
International trade and environmental negotiations lead to the adoption of the 
following cooperative policies: 
7-c = -F* = 
and 
tc =: t* . 
OH(a + SE) 
ca 
The following result immediately follows from the analysis of (2.18): 
(2.17) 
(2-18) 
can be unambiguously interpreted as a welfare measure. 
This is also the case for policies that 
lie on different sides of the optimum, 
if the welfare function is symmetric with respect to the 
environmental tax. 
Yýade and Environmental Outcomes 35 
Lemma 2.2 In the case of two syTnrnetric countnes that are not bound by a free 
trade agreement, internationally coordinated pollution taxes are always higher than 
optimal. 
PROOF: From (2-18), it is straightforward to verify that cooperative taxes can 
only coincide with the Pigouvian taxes if sE= 0) i. e. if no citizen is a member of 
the green lobby. For sE> 0) tc > tp. Q. E. D. 
Combining Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, it is evident that efficient Pigouvian taxes can 
only be achieved in an uncoordinated framework. However, the question we really 
want to address is one of second-best nature: would the environmental policies 
set by individual governments be more or less efficient than those set by a supra- 
national authority? The comparison between (2.16) and (2.18) allows us to state 
our first proposition: 
Proposition 2.1 If governments are not bound by international trade rules, envi- 
ronmental policy coordination is efficiency enhanctng if and only if sE< aO/(2-0), - 
PROOF: When both trade and environmental policies are available, we can dis- 
tinguish two cases: 
1. If sE> laoo ::: 
ý tC > tNC > tP'7 
2. If sE< qO 1-0 =#ý tC ý> tP > 
tNC> 0. There are two subcases: 
(a) (tP - tNC) (tC - )SE aO . tP 2-01 
(b) (tP - tNC) - (tC tP) aO SE 2-0 
Thus cooperative taxes are closer to the optimal Pigouvian solution than unilateral 
taxes if and only if sE< 
aO < qO Q. E. D. 
2-0 1-0 
The intuition behind Proposition 2.1, is the following: at the 
decentralized 
level, the bias towards higher pollution taxes caused by the political distortion 
(green lobbying) counteracts the bias towards lower pollution taxes caused by the 
environmental distortion 
(environmental spillovers); at the level of international 
negotiations, however, green 
lobbying distorts upwards policies that would other- 
wise be optimal. Therefore the comparative efficiency of unilateral and cooperative 
outcomes depends on the relative size of 
the two types of distortions. 
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2.4 Environmental- only Outcomes 
Next, we examine the comparative efficiency of non-cooperative and cooperative 
environmental policy outcomes, assuming the two governments have already com- 
mitted to trade policy coordination. This scenario could apply to members of 
a regional trade agreement like the European Union and the North American 
Free Týade Agreement (NAFTA) or to countries that are effectively bound by 
GATT/WTO rules. " 
2.4.1 Environmental Wars 
Equilibrium environmental policies emerging from decentralized decision-making 
are given by 
t* tNC 
NC 
OH(a + s)(6 +0- 1) (2.19) 
a(6 - 1) 
Comparing equation (2.14) and (2.19), we obtain the following result: 
Lemma 2.3 When two syrnrnetric governTnents are bound by a free trade agree- 
ment, uncoordinated environmental policies are socially optimal if and only if na- 
honal green lobbies have SiZe SE = aO/(l -6- 0). 
PROOF: The distance between the Pigouvian taxes and the equilibrium non- 
cooperative taxes is given by 
OH [aO +s E(6 +0- 1)] 
iNC 
- tP = a(b - 1) 
(2.20) 
Setting expression (2.20) equal to zero and solving for sE, we find that unilateral 
policies are equal to the first-best if 
aO (2.21) 
Pollution taxes will be higher (lower) than optimal if SE is larger (smaller) than 
this critical size. Q. E. D. 
26jt could be argued that the application to members of regional trade agreements is more ap- 
propriate in the case of regional environmental problems 
(i. e. 0<0< 1/2), while the application 
to GATT/WTO members is more suitable in the case of global pollution (i. e. 0= 1/2). 
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The most striking result emerging from the analysis of (2.19) is described by 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.2 When two symmetric governments are bound by a free trade 
agreement, national green lobbying can create a bias towards lower domestic pol- 
lution taxes. 
PROOF: An increase in the size of the green lobby has the following impact of the 
equilibrium unilateral pollution taxes: 
OtNC 3H(6 +0- 
OSE 
a(6 - 1) 
(2.22) 
which is negative if 6+0>1. This implies that, if the leakage effects of environ- 
mental policy and the emission spillovers are large enough, green lobbying could 
bias pollution taxes downwards. To understand this result, consider the effect 
of a unilateral increase in the home country's emission tax on the welfare of the 
national green lobby: 
OWNE 
E 
-- _8 H, 3Yp(6 +0- 1). at (2.23) 
If 6+0>1, (2.23) is negative, implying that the green lobby will favor lower 
domestic pollution taxes. Q. E. D. 
Notice that, if 6+0>1, the non-cooperative environmental taxes will actually be 
negative. This implies that, if the leakages effects of environmental policy and the 
emission spillovers are large enough, governments could end up subsidizing their 
domestic producers. 
Proposition 2.2 is in contrast with the results obtained by Fredriksson (1997) 
and Aidt (1998) who, focusing on a small open economy and on local pollution 
problems, find that green lobbying unambiguously leads governments to adopt 
higher pollution taxes. Our analysis shows that, when countries are large and pol- 
lution is transboundary, the support of green lobbies for higher domestic pollution 
taxes can be weaker, due to the existence of pollution leakages. The larger are the 
leakage effects of environmental policy and the emissions spillovers, the weaker the 
green lobbies' support for stricter domestic policies will be. In the extreme case 
described by Proposition 2.2, green lobbies could even favor unilateral reductions 
in pollution taxes. 
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2.4.2 Environmental Talks 
The first-order conditions for cooperative environmental equilibrium policies yield 
38 
the same equilibrium policies as in equation (2.18): 
tc = t* c 
OH(a +s E) (2.24) 
a 
Therefore Lemma 2.2 also applies to the case in which governments have previously 
committed to trade policy coordination. 
Notably absent from (2.24) are is the coefficient 6. This is because, when the 
decision-making process is centralized, the terms-of-trade effects of environmental 
policies-and thus the pollution leakages-are internalized. This explains why 
in this scenario green lobbying always creates a bias towards higher cooperative 
pollution taxes ("ýc > 0). OSE 
The comparison between (2.19) and (2.24) allows us to state the following result: 
Proposition 2.3 When two symmetric governments are bound by internahonal 
trade rules, environmental policy coordination is efficiency enhancing if and only 
if s' < aO/(2 -0- 26). 
PROOF: When governments are bound by free trade rules, we can distinguish 
three cases: 
If 6+0<1 and sE> 
aO tC > tNC > tP; 
(1-0-6) 
2. lfb+O< lands E< qO -::: * tC > tP > tNC> 0. There are two sub-cases: 1-0-6 
(a) (tP - tNC) `ý (tC - tP) '0 S' > 2-0-26 
(b) (tP 
- tNC) > 
(tC 
- tP) 
E aO S< 2-0-261 
3. If 6+0>1::: ý tC > tP >0> tNc and 
(tP 
- tNC) > 
(tC 
- tP). 
Thus cooperative taxes are closer to the optimal Pigouvian solution than non- 
cooperative taxes if and only if sE< aO < aO Q. E. D. 2-0-26 1-0-6* 
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2.5 The Case of an International Green Lobby 
In the previous two sections, we have examined how national green lobbies in- 
fluence the determination of unilateral and cooperative trade and environmental 
policies. Focusing on the case of two symmetric countries we have shown that, 
when governments are allowed to use both policy instruments, green lobbying al- 
ways creates a bias towards higher pollution taxes. However, in a situation where 
governments are bound by free trade rules, unilateral efforts to reduce pollution by 
taxing domestic producers lead to an increase in foreign emissions, which the do- 
mestic residents dislike as well; if the pollution leakages and the emission spillover 
are large enough, green lobbying might actually create a bias towards the adoption 
of lower domestic pollution taxes. 
In this section, we examine the policy outcomes that emerge when national 
green lobbies coordinate their actions, forming an international green lobby 27 which 
offers political contributions to both governments. 28 The utility of the international 
green lobby is simply the sum of the utilities of the two national green lobbies: 
E H(I + Oi) + SE*H*Oi*] Ei(tiril ti*ý Ti*) 
i=l 
+ SE *H*(l + Oi) HO] Ei* (ti , ri ý ti , 7-i), 
(2.25) 
i=: l 
and BW -B+ B*. Notice that in the case of global pollution (Oi = Oj* = 1/2), 
the international green lobby cares equally about emissions in the two countries. 29 
It is easy to verify that the same result is also achieved when pollution is less 
transboundary, as long as each country is equally exposed (Oi 0, *) and the number 
of environmentalists in the two countries is the same (SE H SE*H*). 
The international green lobby influences the determination of domestic and for- 
eign policies, by offering political contributions to both governments. Its objective 
27 The analysis of this section could apply to an environmental interest group like Greenpeace, 
which is formed by 41 internationally coordinated national lobbies 
(see www. greenpeace. org). 
28We rule out corner solutions, situations in which political contributions are concentrated are 
offered to one of the two governments only. 
29 In Hillman and Ursprung (1992,1994)'s terminology, this would be the case of 'supergreens. 
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function is given by 
N 
WIE - WIE (t r , 
t* r*) _Z Ci (ti, -rj; t* 17 
*) 
- 
40 
ci* (ti 
I Ti; 
ti 
- Ti). (2.26) 
Table 2.1 reports the equilibrium unilateral and cooperative environmental poli- 
cies for the two trade policy regimes, under the assumption of country symmetry. 30 
Table 2.1: Equilibrium Policies in the Case of an International Green Lobby 
Policy Regime Policy-making Process 
Decentralized Centralized 
'Iýrade and 'FNC aM' TC ::::::::: 
0 
Environment 
8H 
[a(1-0)+sE(1+20)1 
OH 
[a+sE(1+20)] 
. tNC _ tc - a a 
OH 
[a(6+0-j)+SE(1+20)(26-1)] 
8H 
[a+SE(1+20)] 
Environment _ iNC a(6-1) 
tC - 
a 
The more interesting result emerging from the analysis of Table 2.1 is that the 
count erintuitive result of Proposition 2.2 still holds when national green lobbies 
act cooperatively: 
Proposition 2.4 glen two symmetric governments are bound by a free trade 
agreement, international green lobbying can create a bias towards lower domestic 
pollution taxes. 
30These are derived using the equilibrium conditions given in Appendix A, for the case in 
which 
IlE = 1, INE = -LrýrE := 
0- 
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PROOF: in the scenario in which the two governments are under a free trade 
regime and select pollution taxes unilaterally, the influence of the international 
green lobby on the environmental policy outcomes is captured by 
OtNC 
OSE 
OH(26 - 1)(1 + 20) (2.27) 
a(6 - 1) 
It is straightforward to verify that expression (2.27) is negative if 6> 1/2. Hence, 
an increase in the influence of environmental groups-even when they act as an 
international green lobby-does not guarantee that environmental policy will be 
stricter. Q. E. D. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2.4 is that a unilateral increase in domestic 
pollution taxes, if unaccompanied by an increase in import tariffs, will shift the 
terms of trade in favor of the foreign country and lead to an increase in foreign 
emissions. Therefore, while the problem of the pollution leakages can be eliminated 
through international coordination between national governments, it cannot be 
eliminated through international coordination between national green lobbies. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have proposed an analytical framework to investigate how the 
presence of green lobbies can influence the comparative efficiency of unilateral and 
cooperative environmental policies. We have focused on the case of two large sym- 
metric countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. 
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows: 
The impact of green lobbies on the comparative efficiency of unilateral and 
cooperative environmental policies depends on the type of trade regime and 
on the size of the pollution leakages and the emission spillovers, 
4o If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, and the pol- 
lution leakages and the emission spillovers are large enough, green lobbying 
could actually bias unilateral pollution taxes downwards; 
In the absence of preexisting international trade agreements, the presence of 
green lobbies always biases pollution taxes upwards. 
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Does the presence of green lobbies weaken the need for environmental policy 
coordination? Our analysis suggests that the answer to this question depends cru- 
cially on the degree of trade policy cooperation. On the one hand, countries that 
have not committed to trade cooperation might find it more efficient to choose 
policies in a unilateral manner. On the other hand, countries that are already 
cooperating over trade policy could gain by coordinating their environmental poli- 
cies too, at least in those sectors of the economy where there are large pollution 
leakages. 
These results have important international and regional implications. At the 
international level, the existence of GATT/WTO rules which restrict governments' 
ability to use trade barriers would suggest the need for the creation of a VVEO- 
However, if GATT/WTO rules are not binding3l unilateral policy-making could 
lead to more efficient policy outcomes. At the regional level, our analysis hints at 
the need for environmental cooperation among the members of preferential trade 
agreements such as the E. U., NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. 32 
The analytical framework described in this chapter is highly simplified and the 
results obtained must be interpreted with great caution. More work is needed to 
examine how economic policy, including environmental policy, is determined by 
political and economic interests. 
First, the common agency approach leaves two crucial issues aside: it does 
not explain why only some groups of citizens overcome the free-rider problem 
of collective action described by Olson (1965) and become politically organized; 
and it does not model the underlying electoral process, failing to provide clear 
microfoundations for the government's objective function. Second, it would be 
relevant to consider the impact of lobbying by producer groups. Their pressure for 
lower pollution taxes could counteract the influence of environmental groups (when 
they lobby for higher pollution taxes) or reinforce it (when they lobby for lower 
pollution taxes) - 
In both cases, unilateral environmental policies would become 
31 GATT obligations are eroded by the fact that countries are able to invoke many exceptions 
to them. Examples are exceptions for health, welfare, and national security reasons (Articles 
XX and XXI), the General Waivers (Article XXV), or antidumping and countervailing 
duties 
(Articles VI) - 
32TO some extent, environmental policy cooperation already happens within the 
E. U. and 
NAFTA (see Carraro e Siniscalco, 1993, and Bulmer-Thomas et al., 1994). 
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less efficient compared to internationally coordinated policies. Finally, a model 
with symmetric countries does not capture the North-South divide which often 
characterizes international environmental relations. By relaxing the symmetry 
assumption, one could extend our analysis to consider the interaction between 
countries with different economic and political structures. 
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Appendix A 
We introduce the following variables: 
* INE (4E): indicator variable which is equal to one if the home (foreign) 
government is influenced by a national green lobby, and zero otherwise. 
'0 IIE: indicator variable which is equal to one if the governments are influenced 
by an international green lobby, and zero otherwise. 
In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we examine the policies that emerge when governments 
are influenced by national green lobbies which act non- cooperatively (i. e. INE = 
4E = 1) 11E = 0) - In Section 2.5, we derive the policy outcomes in the alternative 
case in which the two national lobbies coordinate their political efforts (i. e. INE 
'ýE = 01 IIE = 1)- 
We use the following expression to denote the effect of an increase in domestic 
import tariffs on international prices: 
07r 
-- 
m/ 
-= -0. (2.28) 07 MI + m*I 
Notice that 0 always lies between 0 and 1. 
Market clearing implies the following equilibrium conditions: 
am 
- -am* 6- YP(6 - 1) = (Y' - D*)6 
(2.29) 
at at 
Dq 
pq 
am 
()M (2.30) 
p 
(Dq - yp)(1 - 0) = -O(yp - D*) a-r - 07- q 
UnZIateral Policies 
When governments act non-cooperatively, policies are chosen so as to maximize 
(2.8). Under the assumption that lobbies offer truthful political contributions, the 
domestic (politically) optimal non-cooperative policies in a representative sector 
of the economy must satisfy: 
ow owNE OWIE 
-0, (2.31) a+ 
INE -+ ITIE- at at at 
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Ow OWNE aWIE 
19T 
+ INE--5 
T+ 
IIE 
aT 0) (2.32) 
while foreign unilateral policies must satisfy 
6t*Ow* + 
awNE* owlE 
7- -0 at* 
4E 
(9t* 
+ IIE 
at* 1 (2-33) 
aw 
+ 
owNE* aWIE 
07-* NE---5ýý 
+ IIE 
Or* 
0. (2.34) 
Substituting partial derivatives into (2-31) and (2.32 ), we obtain: 
aýY(6 - 1) + tYP(6 - 1) +y+ -F[Dq6 - 
yp(6 
- 1)] -D6 
-H 
[(I 
- O)OYP(6 - 1) + 0,3*Y*6] p 
-INE'SE H [(I - O)OYP(6 - 1) + 00*Y*6] p 
-11E+3y P(6 _ 
1) 
[SE 
H(I + 0) +s E*H*O* 
+/ß*y*b E*H*(l + 0*) + sEHO p (2.35) 
and 
aýY(I - 0) +7-(1-0)(Dq - Yp) +D-Y+ tYp(1 - 0) - D(I - 0) 
-H 
[(l 
- O)oYp(1 - 0) - 000*YP*] 
1 
-INES 
EH [(l 
- O)oYp(1 - 0) - Oo*Yp*O] 
OY -IIE p(1 
[SE 
H(I + 0) +s E*H*0* 
- 
*o E* E=0. (2.36) , 3*yp 
18 H*(1 + 0*) +s HO] ý 
Foreign environmental and trade policies must satisfy two symmetric conditions. 
The non-cooperative trade and environmental Policy outcomes reported in Section 
2.3 are obtained by solving equilibrium conditions (2.29)-(2.30) and (2-35)-(2-36) 
for the case of two symmetric countries. 
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Cooperatme Policies 
In the case of cooperation, environmental and trade policies are chosen so as to 
maximize equation (2.10). Under the assumption of truthfulness of the political 
contributions, this implies the following first-order conditions: 
OWNE awIE awNE* aw aw* 
a* 
[INE 
+ IIE- + a4E-+ aa* +]=: ol at at 
I 
at 
I 
at at 
(2.37) 
awNE owlE awNE* aw aw* a* [INE + IIE- + a4E- + aa* -+ -] = &T 19T 
I 
19T 
I 
(9T a-F (2-38) 
owNE* wIE OWNE 
+ IIE, 
90t* 
+ a*INE-+ aa* 
['W '9ý* 
Ot* Ot* Ot* 
(2.39) 
owNE* OWIE awNE Ow aw* 
a[4E- + -IIE- + a*INE--jýý + aa* +-= 07-* a-r* 
I 10-F* 
0-7-* 
1 
(2.40) 
Substituting partial derivatives into (2.37) and (2.38 ), we obtain: 
a ITSE H 
[(I 
- 0)ý3Yp(6 - 1) + Oý3*YP*6] 
IN:, 
(SE E* O*y*6 E* E HO H(I + 0) -s H*O* p 
(s H*(l + 0*) +s IIE [, 3yp (6 
+aý - 4ES 
E*H* [(I 
- 0*)O*Yp*6 + O*Oyp(6 - 1)] 
+aa* 
ýY(6 
- 1) + typ(6 - 1) +y+7 
[Dq6 
- yp(l 
6)] -D6 
-H 
[(l 
- O)Oyp(6 - 
1) + 013*yp*6] 
+Y*6 + t*YP*6 +, r*6(D* - Yp'*) - D*6 q 
-H* 
[(I 
- 0*)O*yp*6 + O*OYP(6 - 1)] ol 
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a*ý - 
INESE H 0), ßYp(1 - 0/3*Y*o] p 
[OY H(I + 0) IIE p(1 
(SE 
+, SE*H*0*) -, 3*YP*o s 
E* H*(l + 0*) +sE HO 
+aý - IýE'S 
E*H* [- (1 - 0*)0*YP*o + 0*OYP(l - 0)] 
ý 
+aa*ýY(I - 0) + -F(1-0)(Dq - 
Yp)+ D 
H[ (1 - 0), ßYp (1 - 0) - 0,3* Yp' p 
-Y*o -, T*0(D* - YP*) - t*Yp*O + D*o q 
-H* 
[- (1 - 0*)0*YP*o + 0*OYp(1 - 0)] 
ý 
Y+ tYp(1 - 0) - D(I - 0) 
0. 
Two symmetric conditions must hold for the foreign country. 
The cooperative trade and environmental policy outcomes reported in Section 2.3 
are obtained by combining equilibrium conditions (2.29)-(2.30) and (2.4l)-(2.42) 
for the case of two symmetric countries. 
Free Trade Regime 
In the case of a free trade regime, we set -r = -r* =0 and derive the unilateral 
(2.42) 
and cooperative environmental policy outcomes reported in Section 2.4 by solving 
(2.29), (2-30), (2.35) and (2.41) for the case of two symmetric countries. 
C hapt er 3 
Green and Producer Lobbies: 
Enemies or Allies? 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the analysis carried out in this chapter is to understand how the 
presence of green and producer lobbies can affect the political determination of 
trade and environmental policies. 
Recent events in the United States have illustrated the extent to which citizen 
groups condition trade and environmental policies, both at the national and mul- 
tilateral level. On the trade side, the creation of the North American Free 'Rade 
Agreement (NAFTA) initially encountered the resistance of business, labor and 
environmental groups (VanGrasstek, 1992). By pledging in an environmental side 
agreement', the White House was able to win the support of at least some environ- 
mental groups and obtain the fast track authority to negotiate the trade agreement 
without a line-by-line veto from Congress. 2 More recently, environmental groups 
have joined forces with protectionist industries and labor groups to launch a fierce 
campaign against further trade liberalization, which has caused the breakdown 
'The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), could be char- 
acterized as being primarily concerned with safeguarding the sovereign rights of each party to 
establish its environmental standards while working towards the compatibility of standards. 
20pposition on the part of business and environmental groups has also undermined the project 
of a Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which the United States, Canada and 34 American 
and Caribbean countries (all of them except Cuba) have agreed to establish by 2005. 
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of the new round of GATT/WTO negotiations in Seattle. ' Industry and green 
lobbies have been extremely influential also on the environmental side. On some 
issues, such as multilateral emissions cuts, they have held different positions. ' On 
others, such as the compliance of foreign legislation with American environmental 
standards, their objectives have often coincided. 5 
This chapter attempts to shed some light on the relationship between green 
and producer lobbies. In particular, we wish to address the following questions: 
when will their interests over trade and environmental polices be aligned and when 
will they diverge? What will be the unilateral and cooperative policies selected 
by politically minded governments? When will policy coordination be efficiency 
enhancing? 
Understanding the nature of the relationship between lobby groups is important 
for two reasons. On the positive side, it can help us to explain observed trade and 
environmental policies. On the normative side, it can provide some guidance on 
how to construct efficient policy mechanisms in the presence of political distortions. 
In Chapter 2, we have studied how green lobbying can influence the determina- 
tion of trade and environmental policies when countries are large and emissions are 
transboundary. Here we extend the analysis to a situation in which both producer 
and environmental interests are organized. 
To examine the relationship between interest groups and policy-makers, we 
adopt the common agency model pioneered by Bernheim and Winston (1986) and 
applied to trade policy by Grossman and Helpman (1994,1995a, b). A national or 
supra-national government is the agent who sets trade and environmental policies. 
Green and producer lobbies act as principals and confront the government with 
contribution schedules, namely functions describing their political contributions 
3 See The Economist, December 11,1999. 
4 While green lobbies have exercised "considerable influence on the negotiations" at the Kyoto 
Conference in favor of multilateral reductions in greenhouse emissions (FinancZal Times, Decem- 
ber 11,1997), a broad coalition of corporations, unions and economic lobby groups has organized 
4cone of the most intensive campaigns ever mounted on a single political issue, seeking to convince 
that American curbs on greenhouse gas are unfair and damaging to the economy" (Financial 
Times, September 10 1997). 
5For example, both lobbies have demanded compliance of foreign legislation with American 
environmental standards on incidental catching of 
dolphins set out in the Marine Mammal Pro- 
tection Act. 
Introduction 50 
contingent on the chosen economic policies. These can be interpreted, depending 
on the context, as legal campaign contributions, support demonstrations, or simply 
as bribes. The timing is that first lobbies simultaneously commit to contribution 
schedules, and then the government, having observed these schedules, sets trade 
and environmental policies. The implicit objective of incumbent politicians is 
to be re-elected. They trade off the political support that comes from heeding 
interest groups' demands against the alienation of voters that may result from the 
implementation of socially costly policies. 
A key feature of our model is that the countries considered are large, i. e. they 
are able to affect world prices. This implies that a unilateral increase in domestic 
pollution taxes or decrease in import tariffs generate pollutZon leakages, i. e. they 
shift the terms of trade away from the implementing country, leading to an increase 
in emissions by its trading partners. If emissions cross borders, the increase in 
foreign pollution will have a negative environmental impact from the point of view 
of the domestic residents. 
Focusing on the case of two symmetric countries, we examine the impact of 
green and producer lobbying on the unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes 
obtained in three alternative regimes: one where governments control both trade 
and environmental policies; one in which they are restrained to the use of environ- 
mental policy by an existing free trade agreement; and one in which trade policy 
is the only available instrument. 
We show that, in the presence of emission spillovers and pollution leakages, the 
relationship between green and producer interests over trade and environmental 
policy is ambiguous. If instead pollution is local and/or the pollution leakages are 
eliminated either through the combined use of trade and environmental policy in- 
struments or through international policy cooperation, green and producer 
lobbies 
will unambiguously be enemies or allies. 
The analysis presented in this chapter is part of a vast literature which 
looks 
at the relationship between interest groups and policy-makers. 
' Most studies have 
focused on the role of producer groups in the determination of trade pohcy. 
7 In 
this area, the poldical contr2butions approach of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 
'See Persson and Tabellini (2000), for an extensive review of this literature. 
7The literature on the political economy of trade policy is nicely reviewed by Rodrik 
(1995). 
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1995a, b) adopted in this paper has become something of a work-horse model (see 
Cadot et al (1997), Rama and Tabellini (1998) and Mitra (1999), among many 
8 others). A similar approach, originally developed by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman 
(1976), and first applied to trade policy by Hillman (1982), describes trade policy 
as being set by an incumbent government seeking to maximize its political support. 
A third approach, developed by Magee at al. (1989), and Hillman and Ursprung 
(1988), focuses on the electoral competttion among political parties. Here lobbies 
do not directly affect policy choices, but instead influence the probability of their 
favorite party being elected. Alternatively, Austen- Smith (1997) views the policy- 
making process as being characterized by uncertainty. In his framework, interest 
groups influence the provision of informational expertise. Most studies on the 
political economy of trade policy have disregarded the environmental impact of 
trade and the role of green lobbies. Two notable exceptions in this respect are 
Hillman and Ursprung (1992,1994), who introduce environmental lobby groups in 
a model of endogenous trade policy. 
A more recent body of literature, which includes ftedriksson (1997) and Aidt 
(1998), has studied the political economy of environmental policy. These studies 
adopt the political contribution approach to study the impact of green and pro- 
ducer interest on environmental policy, but differ from our analysis in a number 
of ways. First, they only study environmental policy, while we are interested in 
the joint determination of trade and environmental policies. Second, they focus 
on local environmental problems in a small open economy, while we look at trans- 
boundary environmental problems between large countries. Third, in their setup, 
the interests of green and producer lobbies over environmental policy are always 
divergent, while we show that in some cases they might actually coincide. This 
consideration has also efficiency implications: while they find that the competition 
between green and producer lobbies is the "driving force behind the political in- 
ternalization of externalities" (Aidt, 1998, p. 13), we show that a possible alliance 
between them can exacerbate the environmental distortion. 
'Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) have recently tested the empirical predictions of 
Gross- 
man and Helpman (1994)'s model about the pattern of protection and 
lobbying spending. Using 
cross-industry data on US nontariff 
barriers and US lobby spending, they find that US pattern 
of protection is indeed "influenced 
by lobbying spending and lobbying competition, and that, 
hence, protection is sold". 
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The issue of the link between the trade policy regime and stringency of environ- 
mental regulations has been recognized in number of papers. A study by Perroni 
and Wigle (1994) shows that, given the level of environmental regulations, trade 
policy has little impact on the quality of the environment. Husted and Logsdon 
(1997) find instead that the NAFTA agreement has lead Mexico to strengthen its 
environmental policies. 9 On the theoretical side, Fredriksson (1999) examines a 
scenario in which environmental and industry interest lobby groups influence the 
determination of pollution taxes in sectors protected by tariffs. The level of pro- 
tectionism is exogenously determined. 'o The main result of his analysis is that 
the level of political conflict on environmental policy falls with trade liberaliza- 
tion. Schleigh (1999) studies the joint determination of trade and environmental 
policies. The government is assumed to have a single or a variety of domestic and 
trade policy instruments to address production or consumption externalities and 
to obtain political contributions from producer lobby groups. He shows that, in 
the presence of both trade and environmental distortions, inefficient trade poli- 
cies can lead to higher environmental quality than more efficient domestic policies. 
Differently from our analysis, both Fredriksson (1999) and Schleigh (1999) focus 
on a small economy and on local environmental problems, thus leaving aside the 
leakage effects of trade and environmental policies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we de- 
scribe the economic and political features of the model. In Section 3.3, we derive 
unilateral and cooperative equilibrium policies in alternative regimes. Section 3.4 
analyzes the relationship between green and producer interests. Section 3.5 dis- 
cusses the relative efficiency of the policy outcomes. Finally, Section 3.6 presents 
some concluding remarks. 
9For example, regulatory plant inspections have increased from 1425 in 1990 to 13,993 in 
1995. 
'OF'redrikkson (1999) compares an initial scenario with exogenously given tariffs with a free 
trade scenario. As noted by the author, this analysis only applies to small open economies ýN, ith 
a negligible impact on multilateral trade talks. 
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3.2 The Model 
3.2.1 The Economy 
53 
We consider two large countries, denominated home (no *) and foreign (*) . Our 
analysis is mainly focused on the economic and political structure of the home 
country (the foreign country will have symmetric characteristics). 
The economy is described by a Ricardo-Viner model in which there are N+I 
goods i == 0,1,... , 
N. All goods are produced under constant returns to scale and 
sold in a competitive market. Production of the numeraire good 0 requires labor 
alone and does not generate pollution. Production of all other goods requires both 
the mobile factor, labor, and a sector specific capital, and generates emissions at 
the fixed level 13 per unit of output. 
The numeraire good is traded freely across countries, with a world and a do- 
mestic price equal to one. In a competitive equilibrium, this implies that wage 
rate is also equal to unity. " 
Let 7ri be the international price of a non-numeraire good and qj and pi be its 
domestic consumer and producer prices, respectively. The reward to the owners 
of a specific factor can be denoted as Hi (pi). By Hotelling's Lemma, the industry 
, 
/a 2< OY supply curve is then equal to Yj(pi) = 011i/Opi, where OYi1i9pi > 0, and ý Pi 
0. 
The economy is populated by H individuals, h =: 0,1,... , 
H, with identical 
preferences. Utility is quasilinear and additively separable: 
Uh(COý ... ý CN i 
Z) CO +Z Ui (Ci) - 
i=l 
where co and ci indicate consumption of the numeraire and non-numeraire goods. 
The functions u(ci) are differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. The last 
term captures the disutility caused by environmental damage: 
N 
Z(P, P*) oi)oiyi (pi) + oioi*yi* (pi: )] 
(3.2) 
1 'The economy's labor supply is assumed to be sufficiently 
large for the supply of the numeraire 
good to be positive. 
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where p and p* are vectors of producer prices and (I - Oj) and Oi are the relative 
weights associated with domestic and foreign emissions in sector i, respect ively. 
Equation (3-2) implies that, if the coefficient Oi is positive, citizens in the home 
country are negatively affected by the emissions generated in both the domestic 
and foreign production of good i. The larger is Oi, the larger is the impact of 
foreign pollution on the environmental damage suffered by the home citizens. 
Inverse demand for a non-numeraire good can be expressed as a function of its 
price alone, i. e. Di (qj). The indirect utility function corresponding to (3.1) can be 
written as: 
NNN 
+ Ahlli(pi) + tiy i (pi) Vh (q, p, p*) Lh iH+H 
ETj [Di (qi) - Yj (pi) 
NN 
qi Di (qi) -Z (p, p*). +Eu 
(Di(qi)) 
-y (3-3) 
The terms in the first row of (3.3) represent income, which consists of wage income 
(Lh), 
capital claims (with Ah indicating the share of capital owned by individual 
h) 12 and IIH of environmental and trade revenues, transferred as a lump sum. 
The first two terms in the second row capture consumer surplus and the last term 
indicates environmental damage. 
We consider two policy instruments: environmental taxes/subsidies t and im- 
port tariffs/subsidies -r. Thus the consumer prices of a non-numeraire good is 
given by qj =7ri + -ri and its producer price is pi= 7ri + Ti - 
ti. 
International product markets clear when 
Mi(7ril Tiý ti) + Mi (7riý Ti I 
ti) = ol vt (3.4) 
where A= Di (qj) - Yj (pi) and Mj* = Dj* (qj) *- Yj* (pi) * represent the net imports 
of the home and foreign countries. 
3.2.2 The Leakage Effects of Trade and Environmental Poli- 
cies 
In the setup described above, both countries are "large" in that they are able to 
affect world prices. In such a scenario, a unilateral increase in pollution taxes or a 
12We assume that individuals own at most one type of specific factor. 
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unilateral tariff cut will raise world prices and hence lead to an increase in foreign 
emissions. The indirect effects of domestic policies on foreign emissions via trade 
are referred to in the literature as pollution leakages (Copeland and Taylor, 2000). 
Formally, an increase in the domestic pollution tax on good i13 generates the 
following effect on its international price: 
07r yp 
-6 
at M/+M*/- 
(3-5) 
where MI = Dq - Yp, with Yp = OY10p and Dq= OD10q. Notice that 6 always 
lies between 0 and 1, implying an increase in the international price. Therefore, a 
unilateral increase in domestic pollution taxes shifts the comparative advantage of 
producing 'dirty' goods in favor of the foreign country and generates the following 
leakage effect: 
OE* 
:: - 13 * Yp* 6. at 
(3-6) 
Hence, if pollution taxes are raised unilaterally and unaccompanied by the use of 
import tariffs, they can only reduce domestic pollution at the cost of increased 
foreign pollution. It is important to stress that what is leaking through trade is 
not domestic pollution but domestic environmental policy. Thus, a leakage could 
also arise if environmental problems are strictly local. However, it is only in the 
case of transboundary environmental problems (Oi > 0) that the leakage negatively 
affects domestic residents. In this case, the environmental impact of an increase 
in the domestic pollution tax from the point of view of domestic residents is 
az 
O)OYP(6 - 1) + oo*Yý6; at 
(3.7) 
hence in the presence of trade flows higher domestic pollution taxes have two op- 
posite environmental effects: a diT-ect positive effect, due to a reduction in domestic 
emissions by (I - O)OYp(b - 1); and an indirect negative effect, 
due to an increase 
in foreign transboundary emissions by 00*YP*6. The relative importance of the 
negative environmental effect increases with the size of the pollution 
leakages and 
the degree to which foreign emissions cross over into the home country. Therefore. 
13 Given the quasilinearity of the utility function, there is no possibility of substitution among 
goods such that the amount of pollution resulting 
from a given level of production can be varied. 
This allows us to study the determination trade and environmental policies 
in a representative 
non-numeraire sector i of the economy. 
For ease of the exposition, in what follows we drop the 
sectoral subscript. 
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Proposition 1A unilateral increase in pollution taxes, if unaccompanied by an 
increase in import tariffs, can lead to environmental degradation. A sufficient 
condition for this to occur is that the indirect environmental costs associated with 
the increase M transboundary foreign emissions outweigh the direct environmental 
benefits due to the reduction in domestic emissions. 
Consider now the impact of a unilateral increase in domestic import tariffs on 
the international price: 
07r M/ 
--- : -: -0. O-r Mi + M*l (3.8) 
Since 0<0<1, higher domestic tariffs imply a fall in the international price and 
a shift of the terms of trade in favor of the implementing country. This generates 
the following leakage effects: 
OE* 
-, e*YP (3.9) 
The overall environmental impact of the domestic tariff increase is 
az 
p a-r = 
(1 - 0)OYP(l - 0) - 0,3*yp, 
Therefore, in the presence of trade flows higher domestic pollution taxes have two 
opposite environmental effects: a positive effect, due to a reduction in transbound- 
ary foreign emissions by -0,3*YP*0; and a negative effect, due to an increase in 
domestic emissions by (I - O)OYp(I - 0). The relative importance of the negative 
environmental effect decreases with the size of the pollution leakages and the de- 
gree to which foreign emissions cross over into the home country. The following 
result follows immediately from (3.10): 
Proposition 2A unilateral Mcrease in mport tariffs, if unaccompanied by an in- 
crease in pollution taxes, can lead to enmronmental degradation. A sufficient con- 
dihon for this to occur is that the enmronmental costs associated with the increase 
in domestic emissions outweigh the environmental benefits due to the reduction in 
transboundary foreign emissions. 
To summarize the results obtained in this Section, when emission taxes and 
import tariffs are selected unilaterally and are not combined, they can only reduce 
pollution in one country at the cost of increased pollution in the other country. 
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Propositions 1 and 2 will be key in understanding the relationship between 
green and producer lobbies. In Section 3.4, we will show that, in the presence of 
pollution leakages such relationship will be ambiguous; if, however, the leakages 
effects of domestic policies are eliminated either through the combined use of pol- 
lution taxes and import tariffs or through international policy coordination, the 
relationship between the two lobbies will be unambiguous. 
3.2.3 The Political Process 
Our model does not explain the process of lobby formation. We simply assume 
that only the following groups of citizens can overcome the free-riding problem 
described by Olson (1965) and get politically organized: a proportion SE of the 
population, the 'environmentalists', who form a national green lobby; and the 
owners of a subset S of all specific factors, who form producer lobbies in their 
respective sectors. In each sector iES, capital owners represent a proportion sp 
of the population. 
Political competition can be modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, 
green and producer lobbies simultaneously present incumbent policymakers with 
contribution schedules, namely functions mapping every combination or trade and 
environmental policy into a level of political contribution. We assume that a 
citizen cannot be a member of more than one interest group. We also exclude the 
possibility that lobbies cooperate with one another and that they can offer political 
contributions to politicians in the other country. Therefore, when we refer to an 
ýalliance' between green and producer lobbies, we will be alluding to the fact that 
they exercise political pressure in the same direction, without formally coordinating 
their actions. The equilibrium set of contribution schedules is one in which each 
lobby maximizes the aggregate utility of its members, given the schedules of the 
other lobby group. 
In the second stage, incumbent politicians select trade and environmental poli- 
cies, given the equilibrium contribution schedules, and collect the corresponding 
contributions from every lobby. They are concerned with aggregate well-being, 
but also with the support they get from interest groups. In equilibrium, the 
decision-makers balance optimally the marginal benefit of net aggregate contribu- 
tions against the marginal welfare cost of distortionary trade and environmental 
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In contrast to Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that interest groups 
are 'functionally specialized' (Aidt, 1998), in the sense that producer lobbies are 
only concerned about industry profits and the green lobby is only concerned about 
environmental damage. " The gross (of contributions) welfare of a producer lobby 
iES is thus given by: 
W- p (ti 
17i 5 
t* 'F*) 8p Hlli (ti 
2 Ti ý 
t* 
, 7-* 
Vi Ei S %ii-i i)ý 1 
while the utility of the national environmental lobby is 
E(tý 
77 t* 7, r*) -= B-sE 
HZ(t7 7,7 t*, lr*) , 
where B is a constant. 
National producer and green lobbies present their government with contribu- 
tion schedules Ci (t, -r; t *, -r*). Their objective functions are, respectively, 
Vz Ei Sý (3-13) 
and 
E(t3 
-rl t*I -r*) WE(tý _rl t*ý T*) Ci(tiý Ti; ti*l Ti*). w (3.14) 
i 
The implicit objective of incumbent politicians is to be reelected. " This implies 
that they care about the utility level achieved by the median voter, particularly 
if voters are well informed about the effects of government policy and base their 
vote partly on their standard of living. Incumbent politicians also value politi- 
cal contributions for financing future campaigns and deterring competitors. The 
government's objective is thus given by 
G(tl -r3 t*1, r*) -= aW(t, -r, t*, -r*)+ 
Z Ci (ti, Fi; ti* 'Fi*) ýaý: 01 (3.15) 
i 
where W is the welfare of citizens (or "social welfare") and a represents the weight 
that the government attaches to social welfare relative to lobbies' contributions. 
"The motivation for focusing on functionally specialized lobby groups is empirical: while it 
is possible to find examples of lobby groups with multiple goals, most interest groups are highly 
specialized (see Marshall, 1998). 
"See Grossman and Helpman (1996) for an explicit treatment of the electoral stage. 
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Social welfare is defined as aggregate income plus total consumer surplus minus 
total environmental damage: 
W(t, 7, t*, 7-*) L+i: 1-li (ti, Ti, ti, Ti) +i (ti, -ri, T*) 
Etiy 
i=I i=I 
N 
+H u 
(Di (ti, -ri, ti*, -ri*)) - 
(ti, Ti. ti , Ti 
qi Di (ti, Ti, ti*) Ti HZ(t, -r, t*, -r*). 
(3-16) 
In order to derive the equilibrium cooperative policies, we can rely on the notion 
that the outcomes of international negotiations must satisfy Pareto efficiency for 
the two policy-makers involved (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995a). This implies 
that cooperative policies must maximize the weighted sum 
Gw=-a*G+aG* a*a[W(t, -r, t*, -r*)+W*(t*, -r*, t, -r)]+ 
a* Ci (ti , -ri, 
ti* 
7 -Fi*) 
+a Ci* (ti 
7 7i 7 
ti 
I Ti). (3.17) 
Thus the cooperative equilibrium policies are the same that would be selected by 
a single decision (a "supra-national mediator") with preferences as given on the 
16 right hand side of (3.17). 
Common agency games of the types described typically admit a multiplicity of 
Nash equilibria. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), we focus on truthful 
equffibria, where lobbies make contributions up to the point where the resulting 
change in economic policies is exactly offset by the marginal cost of the contribu- 
tions. 17 
"Notice that (3.17) stipulates that cooperative policies must be efficient for the two govern- 
ments without specifying how the surplus will be divided between them. To determine which 
utility pair (G, G*) will be selected, a bargaining procedure should be introduced. One could 
adopt the Nash bargaining solution or, as in Grossman and Helpman (1995a), the Rubinstein's 
bargaining solution. 
"It can be shown that only truthful contributions support coalition-proof Nash equilibria, and 
vice-versa, all such equilibria are reflected by truthful contributions (see Bernheim and Whinston, 
1986). 
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In this section, we characterize the (politically) optimal unilateral and cooperative 
equilibrium policies in a sector iES of the economy. " We focus on the simple 
case in which the two countries have identical economic and political structures 
and consider three alternative policy regimes: one where governments have control 
over both trade and environmental policies; one in which they are restrained to 
the use of environmental policy by an existing free trade agreement; and one in 
which trade policy is the only instrument at their disposal. 
3.3.1 M-ade and Environmental Outcomes 
Let us first consider the case where governments set trade and environmental taxes 
independently. Using the equilibrium conditions given in Appendix B, we obtain: 
OHOYp (a + s') 
TNC - 7-NC 
a(Yp - 
Dq) 
and 
H[oYp(a +s E)(1 _ 0) _, SPy] tNC - tNC -a Yp 
In the case of centralized decision-making, governments select the following poli- 
cies: 
TC TC 01 
and 
tc = t* c 
H[OY (a +s E) -s pyl p 
aYp 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
3.3.2 Environmental- only Outcomes 
Next, consider the case in which the two governments have signed a free trade 
agreement, eliminating the tariffs on each other's imports. In this scenario, envi- 
ronmental policy is the only instrument available. Unilateral emissions are given 
"The equilibrium conditions for unilateral and cooperative trade and environmental policies 
are given in Appendix B. 
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by 
H[OYp(a + SE)(6 +0_ 1) _ SPy(6 - 1)] (3.22) tNC == tNC 
aYp(6 - 1) 
while international policy coordination yields 
tc = t* 
H[OYp(a + s') - s'Y] (3.23) c aYp 
3.3.3 M-ade-only Outcomes 
Finally, suppose trade policy is the only instrument available. Unilateral policy- 
making leads to the adoption of the following import tariffs: 
TNC - 7-NC 
H[OYp (a + s') (I - 20) - sPY] (3.24) 
a(Dq - yp) 
I 
while cooperative policy-making results in the adoption of identical import tariffs: 
Tc =* (3.25) C. 
3.4 Green and Producer Lobbies: Competition 
or Alliance? 
In this section, we examine the impact of lobbying by green and producer groups 
on the policy outcomes derived above. This then allows us to evaluate whether 
green and producer lobbies have similar or divergent interests over trade and en- 
vironmental policy. As a measure of a lobby's influence, we consider the effect of 
a change in its size on the policy outcomes, i. e. OTIOs E and OtlOs' for the green 
lobbies and O-rlOsp and Otlasp for producer lobbies. " 
Let us examine each of the policy scenarios considered in the previous section, 
starting from the case in which governments can use both policy instruments and 
act in a non-cooperative manner. We obtain the following result: 
'9 Notice that defining political pressure in terms of lobby's contributions for each single policy 
vector would be inappropriate, since it would not take into account the interdependence 
between 
trade and environmental policies. 
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Lemma 3.1 If two symmetric governments select trade and envtronmental poli- 
cies unilaterally, green and producer lobbies will have opposite interests over envj_ 
ronmental policy. 
PROOF: Green lobbying leads to an increase in the pollution tax by 
OtNC ßH(l - 0) 0 
(98E 
and to an increase in the import tariff by 
OTNC 
OSE , 
3HOY 
a(Yp - 
Dq) >0. 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
Producer lobbying leads to a fall in the pollution tax by 
OtNC HY 
0 
asp aYp 
and has no effect on equilibrium import tariffs: 
OTNC 
asp 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
Q. E. D. 
Moving to the case of centralized decision- making, we find: 
Lemma 3.2 If two symmetric governments select trade and environmental poli- 
cies cooperatively, green and producer lobbies will have opposite interests over en- 
vironmental policy. 
PROOF: The presence of the green lobby implies an increase in cooperative pol- 
lution taxes: 
Otc OH 
> 0. 
(98E a 
The impact of producer lobbying on the cooperative equilibrium policies is: 
atc HY 
< 0. asp aYp 
None of the lobbies has any impact on the trade policy outcomes: 
a-rc 07-C 
OSE (98P 
(3-30) 
(3-31) 
(3.32) 
Q. E. D. 
Consider now the situation in which governments have committed to free trade. 
In the case of decentralized decision-making, we obtain the following result: 
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Lemma 3.3 If tWO 8YMMetrZC _qoveT-nTnent8 8eleCt CMZS8Zon 
taxes non-cooperahvely, 
the interests green and producer lobbies will have opposite interests over envzron- 
mental poltcy if and only if 6+0<1. 
PROOF: Under a free trade regime, green lobbying has an ambiguous effect on 
the non-cooperative environmental outcomes: 
OtNC 
OSE 
a(6 - 1) 
(3-33) 
It is straightforward to verify that expression (3.33) is positive for 6+0<1- This 
condition implies green lobbies will support a unilateral increase in pollution taxes 
only if the environmental benefits associated with the decrease in domestic pollu- 
tion outweigh the environmental costs due to the increase in foreign transboundary 
pollution. The impact of producer lobbying on the unilateral environmental policy 
outcomes is 
OtNC HY 
asp a Yp 
(3-34) 
Q. E. D. 
If the decision-making process is centralized, the relationship between environmen- 
tal and producer groups is described by the following lemma: 
Lemma 3.4 If two symmetric governments select emission taxes cooperahvely, 
green and producer lobbies will always have opposite interests over environmental 
polzcy. 
PROOF: Green lobbying biases cooperative emission taxes upwards: 
atc 
= 
OH 
> 01 (3-35) 
19SE a 
while producer lobbying has the opposite effect: 
(9tc HY < 0. (3.36) 
asp aYp 
The competitive nature of the relationship between the two lobbies is due to the 
fact that a multilateral increase in emission taxes will unambiguously lead to a 
OH(6 +0 1) 
reduction in productive activities in both countries, which implies a reduction in 
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total environmental damage and a fall in industry profits in both countries. Q. E. D. 
Let us now consider the scenario in which trade policy is the only instrument 
available. When import tariffs are selected in an independent manner, we obtain: 
Lemma 3.5 If two syrnTnetric governTnents select Mport tariffs unilaterally, green 
and producer lobbies will have opposite Mterests if and only if 0< 1/2. 
PROOF: An increase in the size of the green lobby has the following impact on 
non-cooperative import tariffs: 
OTNC 
13HYp(l - 20) 
OSE a(Dq - yp) 
(3.37) 
which is negative for 0< 1/2. This implies that in the case of local or regional en- 
vironmental problems (0 < 1/2) green lobbying will bias import tariffs downwards, 
since in this case the environmental costs associated with the increase in domestic 
emissions will outweigh the environmental benefits due to the fall in foreign emis- 
sions; in the case of global environmental problems (0 = 1/2), green lobbying will 
have no effect on the trade policy outcomes, since the environmental gains associ- 
ated with the decrease in foreign pollution will exactly offset the costs associated 
with the increase in domestic emissions. The impact of producer lobbying is: 
197-NC 
19sp 
HY 
a (Yp - Dp) 
>0. (3.38) 
Q. E. D. 
Finally, Lemma 3.6 applies to the case of trade policy coordination: 
Lemma 3.6 If two syTnTnetric governTnents select Zmport tariffs cooperatively, green 
and producer lobbies have no Zmpact on the policy outcomes. 
PROOF: an increase in the side of the green or producer lobby has no effect on 
the cooperative equilibrium tariffs: 
OTC OTC 
(3-39) 
OSE Osp 
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This result is due to the fact that in equilibrium two symmetric countries will 
1 always adopt identical import tariffs and trade policy will thus have no impact on 
productive activities and emission levels. Q. E. D. 
The results presented in Lemmas 3.1-3.6 are summarized by Table 3.1 and by 
the following Proposition: 
Proposition 3.1 The nature of the relationship between green and producer lob- 
bies depends crucially on which policy instruments are available, whether govern- 
ment act Ma unilateral or cooperative manner, and the magnitude of the emission 
leakages and the assocZated transboundary spfflovers. 
Table 3.1 shows that the ambiguity of the relationship between green and 
producer groups arises only in the presence of pollution leakages and emission 
spillovers (cases 3 and 5). If instead pollution is local and/or pollution leakages 
are eliminated either through the combined use of trade and environmental policy 
(cases I and 2) or through international policy coordination (cases 2,4, and 6), 
the relationship between green and producer groups is always unambiguous. 
3.5 The Efficiency Question 
The model presented in this chapter is characterized by the existence of three types 
of distortions: an environmental distortion, caused by the presence of emission 
spillovers; a trade distortion, due to the fact that countries are able to affect the 
terms of trade; and a political distortion, arising from the lobbying activities of 
green and producer groups. The question we want to address in this section is the 
following: is it still possible to achieve efficient policy outcomes in this second-best 
world? 
The first-best solution-which is obtained when benevolent policymakers act 
coop eratively-requires that governments eliminate tariffs on each other's imports 
and adopt optimal Pigouvian emission taxes, which reflects the social marginal 
damage of emissions: 
7-T* =0ý (3.40) 
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Table 3.1: The Relationships between Green and Producer Lobbies 
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Policy Regimes Policy-making Process 
Decentralize, -] Centralized 
2 
'Iýrade and Competition over Competition over 
Environment environmental Policy environmental Policy 
3 4 
Environment only Competition over Competition over 
environmental policy if 6+0<I environmental Policy 
5 6 
Týrade only Competition over 
trade policy if 0< 1/2 
tp = t* = OH. p 
(3.41) 
Due to the symmetry assumption, the two countries always select identical tariffs. 
As noted above, this implies that in equilibrium there is no trade distortion. In 
this setup, it is thus possible to focus the analysis on the relative efficiency of 
alternative environmental policy outcomes, which we simply measure scenarios in 
terms of their distance from (3.41). We obtain to the following result: 
Proposition 3.2 In the case of symmetric countries, the first-best solution can 
only be achieved if and only: 
(i) pollutzon taxes are an available policy znstrument; 
(ii) green and producer lobbies have opposite interests over environmental policy; 
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and (iti) green lobbies have size 
; E. 
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PROOF: Table 3.2 reports the size of the green lobby for which the environmental 
policy outcomes given in Section 3.3 are equal to the optimal Pigouvian taxes. 
Notice that efficiency can only be achieved though the use of emtssZon taxes. In 
the policy regime in which import tariffs are the only available instrument, the 
environmental distortion cannot be corrected. The reason behind this result is 
that, due to the symmetry assumption, trade policy has no effect on relative prices 
and productive activities. 
Table 3.2 also reveals that the relative efficiency of the policy outcomes de- 
pends on the nature of the relationship between the two lobbies: if governments 
act unilaterally and are bound by a free trade agreement, ý is positive if and only 
if 0+6<1. This implies that efficiency can only be achieved if the green and 
producer lobbies are in competition. Q. E. D. 
Comparing the unilateral and cooperative policy-making processes, we obtain 
the following result: 
Lemma 3.7 The stze of the green lobby necessary to reach efficiency at the supra- 
national decision-making level Zs smaller than at the national level. 
PROOF: Consider first the regime where both trade and environmental policies 
are available. The difference between the critical size of green lobbies in the case 
of a unilateral decision-making and in the case of policy cooperation is: 
JOY + OaOY. 
yý (1 - 0) 
p 
/3 p 
(3.42) 
The corresponding expression for the regime in which environmental policy is the 
only available instrument is 
OVY + OaY. ) "PI > 0. Oyp (I -6 0) 
(3.43) 
Q. E. D. 
The intuition behind Lemma 3.7 is simple. Cooperative pollution taxes are 
efficient in the absence of lobbies; in the presence of green and producer lobbies, 
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Table 3.2: Efficiency and the Size of the Green Lobby 
Policy Regimes Policy-making Process 
Decentralized Centralized 
Trade and 
Environment 
;E spY+oHaOYp 
)3Yp(I-0) 
spy SE =0 Yp 
Environment only 
sPY(1-6)+, 3aOYp ;E 
OYP(1-6-0) SE =Y OHYp 
Trade only 
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they can be efficient if green lobbies are large enough to exactly offset the political 
pressure exercised by producer lobbies. For unilateral environmental policies to 
be efficient, however, green lobbies must be larger, so that their bias towards 
higher taxes counteracts the downward bias of both producer groups and national 
governments. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have employed a common agency model to examine the role of 
green and producer lobbies in the joint determination of trade and environmental 
policy. We have focused our analysis on the case Of two large symmetric countries, 
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which are linked through trade and transboundary pollution. 
We have characterized the policy outcomes and the relationship between lobbies 
in three alternative policy regimes: one where governments control both trade and 
environmental policies; one in which they are restrained to the use of environmental 
policy by an existing free trade agreement; and one in which trade policy is the 
only available instrument. 
We have shown that, in the presence of emission spillovers and pollution leak- 
ages, the relationship between green and producer interests over trade and envi- 
ronmental policy is ambiguous. If instead pollution is local and/or the pollution 
leakages are eliminated either through the combined use of trade and environ- 
mental policy instruments or through international policy cooperation, green and 
producer lobbies will unambiguously be enemies or allies. 
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Appendix B 
We introduce the following indicator variables: 
* IE (1ý): indicator variable which is equal to one if the home (foreign) gov- 
ernment is influenced by a national green lobby, and zero otherwise. 
Ip (1ý): indicator variable which is equal to one if there is an organized 
producer lobby in the home (foreign) country, and zero otherwise. 
Market clearing implies the following equilibrium conditions: 
am am * 
=: >- 
Dqb 
- 
yp(6 
- 1) = 
(Y' 
- D*)6 Ot Ot pq (3.44) 
(9m 
-am* =ý> (D -Y (I - -O(Y' - D*) (3.45) aT 19T q P) pq 
Unilateral Policies 
In the case of non-cooperation, trade and environmental policies are selected to 
maximize (3.15). Under the assumption that lobbies offer truthful political contri- 
butions, the first-order conditions for the derivation of the domestic (politically) 
optimal non-cooperative policies in a representative sector of the economy are: 
ow 
+ IE . 
aWE 
+ lp 
owp 
= 0) (3.46) at at at 
Ow 
+ IE - 
OWE 
+ IP 
awp 
= 07 (3.47) 
19T OT 
O-r 
while foreign unilateral policies must satisfy 
*OW 
* OWE* Owp* 
-0 (3.48) a-+ 4- + 4- at* at* at* 
a 
OW 
+ 1ý 
OWE* 
+ 1ý (gwp* = 0. (3.49) O-r* OT* 
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Substituting partial derivatives into (3.46) and (3.47), we obtain: 
aýY(6 - 1) + tYP(6 - 1) +y+, r 
[Dq6 
- yp(6 - 1)] - D6 
-H 
[(I 
- 0), 3YP(6 - 1) + 0,3*Y*6 p 
-IES 
EH [(l 
- O)OYP(6 - 1) + 00*Y*6] p 
+IpspHY(6 - 1) = 0, 
and 
(3.50) 
aýY(I - 0) + -F(l - 0)(Dq - yp) +D-Y+ tYp(1 - 0) - D(I - 0) 
-H 
[(l 
- 0)OYp(1 - 0) - 00,3*YP*] 
1 
SE *Y*o EH 
[(l 
- 0), 3Yp(1 - 0) - 00 p1 
+IpspHY(l - 0) = 0. (3-51) 
Foreign environmental and trade policies must satisfy two symmetric conditions. 
In Section 3.3.1, we derive the unilateral trade and environmental policies adopted 
by two symmetric countries by combining (3.44)-(3.45) with (3.50)-(3.51). 
Cooperatme Poltues 
In the case of cooperation, environmental and trade policies are chosen so as to 
maximize equation (3.17). Under the assumption of truthfulness of the political 
contributions, this implies the following first-order conditions: 
[IE OWE 
at 
IE 
OWE 
OT 
lp 
Owp 
+a [-[ý 
OWE* 
Ot 
I 
Ot 
awp* 
+ aa* 
Ow 
at 
II 
at 
(gwp* + aa* 
Ow 
O, T 
II 
Or 
aw* 
+ at 
I= ol 
(3.52) 
IP 
Owp 
+a 
ý4 OWE* 
OT 
I 
OT 
aWE* 
a 
[1ý 
owp* 
+4 
*I 
+ a* 
[IE aWE 
* at* at at 
IP 
owp 
+ aa* 
ow 
(9t* 
I 1(9t* 
ow* 
+= 0) 
(3.53) 
aw* 
at *1 
(3-54) 
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a 
[1ý owE* 
+ 1ý 
OWP* 
+a* IE 
19WE 
+ IP 
owp 
+ aa* 
aw 
+ (9w* (9-F* OT* 
II 
a7*- (9-r* 
11 
0-r* 
19T* 
(3-55) 
Substituting partial derivatives into (3-52) and (3.53), we obtain: 
a *ý _I ESE H O)OYP(6 - 1) + oo*Y*6] + lpspHY(6 - 1) p 
+aý - Iýs E*H* 
[(I 
- 0*)O*YP*6 + O*OYP(6 - 1)] + Iýsp*H*Y*6 
+aa* ýY(6 - 
1) + typ(6 - 1) +Y+T 
[Dq6 
- yp(l - 6)] - D6 
-H 
[(I 
- O)OYP(6 - 1) + oo*y*6 p1 
+Y*6 + t* YP*6 + T*6(D* - Y-*) - D*6 qp 
H* [(I - 0*)O*YP*6 + O*OYP(b - 1)] 
ý=o, 
and 
(3-56) 
a*ý_ JESE H 
[(l 
- O)oYp(1 - 0) - Oo*Yp*O] + IpspHY(I - 0) 
ý 
+aý _ IýSE*H* 
[- (1 - 0*), 3*YP*o + O*oYp(1 - 0)] - Iýsp*H*Y*Oý 
+aa*fY(I - 0) + -F(l - 0)(Dq - 
yp) +D-Y+ tYp(1 - 0) - D(I - 0) 
-H[(l - 0), ßYp(1 - 0) - 0, ß*YP*o] 
-Y*o - -F*0(D* - YP*) - t*YP*o + D*O 
-H* 
[- (1 - 0*)0*YP*o + 0*, 3Yp(1 - 0)] 
ý=0. (3-57) 
Two symmetric expressions hold for the foreign country. 
In Section 3.3.1, we derive the cooperative trade and environmental policies adopted 
by two symmetric countries by combining (3.44)-(3.45) with (3.56)-(3.57). 
In the case of a free trade regime (Section 3.3.2), we set T= -r* =0 and 
combine (3.44)-(3.45) with (3.50) and (3-56) to solve for the equilibrium unilateral 
and cooperative environmental taxes. 
Finally, in the case in which trade policy is the only instrument (Section 3.3.3), 
unilateral and cooperative equilibrium tariffs are obtained by setting t= t* =0 
and combining (3.44)-(3.45) with (3-51) and (3.57). 
Part 11 
Mult i- dimensional Agreement 
Formation 
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Chapter 4 
Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in 
Multilateral Negotiations 
4.1 Introduction 
International relations involve multiple dimensions of interaction. Even when these 
dimensions are not directly interdependent-in the sense that the effects of choices 
along one dimension are dependent on choices along the others-there can still be 
cross-issue negotiatton linkage: by exchanging concessions across different policy 
dimensions, two countries may be able to achieve cooperation in situations where 
there would otherwise be no scope for mutual gains to be attained. Although this 
idea is not new, ' its implications have so far only been examined in the context of 
bilateral negotiations, not multilateral negotiations. 
The literature on multilateral international agreements has primarily been con- 
cerned with whether single-issue multilateral agreements are immune from the 
possibility of deviations by a subset of countries. Consistently with the single- 
issue nature of the problem it studies, this literature has built upon theories of 
coalition formation whereby members of a coalition coordinate all of their actions 
with other members. ' Simply extending the concept of coalition structure to a 
multi- dimensional framework in order to characterize the viability of multilateral 
'The point was first stressed by Raiffa (1982) and Sebenius (1983). For a recent application 
to North-South trade and environmental policy cooperation, see Abrego et al. (1997). 
2For an extensive survey of this literature, see Bloch (1997). 
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cooperation arrangements can be misleading, because it does not account for the 
fact that countries can (and often do) form selective arrangements with different 
partners over different issues. 
Here we draw a distinction between the idea of issue linkage-which refers to the 
possibility of forming agreements over multiple issues-and that of issue tie-in- 
the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interactions, 
ruling out single-issue agreements. Multilateral cooperation across different issues 
(issue linkage) is an equilibrium phenomenon, whereas negotiation tie-in is an 
exogenous constraint on the set of possible cooperation arrangements. Whether 
such a tie-in restriction helps or hinders multilateral cooperation depends on the 
payoff structure of the underlying non-cooperative game. In some cases negotiation 
tie-in can facilitate multilateral cooperation by limiting the set of the feasible 
objections to joint cooperation arrangements. However, in other cases, rather than 
inducing parties to trade across issues, a tie-in restriction can actually constitute 
an obstacle to multilateral cooperation, as it removes certain counterobjections 
that could be put forward, out of equilibrium, in order to support issue trading in 
equilibrium. 
We build our argument by presenting a model of international policy coor- 
dination choices where countries can enter into selective and separate binding 
agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. International 
relations are described as a two-stage game, in which agreements are formed in 
the first stage and policies are selected in the second stageý---cooperatively among 
countries participating in an agreement and non-cooperatively between countries 
belonging to separate agreements. To accommodate for the possibility of individ- 
ual countries belonging to multiple agreements, we define an equilibrium concept 
built on a formal distinction between agreements, as arrangements that determine 
the payoff structure in the last stage of the game, and blocking coahtions, as sub- 
sets of players that can make objections to a proposed configuration of agreements 
in the first stage. Using this construct, we examine how the stability of the joint 
global agreement (the agreement structure where all players jointly cooperate over 
all strategic dimensions) is affected by the imposition of a tie-in rule, a constraint 
limiting the set of feasible objections to those featuring a simultaneous deviation 
across all issues for each player involved-which in turn amounts to only consid- 
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ering coalitions of players, rather than general agreement structures. 
We then focus on a more specific model where countries are linked by interna- 
tional trade and transboundary pollution. In this context, the presence of a tie-in 
rule would imply that trade cooperation is conditional on environmental cooper- 
ation and viceversa. This would be in line with the idea, often discussed in the 
policy debate on trade and environment, that the WTO should act as an inter- 
national policing organism, forcing countries to cooperate over issues that do not 
strictly pertain to trade policy narrowly defined. ' It should be stressed, however, 
that the prevalent position in policy circles seems to be that the WTO should just 
accommodate the aims of the parties to multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), ' without directly extending its reach to cover environmental issues, thus 
rejecting conditionality as a means of promoting compliance. 5 
In this model, we show that, while in some cases the stability of a Joint mul- 
tilateral agreement is unaffected or enhanced by tie-in, in others a formal tie-in 
constraint can make an otherwise stable joint multilateral agreement unstable. The 
possibility of each scenario occurring is illustrated by means of parameterized ex- 
amples, for which we derive players' payoffs under alternative agreement structures 
and bargaining rules. Negotiation tie-in is more likely to facilitate multilateral co- 
operation in situations where the environmental policy stakes are small relative to 
the welfare effects of trade policies and when partial environmental coordination 
is preferred to no cooperation by all countries involved, implying that outsiders 
3 On this point, see Whalley and Hamilton (1996). 
'For a discussion of issues related to the integration of multilateral environmental agreements 
within the GATT/WTO see Esty (1994) and Brack (1997). Such integration would require a new 
interpretation of WTO rules, or possibly even textual amendments to them, so as to legitimize 
the use of trade restrictions in accordance with multilateral environmental agreements such as 
the Basle Convention on flows of toxic wastes, the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depletion 
or the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. This latter approach is reflected in several 
speeches made at the WTO High Symposium on Trade and Environment held in Geneva from 
15-16 March 1999, which are available on the WTO web site. 
50n several occasions the WTO has strongly rejected the prospect of "becoming an inter- 
national body with unilateral powers [ ... 
1, a world policeman that can force compliance upon 
unwilling governments"; see, for example, the address given by WTO Director General Renato 
Ruggiero to the Bellerive/Globe international conference in "Policing the Global Economy", on 
23 March 1998. 
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can free-ride effectively on partial environmental agreements. On the other hand, 
when the costs of environmental compliance are high but the ability to free-ride 
on partial environmental agreements is limited, a negotiation tie-in restriction can 
hinder multilateral cooperation by making it both attractive and viable for a single 
country to remain outside of any agreement. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes a 
cooperative game of multi-dimensional agreement formation and defines the notion 
of Stable Agreement Structure. Section 4.3 contrasts issue linkage and issue tie- 
in, discussing their respective implications for the stability of a joint multilateral 
agreement. Section 4.4 applies these ideas to a simple three-country example in 
which countries can form trade and environmental agreements. Finally, Section 
4.5 offers some concluding remarks. 
4.2 Mult i- dimensional Agreement Formation 
In this section we formalize cooperation choices in an environment where players 
enter into separate agreements with different partners on different policy dimen- 
sions. 
4.2.1 Strategies, Agreements and Behaviour 
Consider the following strategic-form game. Let I be the set of players and let the 
strategy space for each player ic1, Ej, be an N (i) -dimensional vector space, with 
N(i) E N, iEI, representing the number of dimensions in each player's strategy. 
Strategies for player i are denoted by ai (E Ej. 
Assumption 4.1 Ei = XjGf 1,..., N(i)jEi, j) ZG -1, where 
the Ejj, ic1, jc N(O are 
one-dimensional sets. 
Assumption 4.1 means that the pure strategy space for each player can be repre- 
sented as the Cartesian product of one-dimensional sets. This ensures that choices 
along individual dimensions of the strategy vector can be made independently of 
each other, i. e. individual dimensions of strategic choice are not directly linked. 
6 
6The reason for this assumption will be made clear later. Nevertheless. note that it involves 
no loss of generality. Starting from any given game, it is always possible to augment the strategy 
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Definition 4.1 The sets Ejj, ZE1, jE N(i) are elementary strategy sets and 
their elements aij elementary strategies. 
The space of strategy profiles is E =XiCIEi = XiEI XjGj1,..., N(i)jEj, j and strategy 
profiles are a cz E. Players' payoffs are represented by real-valued mappings 7i 
i--* R) ic1. 
In analyses of coalition formation, coalitions are described as non-empty subsets 
of 1, and this is then interpreted as meaning that the players in each subset pool 
all of their elementary strategies and make coordinated choices over them. If we 
are to separately represent different dimensions of choice, then coalitions can be 
defined as follows. Let S (i) =_ fs =_ (i, j) IjEf1, ---, N'(i) 
II, iC 1-i - e. 
S (i) is 
the set of pairs s= (i, j) such that j is a valid dimension of player i's strategy 
vector (i. e. s corresponds to a valid index pair (i, J) for elementary strategies aij)- 
and S -= Uj, ýýj 
S(i)-i. e. each element of S corresponds to a different elementary 
strategy. Finally, let P be a partition of S whose elements are the sets S(i), 
iCI. Then, a coalition structure C consists of a partition of S which is coarser 
than P, i. e. such that all of a player's elementary strategies belong to a single 
element of the partition. For the purpose of our analysis, we wish to examine 
situations where a subset of players coordinate their actions with each other only 
with respect to certain strategy dimensions and not others, and where the same 
player can enter into different coordinating arrangements with different players 
for different strategy dimensions. To allow for this, one can simply drop the 
requirement that the partition of the set of elementary strategies be coarser than 
P, and allow instead for arbitrary partitions of S. The resulting partitions G will 
be called agreement structures and their elements g will be called agreements. The 
sub-profile of elementary strategies in the agreement will be denoted by 0,9 -= 
(a, I 
sC g), and the set of such sub-profiles-the strategy set of agreement g-will be 
denoted as E9. 
Definition 4.2 An agreement gGS Zs a subset of strategy dimensions for a subset 
of players. 
set by redefining it as having rectangular support as required by Assumption 4.1, and then assign 
an infinite negative payoff for all players to any strategy profile involving the added strategies. 
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Note that Assumption 4.1 ensures that a player assigns elementary strategies to 
different agreements, the strategy sets of the different agreements are independent 
sets. 7 
Definition 4.3 A participant to agreement g, -zýg Cfz Cz (Z' J) Eg for some j 
is a player who contrZbutes at least one elementary strategy to the agreement. The 
set of partZcipants to agreement g Zs denoted by 19. 
We shall focus on subgame-perfect equilibria of a two-stage game where players 
first enter into binding cooperative agreements and then the resulting agreements 
interact non-cooperatively. Starting from the last stage, let the vector of payoffs 
for the participants to agreement g be denoted by 7rg (a) =-= 
(7ri (a) IZE 
Assumption 4.2 (Agreements' behaviour) Each agreement gEG chooses ag 
E9 so as to attain a maximal element of 119 (og, a-9) =f 7rg (ag, a-9) I (ag, a-9) C 
(where -g stands for G- g). The best-reply correspondence of agreement g, 
&9 :E ý-* E, is thus defined as &(o, -g) = arg sup,, 119 (o7g, o, -9). 
This assumption simply generalizes best-response behaviour by individual players 
in a non-cooperative setting to a decision-making unit involving multiple players: 
no agreement g (E G can do (Pareto) better than play org, given the behaviour of 
all other agreements (or-9). 
Definition 4.4 A non-cooperative outcome for the agreement structure G is a 
strategy profile & such that ag E 6r(&-9), g Ei G. The set of non-cooperative 
outcomes for the agreement structure G is denoted by E(G). 
4.2.2 Stable Agreement Structures 
Agreement formation in the first stage of the game is formalized using ideas from 
cooperative game theory. We define a Core-like equilibrium concept whereby sub- 
sets of players can put forward objections to a certain proposed arrangement, as 
'Cross-linkage between strategy sets is a complication that is typically assumed away in the 
analysis of strategic-form games and that 
does not arises when players, having independent 
strategy sets but possibly not independent choices along 
different dimensions, form coalitions in 
the more restrictive sense of the term. 
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in Ray and Vohra (1997). Here, however, we make a formal distinction between 
agreements among players to coordinate the use of (one or more) strategies, and 
coalittons of players who can make coordinated objections to a proposed agree- 
ment structure. The two concepts are logically distinct: agreement structures 
determine payoffs in the second stage of the game; coalitions of players can ob- 
ject to a proposed arrangement by rearranging the strategies they control, but 
such objections do not necessarily imply the formation of agreements between the 
objecting players. 8 
In order to describe our equilibrium concept, it is convenient to redefine the 
game by "breaking up" the individual players into smaller units each corresponding 
to a different elementary strategy: 
Definition 4.5 An elementary player is a pair (s -- (z, 3) C S, 7j), Z. e. an element 
of S paired with the payoff mapping of the player to which the elementary strategy 
s belongs. The payoff mapping for elementary player s is denoted by 7r, - 
No problem of interpretation arises with respect to the second stage of the game: 
under Assumption 4.2, the set of non-cooperative outcomes will be the same 
whether we describe the game in terms of players iEI or in terms of elemen- 
tary players sCS. With respect to the formulation of objections to a certain 
agreement, although we do not require that individual elementary players who 
share the same payoff coordinate their objections, such coordination will not be 
ruled out by our equilibrium concept. In other words, elementary players who 
share the same payoff may still choose to act as a single player. 
We shall also need the following definitions: 
Definition 4.6 A restricted agreement structure G(S'), S' CSMa partffion of 
S 
Definition 4.7 An unrestricted agreement structure is an agreement structure 
restrtcted to S. 
'In partition function games (games "with externalities"), it is possible for two players to 
obtain a higher payoff by acting individually than by coordinating their actions, because of the 
effect of a third player's response on the non-cooperative outcome. Achieving such an outcome, 
however, may require abiding by a common, coordinated cOalitional choice (i. e. both players 
must together choose to act in this way). 
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Also let 9 denote the set of all possible partitions of S, and 9C9 the set of 
the feastble agreement structures, where feasibility is a function of institutional or 
other constraints. 
Our equilibrium concept can then be described in terms of the two following 
definitions: 
Definition 4.8 A restricted agreement structure G(S), S' CS can be blocked, 
within an agreement structure G' _= G 
(S) UG (S - S'), by a coalition S" C S' of el- 
ementary players if there exists a restricted agreement structure d (S") -involving 
only elementary players in the blocking coalffion-such that, for each of the re- 
stricted structures d(S' - S")-involving the remaining elementary players in 
S'-that cannot be blocked under the combined structure G" =_ G(S") U G(S' - 
S") UG (S - S') we have that (i) V& (G") (G"), V& (G) (C), it is the 
case that 7, (&(G")) > 7r, (&(G)), sE S", with the inequality being strict for at 
least one sE S"; and (ii) d(S'- S") can be blocked within G". 9 If (ý(S") sahsfies 
the above conditions, we say that it Zs a stable objection to O(S") by S" 
Definition 4.9 A Stable Agreement Structure G* is an unrestricted structure 
which cannot be blocked. 
Note the recursive nature of the above definition: what is required for an 
objection by a coalition of players to constitute a blocking objection is that it 
must be not only profitable (condition (i)) but also immune from further external 
or internal deviations, i. e. it must involve an arrangement that is stable (in the 
restricted sense) according to the very definition of stability so obtained. 'O In this 
construct, objections are made by subsets of elementary players- coalitions in the 
standard sense of cooperative game theory-who make alternative arrangements 
among themselves without involving the other players. Although such objections 
9According to this definition, an objection is viable for a coalition only if it yields a Pareto 
superior outcome for its members under all stable counterobjections that the other players can 
put forward. This idea is analogous to Greenberg's (1990) concept of "pessimistic standard of 
behaviour". 
'OThis consistency requirement, ruling out coalitional deviation which are not themselves im- 
mune from further deviations, also characterizes equilibrium concepts such as the Coalition-Proof 
Nash Equilibrium of Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) and the Equilibrium Binding Agree- 
ments of Ray and Vohra (1997). 
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are coordinated, they do not necessarily involve pooling all the corresponding 
elementary strategies into a single agreement. 
This specification does away with the need for exogenous rules describing the 
fate of agreements under an objection involving a subset of its participants (as 
discussed by Burbidge et al., 1997): in this definition, stable arrangements can 
reform for any restricted set of players, once an objection is made. Also, although 
objections are made by successively finer coalitions-as in Ray and Vohra (1997)- 
the objections themselves can consist of agreement structures that are coarser than 
the one to which a coalition objects to. " 
The concept of Stable Agreement Structure appears to be a natural extension 
of similar equilibrium concepts that have been described for games of coalition 
formation; as is the case for these analogous solution concepts, existence of an 
equilibrium may in general be problematic. In practice, the concept of Stable 
Agreement Structure may also be difficult to operationalize owing to the large 
number of potential objections and counterobjections that are involved. In our 
application, however, we shall focus on a scenario with only three players and two 
dimensions of choice, where the solution concept becomes manageable. 
4.2.3 Within-agreements Bargaining 
Without additional restrictions, Assumption 4.2 does not tie down behaviour to a 
specific distributional objective, and does not rule out asymmetric payoff outcomes 
within an agreement where all participants are identical. This flexibility implies 
that there will typically exist a continuum of non-cooperative equilibria for any 
agreement structure. In the rest of our analysis, we shall narrow down the set 
of possible non-cooperative outcomes by assuming a fixed payoff distribution rule 
within an agreement g, arising as the solution to a bargaining problem among the 
participants to g. As elsewhere in this literature (e. g. Burbidge et al., 
1997) we 
shall assume the bargaining rule to be anonymous (i. e. symmetric), implying that 
identical players in identical situations must obtain the same payoff. 
A symmetric bargaining rule involves two ingredients: the set of efficient 
(within 
the agreement) payoff combinations that can be attained if players 
form g, and the 
1 'Under the Equilibrium Binding Agreement rule of Ray and Vohra (1997), existing agreement 
structures are allowed to break only 
into smaller agreements. 
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Dg "disagreement" payoffs of participants, 7ri IiE 19. 
Given these, optimal policy 
choices by an agreement can be characterized as the policy combination (or set 
Dg , (E Ig of combinations) which maximizes B (7ri - 7ri It where B is a symmetric. 
concave function. 12 
Consistently with our characterization of stability, the disagreement point D 
should be based on the stable outcomes that prevail if a certain agreement were 
not to form. In turn, stability of the disagreement point depends on the payoff 
distribution in alternative agreements, which implies that the characterization of 
the disagreement payoffs for the various agreements is linked, recursively, to the 
characterization of stability of the restricted structures that are involved in the 
various objections an counterobjections. " One can interpret this specification as 
implying an initial pre-agreement stage where players can unilaterally commit not 
to enter into certain agreements with certain partners. Since such a commitment 
by any single player would automatically result in the removal of the corresponding 
agreement structures from the set of feasible structures, the disagreement point is 
naturally defined as that payoff distribution that would result within the resulting 
restricted space of agreement structures. In the application of 4.4, we shall focus 
on a scenario where, in the "pre-game" stage, players can unilaterally veto the 
possibility that any agreement will form, in which case the disagreement point 
D is taken from the payoff combinations that prevail when all agreements are 
singletons (i. e. no agreements form). 14 
12jt is natural here to rely on a simple extension of two-player bargaining ideas to multi- 
player bargaining, rather than resort to the multi-player bargaining solution concepts that have 
been proposed for superadditive coalition-form games (games without "externalities"), such as 
the Shapley value. Such solution concepts define a division rule for the gains from multilateral 
cooperation based on the distribution of payoffs under alternative coalitional outcomes. Our def- 
inition of a stable outcome already calls upon a comparison of payoff outcomes under agreements 
structures; furthermore, in our construct the bargaining rule is relied upon to determine a payoff 
division within agreements for any agreement structure, not just the grand coalition. 
13This approach is consistent with the extensions of the Shapley Value for coalitional form 
games proposed by Aumann and Myerson (1988). 
14The more general case can be formally described as follows. Let Z _= 
{g SI, X be a 
partition of Z with AEX representing an element of this partition; define 
A(g) IG E !; IgE 
A, AnG :ý 01, and 
0 (g) =_ 9- A(g). Also, let !; * (9) denote the set of stable agreement structures 
given g as the (possibly restricted) set of feasible agreement structures, and 
G* : j!; j ý--+ 9 be 
a mapping which selects one specific structure 
from a set (with f9j representing a collection of 
sets). Then, under a symmetric bargaining rule, 
behaviour can be defined in the following way: 
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There is a further complication, arising from the non-superadditive structure 
of the game: when a subset of players form an agreement, it is possible that the 
payoffs they can obtain are less than the payoffs that are feasible in the absence 
of the agreement; thus, the fallback position may involve higher payoffs than are 
possible in the presence of the agreement itself. It is true that, if this is the case, 
then the corresponding agreement structure could never be stable according to our 
definition. Nevertheless, in order to apply our definition of blocking and stability, 
a payoff distribution must be defined for all agreement structures, even those that 
are not stable. To deal with such cases, we can apply the bargaining function B 
"in reverse" by taking the cum-agreement scenario as defining the (endogenously 
determined) disagreement point and the stable no-agreement scenario as defining 
the (exogenously determined) bargaining outcome. 15 
Some remarks are in order at this point with respect to the feasibility of side 
payments. The agreement formation game as we have formalized it above does not 
rule out the possibility of side payments, if feasible. Side payments can be formally 
treated just like additional dimensions of players' strategies, which become active 
only within agreements in which the corresponding elementary players participate. 
In the game so augmented, all of the previous definitions would still apply, both 
in the general case and in the case of a bargaining-based payoff distribution rule 
within agreements. 
for a given restricted set of agreement structures !;, each agreement gEGEg, chooses ag C E9 
Dg (g), i Dg (g) so as to maximize B(-/ri - 7ri E 19), where 7ri = 7ri(&(d*(!; - 
O(g)))). Note that 
such a definition recursively invokes the definition of stability for a structure within a certain 
restricted set of structures, and is therefore intertwined with Definitions 4.8 and 4-9: in order to 
determine the payoff distribution within an agreement in a certain structure, it is necessary to 
determine which structure would be stable if the structures in A(g) were eliminated; in turn this 
determination may require knowledge of the payoff distribution within a certain agreement g' in 
alternative structures, which then may require identifying a further stable outcome in a game 
where further both the structures in A(g) and in A(g)' are ruled out; and so on. The simple 
version of this construct we use in Section 4.4 assumes X to consist of the single element Z. 
'5In a scenario with symmetric players, it is possible to abstract from this problem by simply 
assigning equal payoffs to identical players, which may nevertheless result in lower payoffs when 
a certain agreement is present than without it. Even in this case, however, the use of an equal- 
payoff rule would imply the application of a symmetric bargaining rule, where the disagreement 
point is defined as the payoff distribution which results in a structure where the agreement in 
question does take place. 
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The multi-dimensional agreement formation game described in the previous section 
naturally involves issue linkage, i. e. players can cooperate over multiple dimensions 
and bargain across different issues. Such cooperation and exchange may involve 
the formation of perfectly overlapping agreement structures (i. e. coalitions of 
player in the standard sense) or only partially overlapping structures (with subsets 
of players cooperating over certain issues but not others). A negotiation tie-in 
rule, requiring that countries must form joint agreements over multiple issues- 
coalitions in the usual sense of the term-eliminates the possibility of partially 
overlapping agreement structures, which affects both the feasible proposals as well 
as the feasible objections to a given proposal. The question we want to address 
here is the following: what are the implications of a tie-in rule for the stability of 
the Joint Global Agreement (JGA), J =- ýfSjj-the agreement structure where 
all players jointly cooperate over all strategic dimensions? 
Formally, let 0 the set of partitions of S which are coarser than P (where P is 
the partition of S whose elements are the sets S(i), Zc I). 
Definition 4.10 A perfectly overlapping agreement structure Zs an element of! 9. 
A partially overlapping agreement structure is an element of! 9 - 9. 
A negotiation tie-in rule restricts agreements to lie in 0. Note that since the JGA 
belongs to 0, it is not ruled out by a tie-in restriction. Nevertheless, such a tie- 
in restriction may affect the stability of the JGA as it affects the set of feasible 
objections and counterobjections. 
Suppose that, without a tie-in restriction, the set of feasible agreement struc- 
tures is simply 0- ! 9, and let the sets of Stable Agreement Structures with and 
without a tie-in restriction be respectively denoted as !; ' and g'. Then, theo- 
retically four possibilities arise: 
(i) J EE gR (ii) J EE gR _ (gR - (iii) n gu; n gu), 
J c- gU - (gR n gu); (iV) jý gR n gu. In cases (i) and (iv), a tie-in restriction 
is irrelevant for the stability of the JGA: in case (i) it is stable with or without a 
tie-in restriction, whereas in (iv) it is unstable under both scenarios. In case (ii), 
a tie-in restriction makes J stable when it would not be otherwise; in case (iii) it 
makes J unstable. 
The implicit, informal presumption in the policy debate seems to be that tie-in 
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could "help" cooperation, by forcing asymmetric countries to trade concessions 
across different issues and by offsetting free-riding incentives. 16 The broad idea 
behind our counter argument is that what matters for countries to be persuaded 
to cooperate across all issues is that cross-trading be posstble out of equilibrium, 
not that it be required. In other words, the idea of cross-issue trade focuses on 
within- coalitions bargains, but the formation of an agreement (and the associated 
bargaining that takes place within it) is an equilibrium phenomenon, which may 
or may not occur depending on whether other arrangements can be opposed as 
objections. From this point of view, the effect of a tie-in rule is, in principle, 
ambiguous: it could either make the JGA stableý--by eliminating a partially over- 
lapping agreement structures that would otherwise constitute a stable objection 
to it as in case (ii) above-make the JGA unstable--by eliminating a partially 
overlapping agreement structure that would otherwise make a certain perfectly 
overlapping structure unstable as an objection as in case (iii) above-or, finally, 
have no effect. 
To illustrate these ideas, consider the following stylized example. There are 
three players 1,2, and 3. Player 1 has two elementary strategies, denoted as 
A, and B1, while players 2 and 3 have only one elementary strategy each, de- 
noted respectively as 
A2 and A3- Suppose that to each agreement structure cor- 
responds only one non-cooperative equilibrium, and that payoffs under the JGA, 
J= IIA1, B1, A2, A31 I are 7ri = 3,1 ý1,2,31. 
Consider first a scenario where 7ri 3, zEf1,2,31 in the JGA 1 71 = 7r2= 
4, 
73= 0 under G' = ýýAj, A21) f B11, ýAffl, and 7ri = 1, iEý1,2,31 in all other 
agreement structures. Then if, under a tie-in restriction, G' is ruled out, 
J is 
stable, whereas if it is feasible, players I and 2 can block J by putting forward 
G', 
which in turn cannot be blocked by any agreement structure. Here, negotiation 
tie-in helps support multilateral cooperation. 
Consider next a scenario where the agreement structure G2=I JAI, B1, 
A21, IA311 
the structure where players I and 2 form a coalition-yields payoffs 
71 == 72 == 
4,73 = 0, and all perfectly overlapping structures other than 
J and G2 yield 
16 For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) point out that free-riding incentives could 
be 
offset by making the signing of agreements entailing positive excludable externalities restricted 
to signatory countries (e. g. trade or R&D agreements) condffional on environmental cooperation. 
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7ri == IýiCf1,2,31. Since both players I and 2 are better off under G2 
than under J, the configuration G' could in principle constitute a blocking ob- 
jection to J for them. It remains to be seen whether G' itself is stable with 
respect to restricted counterobjections (objections made by finer blocking coali- 
tions). The only candidate count erobj ections by subsets of the objecting coali- 
tion ý 1,21 are G3= ýf&BIJJA21, fA311, G' = ffA1, A2JJB1JJA3JJ, and 
G' = JfA1JJB1J, JA2J, ýA311- Under a tie-in restriction, however, G' and G' 
are infeasible. Suppose that, under G3 and G', we have 7i = 1, while under G' we 
have 7r, = 57 7r2 =11 7r3= 0. Then, if G3 is the only possible counterobjection to 
G2, the latter will be a stable objection to J, and therefore J will not be stable. If, 
on the other hand, there is no tie-in restriction, G' and G5 are feasible counterob- 
jections, and player 1 can block G2 by putting forward G'-which is itself stable, 
since G5, the only possible counterobjection to G', yields a lower payoff for player 
2 than G' does, and player 2 obtains a lower payoff under GI than under J. Thus, 
without a tie-in restriction, G2 is not a stable objection to J, and J is therefore 
stable. In this scenario, a tie-in restriction hinders multilateral cooperation. 
Notice that issue linkage can still be at work in the same scenario. Sup- 
pose, for example, that countries were forced to coordinate over different issues 
separately-which would rule out both G' and J (as well as all the agreement 
structures involving the elementary player B, and any other player)-and that 
G' = ýfA1, A2, A31jBill (a multilateral agreement over a single dimension) 
yields payoffs 7ri = 0, iEf1,2,31. Then multilateral cooperation over the first 
policy dimension would not be possible unless the other dimension is also brought 
in. 
Whether a tie-in restriction will help or hinder multilateral cooperation there- 
fore depends on the payoff structure of the underlying non-cooperative game. In 
the next section, we describe a policy game involving both trade and environmental 
policies-based on a competitive model of international trade with internationally 
differentiated goods and transboundary pollution-which we then use to examine 
the implications of negotiation tie-in across trade and environmental policies for 
the stability of multilateral, joint trade- and-environment policy agreements. 
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4.4 An Application to International Negotiations on Trade and the 
Environment 
Much of the literature on international policy cooperation has separately exam- 
ined cooperation over trade policies and over environmental policies. Riezman 
(1985), Krugman (1991), Bond and Syropoulos (1993), and Yi (1996), among oth- 
ers, have focused on the creation of customs unions (CUs), while Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994) and Chander and Tulkens (1992), among oth- 
ers, have focused on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The broad 
theme emerging from this literature is that the presence of spillovers between 
coalitions (positive in the case of environmental coalitions, negative in the case 
of trade coalitions) makes global cooperation difficult to sustain, and that partial 
cooperation, restricted to subsets of countries, is more likely to emerge. 
In this context, it has been suggested that multilateral cooperation could be en- 
hanced by formally combining different issues with the aim of joint settlement. In 
the following, the ideas developed in the preceding sections will be used to examine 
formally the question of whether negotiation tie-in across trade and environmental 
policy issues would help or hinder multilateral cooperation. For this purpose, we 
describe a three-country model of international trade with transboundary pollu- 
tion. 17 
4.4.1 International Trade with M-ansboundary Pollution 
Three ex-ante symmetric countries, 1, 2 and 3, are linked by transboundary pol- 
lution and trade, with markets for traded goods being characterized by perfect 
competition. Environmental emissions are "global", i. e. countries are equally 
affected by foreign and domestic emissions. Each country iCI -= 
f 1,2,31 is en- 
171t can be argued that, in the absence of a supranational authority with autonomous powers 
of effective enforcement, it is not legitimate to assume international commitments to be binding, 
and that therefore all international agreements must be self-enforcing. This type of approach to 
the analysis of international trade agreements, using an infinitely repeated game paradigm, has 
been pursued, among others, by Bagwell and Staiger (1997). Note, however, that the structure of 
incentives that makes cooperation sustainable by threat of punishment in a repeated game finds 
a counterpart in the sequence of objections and counterobj ect ions in our static solution concept. 
On the other hand, since punishment strategies in a repeated game can be arbitrarily selective, 
such correspondence would be weakened if only multi-issue agreements were 
included. 
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dowed with an amount Mi of a non-traded good. In each country, firms in the 
tradeable goods sector produce a single good at a constant marginal cost c=1 
in terms of the nontraded good. Markets are assumed to be segmented, in the 
sense that consumers in each country view goods produced in different countries 
as being imperfect substitutes. 
Consumers are identical, and the preferences of the representative consumer in 
country kEI are described by a quasilinear, isoelastic utility function: 
Uk(mk7 Qk) = Mk 
0 
1+1/7, 
- I+ llqQk 1+6 1/0 
D1+110) keI, (4.1) 
where Mk is consumption of the nontraded good, Qk is composite consumption 
of the traded goods-an isoelastic aggregation of the quantities qik produced in 
country z (origin) and consumed by country k (destination), i. e. 
IYA-Y-1) 
k p) 1 /-ý q 
(-Y /-Y + (p / 2) 1 /'y q (-Y /-Y (4.2) kk ik 
i: ý'- k 
with -y representing the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded 
goods from different sources, and y representing the share of imports in total 
tradeables demand-ij <0 is the (constant) elasticity of demand for the tradeables 
aggregate, 13 is a positive scalar, D are global emissions, 0>0 is the (constant) 
inverse elasticity of marginal damage valuation with respect to global emissions, 
and 6 is a positive scalar. 
Demand for the traded aggregate in country k is then given by 
Qk -` 
[Pk/(/3Mk)177 
, 
(4.3) 
where 
+ (ft/2) wkEI kk ik (4.4) 
Mk is the price of the nontraded good in country k, and Wik is the consumer price 
in country k of goods imported from country i. Using Shephard's Lemma, we can 
write uncompensated demands for imports and domestic demand for domestically 
produced tradeables as 
qik 
A 77 
OZik 
( Pk 
zEkE 1) 
(OMk) 
Wik 
(4.5) 
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whereOik= p/2, i=k, andOkk =I- IL) i =ý 
Production of the traded good in country i generates environmental emissions 
that are proportional to output by a certain fixed factor, the same for all countries, 
which, without loss of generality can be assumed to be equal to unity. Global 
emission are then simply 
I: qik, 
ik 
(4.6) 
We restrict the government in country k to the use of only two policy instruments: 
ad valorem output taxes (6k)-which, since emissions are proportional to output, 
are equivalent to emission taxes-and discriminatory, ad valorem imports tariffs 
(tik). Tax and tariff revenues are returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. 
Domestic demand for nontradeables is 
mi - 
Market clearing then requires 
A+I: qik 
k 
Tni 
iGI. 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
Zero-profits for the tradeable goods sector in country z require that the gross-of- 
tariff, gross- of-tax, consumer price of imports from i by k must be 
Wik::::::::::: Mi(l+ei)(I+tik)) i, kC-1. (4.9) 
For the purpose of our analysis, countries' payoffs are defined as the sum of 
consumer surplus, and tariff and tax revenues, minus environmental damage, which 
is in turn equal to the difference between utility and the endowment lai: 
7rj=uj(mi7Qi)-A- iE-I. 
(4.10) 
This is simply a re-normalization of utility, which involves no loss of generality. 
4.4.2 Feasible Agreement Structures 
As discussed in Section 4.2, it is useful to redefine the game in terms of six ele- 
mentary players, by breaking up each country 
i into two smaller players-its trade 
Mimi + Ek[eiTniqik + tkiTnk (I + e-k)qkil - PiQi 
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and environment "ministers" --denoted respectively as Tj and Ej , who share the 
same payoff function, but control each trade and environmental policy for country 
i, respectively. 
Note that in this setting there exist a unique welfare- maximizing combination 
of trade and environmental taxes in each country iE1, for any given combination 
of taxes in the other countries, 18 this combination being a solution for the first- 
order conditions 07ri/(9tik = 0, kG1, and i97rj/0ej = 0. In turn these conditions 
are equivalent to best-response conditions obtained by maximizing 7ri separately 
by choice Of tik, kE1, and ej, i. e. the conditions that characterize behaviour 
for two separate elementary players. In other words, in this setting, there is no 
direct gain for an individual player from coordinating choices across different policy 
dimensions. Thus, for example, agreement structures involving the single element 
f T1, El I and structures involving the separate elements IT, 1,1 El I will yield the 
same payoffs for all players. 
For the purpose of our analysis-and consistently with observed practice--we 
shall restrict feasible agreement structures to those which involve only one policy 
dimension or both, i. e. trade-only agreements, environment-only agreements and 
joint agreements on trade and environment, thus ruling out mixed agreements 
where a country coordinates its trade policy with another country's environmental 
policies. Note, however, that the same equivalence of single-player optimal choice 
and elementary players' best responses applies here with respect to single-issue 
and two-issue agreements involving the same players, implying that we need not 
separately consider structures featuring joint agreements. " In other words, two 
separate agreements over trade and environmental policies respectively between 
two players are here the same as a joint (perfectly overlapping) agreement between 
the same two players. 
With six elementary players and two strategy dimensions-and given the re- 
18 The payoff 7ri is concave in ei and tik- 
19H, for example, two countries sign a trade agreement, their trade ministers will set trade 
taxes in a cooperative manner, taking as given the environmental taxes chosen 
by their re- 
spective environmental ministers. If the two countries sign an environmental agreement, 
their 
environmental ministers will set environmental taxes 
taking as given the trade taxes chosen by 
their respective trade ministers. If they sign 
both, all ministers will behave just as they would 
under each separate agreement, and 
this will entail no coordination failure. 
An Application to International Negotiations on 7ýade and the Environment 92 
striction imposed on the set of feasible agreement structures and the equivalence 
property discussed above--we need to consider twenty-five possible agreement 
structures, which, given the symmetry assumption, can be restricted to the follow- 
ing ten: 
1. Joint Global Agreement (JGA): 
f ýTi, T2, T31, tEl, E2 iE311i 
2. No agreement on either issue: 
ttT, 1, fT21, fT31, fE, 1, fE21, JE311; 
I Global trade agreement, no environmental agreement: 
f IT T2, T31, fEll, lE21i lE311i 
I Global environmental agreement, no trade agreement: 
ftT, 1, fT21, tT3ý, tEl, E2, Effli 
5. Partial environmental agreement, no trade agreement: 
ftT, 1, fT21, fT31, f Eiý, lE2ýE311i 
6. Partial trade agreement, no environmental agreement: 
JIT, 1,1T2, T31, fE, 1, ýE211 fE311; 
7. Partial perfectly overlapping agreements on trade and environment: 
f tT, 1, tT2, T31, lEil, fE2, E3 11 ; 
8. Partial agreements on trade and environment: 
ffTjjjT2, T3j, JEI, E21i fE311; 
9. Global trade agreement and partial environmental agreement: 
f IT T2, T31, tEll, JE2 Al 1 *5 
10. Global environmental agreement and partial trade agreement: 
ffT, 1,17'2, T31, f Ei, E2, E31ý- 
The presence of a tie-in restriction only leaves the perfectly overlapping agree- 
ment structures 1,2 and 7-and all symmetrically corresponding configurations- 
as feasible agreement structures. 
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4.4.3 Negotiation Tie-in and the Stability of the Joint Global 
Agreement 
If we apply the equilibrium concept described in Section 4.2 to this environment, 
we can state the following: 
Proposition 4.1 A tZe-M negotiation rule makes an otherwise unstable JGA sta- 
ble if and only if., (a) under a tie-in restriction, no perfectly overlappzng structure 
put forward by a coalition of one or more countries can block the JGA; and (b) 
when all agreement structures are feasible, a partially overlapping agreement struc- 
ture ts a stable objection to the JGA. 
In our three-country example, the conditions of Proposition 4.1 become: 
1 ý> 7r7* \V(i ý (a) 7ri > 7ri' and -7Til where 7* indicates a reement structure 7 and its 9 
mirror images; 
(b. 1) Within the set of partially overlapping agreement structures that a single 
country 3 could put forward as objections to the JGA (including agreement struc- 
tures 5,6) 9 and 10 and their mirror images), there is at least one structures G' 
GI 1 for which: (i) 7rj > 7rj; and (ii) within the set of agreement structures that the 
other two countries k and h can put forward as counterobjections to G', there is 
no structure G" such that 7r 
G" > 7r 
GI 
and 7r 
G11 > 7G' (with at least one inequality kkhh 
being strict), and/or 
(b. 2) Within the set of partially overlapping agreement structures that two coun- 
tries k and h can put forward as objections to the JGA (including agreement 
structures 3,4,5,6 and 8 and their mirror images), there is at least one structures 
G' for which: (i) 7r 
G' > 7r' and7r 
G' > 7F' (with at least one inequality being strict)- k-kh-h 
and (ii) within the set of agreement structures that a third country J* can put 
G" G' 
forward as counterobj ect ions to G', there is no structure G" such that 7r i> 7r i. 
Proposition 4.2 A tze-zn negotiation rule makes an otherwise stable JGA un- 
stable if only if: (a) under a tie-Zn restriction, a perfectly overlappzng agreement 
structure is a stable objection to the JGA by a coalition of one or more players,, - 
and (b) when all agreement structures are 
feasible, there Zs no stable objection to 
the JGA - 
In our three-country example, the conditions of Proposition 
4.2 are: 
(a) 7r 
7* > 7T- land 7r 
7* 
= 7r7* > 7r 
2= 72 
khk h) where 7* indicates structure 
7 and its 
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mirror images; 
(b. 1) Within the set of partially overlapping agreement structures that two coun- 
tries k and h could put forward as counterobjections to 7* (including agreement 
structures 5 and 6 and their mirror images), consider the agreement structure, G', 
that yields the highest payoff for countries k and h. Then it must be true that (i) 
7r GI = 7r G' > 7F 7* = 77* khkh; and (ii) 7rjG' < 7rjl; and 
(b. 2) No partially overlapping agreement structures (including agreement struc- 
tures 3,4,5,6,8,9 and 10 and their mirror images) is a stable objection to the 
JGA. 
Which of the above scenarios will apply (if any) depends on several factors. If 
we take the trade policy side in isolation (i. e. set 6= 0), with three symmetric 
countries, two countries always gain when forming a trade bloc with coordinated 
tariff setting (a CU) in comparison with a no-coordination scenario (see, for exam- 
ple, Kerman and Riezman, 1990); furthermore the excluded country always gain 
from a move to free trade from a two-country bloc situation. In such a setting, 
the gains from forming a two-country bloc to the participating countries, and the 
cost of such move to the excluded country, increase with the importance of trade 
as reflected in the magnitude of M. 
On the environmental policy side, leaving trade aside (i. e. setting p= 0), 
the incentives for one country to leave the global environmental agreement and 
free ride on a partial coordination agreement between the other two, other things 
equal, increase with the size of the damage and decreases with the elasticity of 
environmental policy responses to changes in marginal damage valuation, which 
in turn depends primarily on 0 (the lower 0 the easier it is to free ride), but 
also on the parameters directly affecting tradeables demand. The value of the 
inverse elasticity of marginal damage valuation (corresponding to the elasticity of 
abatement demand with respect to marginal damage) also determines whether two 
countries have an incentive to engage in partial cooperation over environmental 
policy if the other country does not participate: as environmental policy responses 
become more inelastic, free-riding by the non-participating country can become 
so severe as to make noncooperation preferable for the remaining two. This is a 
well-known result and a theme that runs through the literature on environmental 
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agreement formation. 
20 
Note, however, that in this model emissions abatement can only take place 
through a reduction in the production of tradeables; this means that emission taxes 
coincide with output taxes, which are a relatively close substitute for export taxes 
(and, equivalently, import tariffs), and that in turn import tariffs are a substitute 
for emission taxes with respect to environmental policy goals. Consequently, the 
effects of trade and environmental policy instruments on payoffs are not additive, 
and thus trade policy and environmental policy incentives cannot be separated in as 
clearcut a manner as the above discussion suggests. In particular, as p approaches 
unity, import tariffs and emission taxes become progressively more equivalent. 
To illustrate the potential effects of a negotiation tie-in restriction, below we 
present four different examples, involving alternative parameterizations of the 
model. We focus on a scenario with a symmetric bargaining-based distribution 
rule within agreements. In the present model, even if countries are ex-ante iden- 
tical, asymmetric payoff distributions could still arise between two participants 
to an agreement if they do not also participate in the same agreements outside 
the given one (as in agreement structures 8-10)-a complication that is absent in 
one-dimensional agreement formation games. We consider alternative bargaining 
D rules: Utilitarian bargaining (B(-Fi - -Fi 7i C 
19) = Ej, jg(7rj - 7ri')) and 
Nash 
D* q) = flieIg (7ri - iTp)) without side payments, 
21 and bargaining (B (7ri - 7ri It cF 
the case with side payments under a symmetric, strictly concave B. 
22 In all cases 
the disagreement point for bargaining is given by the payoffs under structure 2. 
Tables 4.1 to 4.4 report non-cooperative equilibrium payoffs under utilitarian 
bargaining under each of the ten agreement structures described in the previous 
subsection, for different parameterizations. 
23 In all cases we set 0= 2/37 6= 4/3, 
"See, for example, Barrett (1994). 
2'Note that, with quasilinear preferences, lump-sum transfers and utility transfers are equiva- 
lent. Transferable utility, however, does not imply that transfers need be feasible. 
Side payments 
are hardly observed in the practice of international agreements, perhaps 
because it is difficult or, 
in view of future commitments, undesirable to arrive at a precise 
determination of willingness to 
pay. 
22With side payments and a symmetric 
disagreement point, any symmetric, strictly concave 
B will always yield an egalitarian outcome, 
i. e. identical payoff for all players. With a utilitarian 
B and side payments, on the other 
hand, the payoff distribution is indeterminate. 
23 Since no closed-form solutions 
for payoffs as a function of policies are available, we have used 
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71 - -3/2, and -y = 2, and vary only the values of [L and 0. Equilibrium policy 
levels (not reported) range from zero to 2 for import tariffs and from 0.4 to 2 for 
emission taxes. 
Consider first the scenario in Table 4.1, in which a large share of tradeable goods 
is imported (p = 63/100) and the inverse marginal damage valuation elasticity is 
large (0 = 3/2). It is easy to verify that the JGA is stable if a tie-in rule is imposed: 
no subset of players is better off at 2 or 7 than at 1. In contrast, without tie-in 
the JGA can be blocked by country I putting forward structure 9: this is a stable 
objection, since all the possible counterobjections by 2 and 3 (structures 2,3,5, 
6,7 and the mirror image of structure 8 24) yield a lower payoff for them. 
In this scenario, the imposition of a tie-in negotiation rule facilitates multilat- 
eral cooperation over trade and environmental policies (case (ii) of Section 4-3), by 
removing the possibility of profitable single-issue deviations-by a single country 
with respect to environmental policy, and by a partial alliance of two countries with 
respect to trade policy. With 0 large, two countries prefer partial environmental 
policy cooperation between themselves to full noncooperation. This implies that, 
if a country attempts to free ride on environmental policy, the other two countries 
cannot credibly counter the move by resolving not to cooperate among themselves. 
At the same time, the gains from forming a trade bloc against a third country, for 
the two countries involved, and the cost of being excluded from a trade bloc, are 
sizeable (1-t is large). This implies that, with a tie-in restriction, a single country 
would not find it profitable to exit from a multilateral cooperation agreement. 
Consider next a scenario where all parameters are the same as in Table 4.1 but 
the inverse elasticity of marginal damage valuation is lower (Table 4.2). Although 
the incentive to move to structure 9 still exists for countries 1, this deviation would 
not be stable whether or not a tie-in restriction is present, because countries 2 and 
3 would counterobject to it by moving to structure 3 where they obtain a higher 
payoff by not coordinating on environmental policy and where country I obtains 
a lower payoff in comparison with structure 1. Thus, in this scenario tie-in is 
irrelevant, because even without it the JGA would be stable (case (i) of Section 
numerical methods to obtain the non-cooperative payoff values. 
24The relevant mirror image of structure 8 is one in which countries 1 and 2 cooperate over 
trade and countries 2 and 3 over environment, yielding 7r, = 0.704,72 = 0.668 and 7r3 = 
0.656. 
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Table 4.1: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payoffs 
p= 63/100,0 = 3/2, -y = 2,77 = -3/2,0 = 2/3,6 = 4/3 
Agreement Structure Countries' Payoffs (71,721 73) 
1: tfTT2, T3ý, tEl, E2, E311 (0.722, 0.722, 0.722) 
2: IT, 1, f T2ý, tT31, tEll, JE21, fE311 (0-656, 0.656, 0.656) 
3: {T T2J31, JE, 1, fE21i lE311 (0-696, 0.696, 0.696) 
4: f fT, 1,1T21, fT31, tEl, E2, E311 (0.700, 0.700, 0.700) 
5: tfT, 1, fT2ý, ýT3ý, tEll, fE2 iE31ý (0-703, 0.667, 0.667) 
6: lfTlý, fT2, T31, ýEll, tE21, tE311 (0.607, 0.692, 0.692) 
7: lfTlý, fT2, T3ý, tEll, fE2, E311 (0-642, 0.695, 0.695) 
8: f fT, 1,1T2, T31, f Ei, E21i tE311 (0.656, 0.668, 0.704) 
9: IIT T2J31, fEll, lE23E311 (0-742, 0.697, 0.697) 
10: ffT, 1, fT2, T31, fEll E2, E311 (0.656, 0.716, 0.716) 
Table 4.2: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payoffs 
p- 63/100,0 = 3/4, -y = 2,77 = -3/2,0 = 2/3,6 = 4/3 
Agreement Structure Countries' Payoffs (7rl, 721 73) 
1: 1f li, T2, T31, f Ei, & E311 (0.824, 0.824, 0.824) 
2: f tT, 1, fT21, ýT31, tEll, fE21ý lE311 (0.764, 0.764, 0.764) 
3: f IT T2, T31, ýEll, tE21, fE31ý (0.812, 0.812, 0.812) 
4: ffT, 1, ýT21, tT3ý, f EI, E2, Effl (0.793, 0.793, 0.793) 
5: «Tjl, fT21, fT31, f Eil, tE2, E311 (0.794, 0.771, 0.771) 
6: ffT, 1, f T2J31, f Ei ý, JE21, tE31ý (0-717, 0.803, 0.803) 
7: «Tjl, fT2, T31, ýEI 1, f E21E311 (0.735, 0.803, 0.803) 
8: týT, 1, fT2, T31, ýEI, E211 
tE3ýl (0.764, 0.793, 0.793) 
9: ttT T2, T31, fEll, fE2, E311 (0.838, 0.810, 0.810) 
1(): f ýT, 1, f T2, T31, ýEl, E21E3J1 (0.764, 0.805, 0.805) 
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4-3). 
Let us now consider the scenario depicted in Table 4.3, in which both the 
import share parameter and the inverse elasticity of marginal damage valuation 
are small (/i == 1/10,0 == 2/5). Recall that under a tie-in restriction only agreement 
structures 1,2 and 7 (and its mirror images) are feasible. Country I now benefits 
from moving from I to 7, because the costs of forgoing trade cooperation are low 
and more than offset by the gains from free-riding on environmental cooperation. 
Under a tie-in constraint, countries 2 and 3 are unable to counterobject, since 
their payoff under structure 2 is lower than under structure 7; hence structure 
7 constitutes a stable objection to the JGA. If, on the other hand, there is no 
tie-in restriction, structure 6 is a stable counterobjection to 7 there is no tie-in 
restriction, structure 6 is a stable counterobjection to 7 (under 6 players 2 and 
3 obtain a higher payoff than under 7, and player I obtains a lower payoff than 
under 1). Thus, without a tie-in restriction, structure 7 is not a stable objection 
by player I to the JGA. Removing a tie-in restriction introduces structure 9 as a 
possible objection, but this also is unstable. 
In this scenario, a tie-in negotiation rule hinders multilateral cooperation over 
trade and environmental policies (case (iii) of Section 4.3), because it removes 
the ability for two countries to effectively counter single-country objections. With 
0 small, if a country chooses not to participate in a multilateral environmental 
agreement, the two remaining countries are better off if they cease environmental 
cooperation among themselves. This means that free-riding attempts by a single 
country could be credibly countered by a move to trade policy-only cooperation 
between the remaining two. With a tie-in restriction, however, the incentives for 
two countries to keep cooperating along the trade policy dimension override their 
incentives to split along the environmental policy dimension, making single-country 
objections stable and the JGA unstable. 
In the case represented in Table 4.4, all the parameters are as in Table 4.3, 
except for the inverse marginal damage elasticity 0, which is now higher. Under a 
tie-in restriction, country I still benefits from moving from I to 7, which remains 
a stable deviation from the JGA. Now, however, even without a tie-in restriction, 
this objection cannot be countered by structure 6, since countries 2 and 3 no longer 
benefit from splitting a partial environmental agreement. This is because a higher 
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Table 4-3: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payoffs 
P= 1/10,0 = 2/5, -y = 2, q= -3/2ý 0= 2/3,6 = 4/3 
Agreement Structure 
1: Jf Ti, T2, T31, f EI, E2, E311 
2: f tT, 1, fT2ý, fT31, f Eil, tE21, fE311 
3: tIT1, T2J31, JE, 1, tE21i tE311 
4: f IT, 1, fT21, fT31, f Ei, E2, E311 
5: lfT, 1,1T21, fT31, JE, 1, f E2, E311 
6: f IT, 1, f T2J31, JE, 1, f E21, fE3» 
7: lfT, 1,1T2, T31, fEll, fE2, E311 
8: lJT, 1, IT2, T31, f Ei, E21i fE311 
g: ff TI, T2, T3ý, fElý, fE21 Effl 
10: f IT, 1, IT2, T31, f Ei, E21E3ýý 
Countries' Payoffs (71, 72,73) 
(0-907, 0.907, 0.907) 
(0-863, 0.863, 0.863) 
(0-870, 0.870, 0.870) 
(0.902, 0.902, 0.902) 
(0-928, 0.862, 0.862) 
(0.859, 0.868, 0.868) 
(0.923, 0.866, 0.866) 
(0-862, 0.863, 0.933) 
(0-936, 0.867, 0.867) 
(0.897, 0.905, 0.905) 
Table 4.4: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payoffs 
p= 1/10,0 = 4/5, -y = 2, q= -3/2,0 = 2/3,6 = 4/3 
Agreement Structure Countries' Payoffs (7rl, 7r2,7F3) 
ffTT2, T3ý, f Ei, E2, E3J1 (0.815, 0.815, 0.815) 
2: f ITII, f T21, fT31, fE, 1, fE21, fE311 (0.749, 0.749, 0.749) 
3: 1f Tj, T2, T3ý, fE, 1, fE2lifE311 (0-754, 0.754, 0.754) 
4: ff Tjý, 1T21, fT31, tEi, E2, E311 (0.811, 0.811, 0.811) 
5: f {Tll, fT21, fT31, f Eil, f E2, E311 (0.840, 0.756, 0.756) 
6: f fT, 1, fT2J31, fEll, fE21, fE311 (0-744, 0.753, 0.753) 
7: ffT, 1,1T2, T31, tEll, fE2, E311 (0.834, 0.759, 0.759) 
8: f fT, 1, fT2, T31, f Ei, E21, {E311 (0-751, 0.759, 0.845) 
g: ff Tj, T2, T31, fEll, fE2A11 (0-847, 0.760, 0.760) 
10: ffT, 1, fT2, T31, ýEI, E2, E3J1 (0-806, 0.814, 0.814) 
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Concluding Remarks 100 
0 implies positive net benefits from partial environmental cooperation compared 
with the non-cooperative outcome . 
25 In this scenario tie-in is irrelevant, because 
even without it the JGA would be unstable (case (iv) of Section 4.3). 
Table 4.5 shows payoffs for the asymmetric structures 8,9 and 10, and their 
mirror images, under alternative bargaining rules-Utilitarian and Nash bargain- 
ing without side payments and symmetric bargaining with side payments-in each 
of the four paramet erizat ions. Payoffs in structures 1-7 are unaffected. Results 
remain the same in some scenarios but change in others. Under Nash bargaining 
and bargaining with side payments, tie-in becomes irrelevant in the first parame- 
terization (as in Table 4.1), since structure 9 is no longer attractive for player I in 
comparison to the JGA. Under the third parameter configuration (as in Table 4-3), 
a tie-in restriction makes the JGA unstable in both the Utilitarian case without 
side payments and the case with side payments; with Nash bargaining without 
any restrictions structure 7 is not a stable objection as in the other two cases, 
but structure 9 becomes a stable objection to the JGA. Changing bargaining rules 
makes no difference in the second and fourth parameterizations. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have described an analytical framework for investigating policy 
coordination choices when players can enter into selective and separate agreements 
with different partners along different policy dimensions. We have then applied 
our model of multi-dimensional agreement formation to the study of trade and 
environmental negotiations between three symmetric countries, focusing on the 
effects of a tie-in negotiation rule for the stability of multilateral cooperation over 
trade and environmental policies. 
Multilateral cooperation over environmental policy is hindered by an individual 
country's incentive to free ride on a partial environmental agreement formed by 
the other two, while trade cooperation is undermined by the incentive for two 
countries to form a trade bloc against a third country. It has been suggested that 
2'Note, however, that a higher 0 also implies a smaller difference in the net benefits between 
partial environmental cooperation and no cooperation. 
This is in the line -with the results of 
Barrett (1994), who shows that international environmental agreements can be self-enforcing 
only when they can marginally improve upon the non-cooperative outcome. 
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Table 4-5: Countries' Payoffs under Alternative Bargaining Rules 
-y == 2, q= -3/2,0 = 2/3,6 == 4/3 
Structure Countries' Payoffs 
Utilitarian Nash 
(7rl, 72) 73) 
Side Payments 
63/100,0 = 3/2 
8 (0-656,0.668, 0.704) (0-656, 0.656, 0.656) (0-685, 0.685, 0.685) 
9 (0.742,0.697, 0.697) (0.716, 0.712, 0.712) (0.712, 0.712, 0.712) 
10 (0.656,0.716, 0.716) (0.677, 0.702, 0.702) (0.697, 0.697, 0.697) 
[L = 63/100,0 = 3/4 
8 (0.764,0.793, 0.793) (0.760, 0.766, 0.769) (0.786, 0.786, 0.786) 
9 (0.838,0.810, 0.810) (0.822, 0.819, 0.819) (0.820, 0.820, 0.820) 
10 (0-764,0.805, 0.805) (0.773, 0.798, 0.798) (0-793, 0.793, 0.793) 
p- 1/10,0 = 2/5 
8 (0.862,0.863,0.933) 
9 (0.936,0.867,0.867) 
10 (0-897,0.905,0.905) 
p= 1/10,0 = 4/5 
(0.864,0.864,0.918) 
(0.917,0.875,0.875) 
(0.901,0.903,0.903) 
(0.886,0.886,0.886) 
(0.890,0.890,0.890) 
(0.902,0.902,0.902) 
8 (0.751,0.759,0.845) 
9 (0.847,0.760,0.760) 
10 (0-806,0.814,0.814) 
(0.758,0.759,0.832) 
(0.828,0.768,0.768) 
(0.810,0.812,0.812) 
(0.785,0.785,0.785) 
(0.789,0.789,0.789) 
(0.811,0.811,0.811) 
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one way to offset free-riding incentives and help sustain more cooperation would 
be to make trade cooperation conditional on environmental cooperation. 26 To do 
so, countries should commit to a tie-in restriction on international negotiations, 
which would rule out the possibility of signing single-issue agreements. Formally, 
such a restriction could be thought of as emerging in an initial constitutional stage 
in which countries can credibly commit to a certain negotiation process. 
Our analysis shows that conditionality could indeed play a positive role, by 
eliminating stable objections to the JGA. But in some cases negotiation tie-in 
could actually become a hurdle to multilateral cooperation, by making an otherwise 
stable JGA unstable. If this is the more likely scenario, the policy implication 
would be that conditionality should be rejected in favour of a flexible system where 
countries remain free to decide whether to negotiate multiple-issue agreements 
or single-issue agreements containing clauses that make them compatible with 
other agreements (e. g. trade rules allowing countries to use trade remedies against 
countries that are in violation of a formally separate environmental agreement). 
Our results also suggest that conditionality can only play a positive role with 
respect to "small" environmental problems (small in terms of the associated welfare 
costs and benefits in comparison with the costs and benefits of trade policies), but 
is more likely to be an impediment to cooperation for broader issues such as climate 
change. This provides a rationale for what seems to be the prevailing position in 
policy circles with respect to global climate treaties. 27 
26 This idea is implicit in the proposal for an International Agreement on Trade and Environ- 
ment (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1996). 
27 The need for a separate "World Environment Organization ( ... 
), an institutional and legal 
counterpart to the World Trade 
Organization", has been stressed bv Renato Ruggiero, Director- 
General of the WTO, in his opening speech at the High Symposium on Trade and Environment, 
15th March 1999. 
Chapter 5 
Trade Bloc Formation Under 
Imperfect Competition 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite the strengthening of the world trading system through the successful con- 
clusion of the Uruguay Round, there is still some concern that the formation of 
preferential trade agreements may result in the fragmentation of the world econ- 
omy. ' The risk is that "countries that join trading blocs will be more protectionist 
towards countries outside the blocs than they were before, so that the world as a 
whole will be hurt more than helped by moves that at first seem to be liberalizing 
in intent. " (Krugman, 1991, p. 9). 
This concern is supported by studies of trade bloc formation focused on per- 
fectly competitive markets, which find that the creation of customs union (CUs), 
while beneficial to the member countries, can be harmful to non-member countries 
and may reduce the welfare of the world as a whole. 2 
lAccording to Fratzsher (1996), 94% of world trade is conducted within or between the Eu- 
ropean Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association 
for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the period 1948-1994, GATT contracting parties 
notified 118 preferential trade agreements relating to trade in goods, of which 38 in the five years 
ending in 1994. Since the completion of the Uruguay Round, 80 additional PTAs covering trade 
in goods and services have been notified. See Whalley and Hamilton 
(1996) and Sampson (1996) 
for more information about the recent increase in the number of preferential trade agreements. 
2 For example, Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Kose and Riezman 
(1999) construct a pure 
exchange general equilibrium model with three countries and three goods, 
in which trade pat- 
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In this chapter, we want to examine the process of trade bloc formation in the 
context of imperfectly competitive markets. For this purpose, we employ a simple 
three-country model of intra-industry trade, in which governments can alter the 
strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms through the use of import tariffs 
and export subsidies. The subsidization of firms engaged in international rivalry 
is common practice in most industrialized countries, ' but cannot be explained by 
traditional trade theories: while import tariffs can improve a country's terms of 
trade, export subsidies do not appear to make much sense, since they improve the 
terms of trade of the importing country. The literature on strategic trade poliCY, 4 
on the other hand, has shown that imperfect competition can create new motives 
for the use of import tariffs and export subsidies: when domestic and foreign firms 
compete in the domestic market, Brander and Spencer (1984a, b) have shown that 
a tariff can be used to shift rents from foreign firms to the domestic firms and 
treasury; when domestic and foreign firms compete in a third country, Brander 
and Spencer (1985) have demonstrated that export subsidies can increase welfare 
by shifting profits from foreign to domestic firms. 5 
We describe international trade relations as a three-stage process. In the first 
stage, countries decide whether or not to form cooperative trade agreements. These 
can take three forms: 'pure' customs unions (CUs), in which member countries 
eliminate tariffs among themselves and set a common external tariff to maximize 
terns are determined by comparative advantage considerations. Using simulation techniques to 
compare optimal tariffs and welfare gains in alternative agreement structures, they show that for 
certain endowment distributions CUs can pose a threat to the multilateral trading system, since, 
due to the improvement in their terms of trade, member countries can obtain larger welfare gains 
than at the free trade equilibrium. 
3 Since direct payments by the government to exporters are prohibited by GATT/WTO rules, 
countries often use indirect forms of support. Examples of covert export subsidies are: currency 
retention schemes which involve a bonus on exports; provision of goods or services 
for use in the 
production of exported goods on terms more favourable than those 
for the production of goods 
for domestic consumption; export-related exemption, remission or deferral of direct taxes and 
social welfare charges; excess exemption, remission, or 
deferral of indirect taxes or import duties; 
and export credits extended at rates below the government's cost of 
funds. See Ray (1995) for a 
discussion. 
4See Brander (1995) for an extensive review of this literature. 
5 The profit-capture motive of trade intervention is most clearly seen when 
domestic and 
foreign firms are competing in a third country, since the home consumer surplus 
is not at issue. 
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their joint welfare'; agreements to coordinate the use of export subsidies only; 
7 and 'impure' CUs, involving the coordinated use of both policy instruments. In 
the second stage, tariffs and subsidies are selected-cooperatively among countries 
participating in an agreement and non-cooperatively between countries belonging 
to separate agreements. In the last stage, firms compete in quantities. 
There is a presumption that, when they are combined, export subsidies and 
import tariffs will 'neutralize' each other. This presumption is misleading in our 
setup, since the optimal response to a foreign export subsidy is never a fully coun- 
tervailing tariff. A similar result is obtained, in a two-country context, by Dixit 
(1984,1988) and Collie (1991). 8 
We analyze the welfare implications of alternative trade arrangements. Then, 
using the concept of Stable Agreement Structure developed in the previous chapter, 
we examine the sustainability of the Joint Global Agreement-entailing interna- 
tional cooperation on both policy variables. We find that, if the traded goods are 
homogeneous, 'Zmpure' CUs are stumbling blocs against the attainment of muffilat- 
eral trade cooperation. If instead products are nationally differentiated, trade bloc 
formation might or might not pose a threat to multilateral cooperation, depending 
on the degree of industry concentration and the extent of product differentiation. 
We show that the introduction of an international ban on export subsidies 
could make multilateral trade cooperation sustainable when it would not be oth- 
erwise. Therefore our analysis provides a rationale for recent strengthening of 
GATT/WTO rules against export subsidies (see Laird, 1999). 9 
6 An example of a pure CU is provided by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). 
7 The European Union can be considered an example of an 'impure' CU: its state aid policy 
restricts the capacity of national governments to support their firms and delegates to the Com- 
mission the task of ensuring that all subsidies granted within the EU are compatible with the 
single market objectives (see Cini and McGowan, 1998). 
8 Dixit (1984,1988) and Collie (1991) describe the following three-stage game: in the first 
stage, the foreign country sets its export subsidy; in the second stage, the domestic country 
chooses optimal tariffs; finally, domestic and foreign firms engage in 
Cournot competition. Both 
studies find that the optimal retaliation against a foreign export subsidy 
is a partially counter- 
vailing tariff. 
9An alternative rationale is suggested by Bagwell and Staiger 
(1994). In their model, export 
subsidies are used to coordinate the entry 
decision of firms. They show that, when subsdidy 
coordination does more to prevent entry than 
to promote entry, the world as a whole can be 
better off when export subsidies are banned. 
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There has been little attempt to look at trade bloc formation in models of 
strategic trade policy. Sinclair and Vines (1994) have extended Brander and 
Spencer (1984a)'s tariff model to consider the impact of the creation of CUs and 
free trade areas (FTAs) on the Nash equilibrium tariffs. However, they have not 
considered the welfare implications of trade bloc formation. In an infinitely re- 
peated version of Brander and Spencer (1985)s export subsidy game, Collie (1993) 
has shown that free trade can be sustained by the threat of retaliation with the 
Nash equilibrium export subsidies, provided that countries are similar and the dis- 
count factor is sufficiently high. A multi-country version of this model is employed 
by Collie (1997) to study the effects of trade bloc enlargement. Differently from 
our analysis, all these studies look at the effects of exogenous trade bloc formation, 
without considering countries' agreement choices. 
Our analysis is close in spirit to Yi (1996), who employs a multi-country exten- 
sion of Brander and Spencer (1984a)'s tariff model to describe endogenous trade 
bloc formation under imperfect competition. He addresses the issue of the sus- 
tainability of global free trade under alternative rules of CU formation. " The 
main difference with our analysis is that Yi (1996) assumes that import tariffs are 
the only available instrument, so that 'pure' CUs are the only potential threat 
to the global trading system. This allows him to reach a more optimistic conclu- 
sion about the sustainability of multilateral trade cooperation in the case of three 
ex-ante symmetric countries. 
A general result emerging from our analysis is that modelling trade negotiations 
as being on tariffs only can be misleading, i. e. might result in drawing incorrect 
conclusions about the negotiation outcomes. 
Various studies have examined how international tariff negotiations might be af- 
fected by the existence of alternative policy instruments. For example, Coopeland 
(1990) has analyzed the general case of bilateral tariff negotiations when there 
exist non-negotiable domestic policy instruments. Gatsios and Karp (1992) have 
looked at the imperfect harmonization of trade and industrial policies and note the 
IOYi (1996) finds that CUs are stepping stones towards global free trade if membership of a 
trade agreement is open to all players, but they might be stumbling blocs towards free trade if 
the formation of a trade bloc requires the agreement of all potential members and the number of 
negotiating countries exceeds a critical value. 
In the case of three countries, he finds that global 
free trade is always sustainable. 
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possibility of welfare reducing preferential trade agreements when members coordi- 
nate only the use of tariffs. A similar result is obtained by Richardson (1999), who 
shows that the uncoordinated use of domestic taxes/subsidies can render a 'Pure' 
CU unattractive. More recently, Richardson (1999), focusing on the interaction 
between trade and competition policies, finds that the formation of a CU improves 
members' welfare only if it goes beyond mere trade coordination. However, none 
of these studies examines the endogenous formation of trade blocs and the issue 
of the sustainability of multilateral trade cooperation. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we present a simple three- 
country model of intra-industry trade. In Section 5.3, we look at the welfare 
implications of alternative trade arrangements. In Section 5.4, we examine the 
stability of such arrangements. Section 5.5 considers the effects of the introduction 
of an international ban on export subsidies. Finally, section 5.6 contains some 
concluding remarks. 
5.2 The Model 
In this section, we describe a simple model of intra-industry trade between three ex- 
ante symmetric countries. The specification of production draws on the reciprocal- 
markets trade model first proposed by Brander (1981) and elaborated by Brander 
and Krugman (1983) and Dixit (1984). 
Each country iEI -= f 1,2,31 is endowed with an amount Ri of a numeraire 
good, which is transferred across countries to settle the balance of trade. 
A crucial assumption of the reciprocal- markets model is that markets are seg- 
mented, in the sense that firms make separate strategic decisions concerning dif- 
fI erent markets, rather than selling their output in a unified or integrated world 
market and relying on arbitrage to distribute it to different locations. 
" This as- 
sumption is appropriate for sectors of the economy in which firms have the ability 
to price discriminate between countries, thus maintaining a dominant position in 
their domestic markets. 12 
"Alternatively, one could assume that oligopolistic firms compete in an integrated market 
(see, for example, Horstmann and 'Markusen, 1986) or make a two stage 
decision, setting first 
their world-wide capacity, and then market specific quantities or prices 
(Venables, 1990). 
12 For example, there is some evidence of markets segmentation in the 
European car market (see 
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On the production side, we assume that n identical firms are located in each 
market-" All firms in a particular country produce an identical good at constant 
marginal cost c, but products are nationally differentiated. Let qik be sales in 
country k (destination) by a firm located in country i (origin), and Qk qikbe 
total sales in country k. 
Preferences of a representative consumer in country k can be described by the 
following quasilinear utility function 
Uk (mk) Yk) 0) = Mk + Vk =- Mk+ aYk- b0 
2+ 
1 -0 2 
2 
Yý 
2 
EYik k 
i 
where Mk is the consumption of the numeraire good", Yik is consumption by 
country k (destination) of a good produced in country i (origin), and Yk = Ei Yik 
is k's total consumption. The product differentiation parameter 0 ranges from 0 
(independent goods) to I (homogeneous goods). Country k's inverse demand for 
country Z's good is given by 
P. =a-b[(l ik - O)Yik + Oykl - (5.2) 
Market clearing requires that total consumption must be equal to total sales, i. e. 
Yik = nqik and Yk =nJ: j Yik - 
Governments can alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms 
through the use of import tariffs and export subsidies. Let tik denote country 
Vs tariffs on imports from country i andSki be its export subsidy (for home firms' 
exports to country i). 
The sequential structure of the model consists of three stages. In the first 
stage, countries decide whether to select policies unilaterally or form cooperative 
Flarn and Nordstrom, 1994) and in the market for computer chips (see Baldwin and Krugman, 
1988). 
13We assume that the number of firms in each country is fixed. This can be regarded as a short- 
run situation or as a situation in which there are legal or technical entry barriers. See Brander 
and Krugman (1983) and Markusen and Venables (1988) for an analysis of the implications of 
trade liberalization with free entry. 
14We assume that A-I, is large enough to guarantee a positive consumption of the numeraire 
good. 
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trade agreements . 
15 Countries may choose to coordinate the use of tariffs only. In 
this case, we assume that they form 'pure' customs unions (CU), eliminating tar- 
iffs among themselves 16 and selecting a common external tariff so as to maximize 
their joint welfare. 17 Alternatively, countries may decide to form agreements to 
cooperatively select export subsidies. A third option is to form 'impure' CUs, in- 
volving the coordinated use of both tariffs and subsidies. We rule out international 
transfers. 18 
In the second stage, tariffs and subsidies are selected- cooperatively among 
countries participating in an agreement and non- cooperatively between countries 
belonging to separate agreements. In the final stage, firms compete by choosing 
quantities in each market. As usual, we start by analyzing the last stage of the 
game, and solve for the equilibrium for the full game by backward induction. 
In the absence of transport costs, 19 the effective cost of supplying the traded 
good to country k for the firm located in country i is C+ tik - Sik and its profits 
are given by 
7ik - (Pik + Sik -C- tik)qik) (5-3) 
"We assume that countries can credibly commit to trade cooperation and that international 
trade agreements are binding. Our analysis thus differs from the strand of the literature which ar- 
gues against the legitimacy of assuming binding commitments in international trade negotiations 
(e. g. Bagwell and Staiger, 1997). 
16 One might also consider the more general case in which the CUs are characterized by non-zero 
tariffs between members. One institutional justification for the internal zero-tariff assumption 
is the fact that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits the formation of 
preferential trade agreements provided that "the duties and other restrictive regulations of com- 
merce are eliminated on substantially all trade between the constituents territories in products 
originating in such territories" (Article XXIV). 
17As underlined by Gatsios and Karp (1995) and Park (2000), trade negotiations will gener- 
ally involve a conflict between countries of different sizes. However, by focusing on symmetric 
countries, we remove the possibility of the emergence of this conflict. 
18While it may be that transfers are important, to analyze them one has to first know what 
happens in their absence. The role of side-payments in international trade negotiations is ana- 
lyzed by Kowalczyk (1994). 
"Differently from Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), we assume that firms do 
not incur any transport costs in supplying foreign markets. However, such costs are assumed to 
be prohibitive for any third-party arbitragers. 
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with associated first-order condition 20 
(97rik 
=a-c- b(1 + n)qik - bn0 
Z qjk + Sik - tik = 0- (5.4) Oqik 
Equation (5.4) represents the reaction functions (in implicit form) for the firms 
supplying market k. It shows the best-reply output of a firm, given whatever level 
of output is produced by the other firms. Notice that the profit function satisfies 
Hahn (1962)'s condition for stability of a Cournot equilibrium: 
d7rik 
< 07 vz: ý 31 dqjk 
that is, each firm's marginal revenue in one market declines as the output of any 
other firm rises. 21 Solving (5.4) for all kC1, we obtain domestic and foreign sales 
in country k at the Cournot equilibrium: 
a(1 +n 
qkk (tik, Sik 
qik (t 's') ik ik 6 I 
(5.5) 
(5-6) 
where a=a-c is a measure of market size and is assumed to be positive (since 
otherwise a firm will never produce any output), 6= b(I +n- On) (1 +n+ 20n) > 0, 
and t and s' are the vectors of tariffs and subsidies for all firms selling in country ik ik 
k 
Notice that the quantities produced for market k do not depend on variables 
in markets other than k. As noted by Brander (1981), this separability property 
depends crucially on the assumption of constant marginal costs. 22 
Negative solutions to equations (5-5) -(5.6) are possible but not meaningful, 
so the reaction functions are truncated at zero. We rule out corner solutions, 
assuming that in equilibrium each firm produces a strictly positive outcome. Since 
20With linear demand, since profits functions are concave, the second-order conditions for 
profit-maximization are satisfied and there exist a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
2 'Expression (5.2) also implies that the strategic variables qik and qjk are strategic substitutes 
as defined by Bulow et al. (1985). 
22jf marginal costs depended on production levels, market separability would 
be lost and one 
could not rule out the kind of strategies considered 
by Krugman (1984), where an advantage 
given to a firm in one market spills over 
into a further advantage in another market. 
On) + On(E 
6 
tik - 
Ei: 
ýýk 
Sik) 
7 
a (I +n- On) + (I +n+ On) (Sik - tik) + Ontjk 
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all firms sell both at home and abroad, market equilibrium involves intra-industry 
trade, even when firms located in different countries sell homogeneous products 
(cross- hauling). 
Equations (5.5)-(5.6) imply the following comparative statics effects: 
dqik 1+n-On 
dsik -6> 01 
dqkk 
dsik 
dqjk 
dsik 
On 
6 
dqik 
dtik 
dqkk 
dtik 
I +n+ On 
6 
dqjk OP, 
> 01 
dtik 
(5.7) 
(5-8) 
(5-9) 
(5.10) 
From (5.7) and (5-8) it follows that, when a country increases its subsidy for 
exports to a given market, its sales in that market increase, while the sales of 
all other countries fall. Equations (5.9) and (5.10) imply that, when a country 
increases its tariff on imports from a given country, imports from that county fall, 
while imports from other countries and its own domestic sales increase. 
Given the quasilinearity of the utility function, if profits and tax revenues 
are rebated back uniformly to all consumers, country Vs welfare can be written 
as the sum of domestic consumer surplus (CS), government revenues (GR), and 
total profits of domestic firms in all markets (11). Using (5.4), we can express a 
firm's domestic and foreign profits as 7kk = bq 2 k) and 7rki = bq 2Z ki kk 
(tik 
i Si ki 
(t 
I Sý 
respectively. Welfare can thus be written as 
Wk (ti-k) S-ik i 
tk'i) Sýki) CSk+ GRk + Hk 
')-1: nqik (t S--* )Pik (t-" )4)+ Vk 
(tik, Sik ik ik ik ik 
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In the model described above, there are two sorts of gains from trade: the pro- 
competitive gains generated by the reduced market power of the domestic industry, 
and the increase in the varZety of goods available to consumers. It is important to 
notice that, due to the quasilinearity of the utility function and to the assumption 
of market segmentation, there are no terms of trade effects. " 
5.3 Agreement Structures and Welfare 
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of alternative trade arrange- 
ments. Since the countries are symmetric, we can limit our analysis to the following 
nine agreement structures: 24 
1. Joint Global Agreement (JGA): 
ýýtli t27 t3ji f Sli S2) S311; 
2. No agreement on either issue (Nash Equilibrium): 
f ftl I) ft2j) ft3j) fSl I) fS21) fS311; 
3. Global tariff agreement, no agreement on subsidies: 
f Itl) t21 t3ji f Slji JS21) f 83111 
4. Global agreement on subsidies, no tariff agreement: 
I ftl Ii ft2j) ft3j) f Sl) S2) S311-) 
5. Partial agreement on subsidies, no tariff agreement: 
f ftl I) ft2ji ft317 f Sl) 821) f S311; 
6. Partial tariff agreement, no agreement on subsidies ('pure' CU): 
I Itl, t217 1617 1 Sljý 18217 f S311; 
7. Partial overlapping agreements on tariffs and subsidies ('impure' CU): 
f ftli t2li ft3j) f Sl) 821) fS311; 
23As remarked by Yi (1996), terms of trade effects are placed solely on the numeraire good. 
24Notice that we exclude the scenario in which one country coordinates the use of 
import 
tariffs with one partner and the use of export subsidies with another, 
i. e. agreement structure 
If t1, t2ji ft3ji IS11,182,8311 and its mirror images. 
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8. Global tariff agreement and partial agreement on subsidies: 
f ftli t27 t3j) f SI) S21) fS311; 
9. Global agreement on subsidies and partial tariff agreement: 
f ft17 t217 ft3j) fSI) S2) S311- 
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For simplicity, and without loss of generality, in the rest of our analysis we set 
ab=I. We first consider the case in which the traded goods are homogeneous 
(0 1), and then examine the case in which firms produce nationally differentiated 
goods (0 < 1). 
5.3.1 The Case of Homogeneous Goods 
The optimal policies and equilibrium welfare functions for the case of homogeneous 
goods can be found in Appendix C. Table 5.1 reports the welfare gains obtained in 
different agreement structures, under alternative assumptions about the number 
of firms located in each market. 
As expected, welfare gains increase with the number of firms located in each 
market. This is due to pro-competitive effects associated with the decrease in 
industry concentration. Notice that, as n increases, the difference between the 
welfare gains obtained in different structures falls. The intuition behind this result 
is that, as markets become more competitive, the profit-shifting incentives for the 
use of import tariffs and export subsidies tend to disappear. 25 
The analysis of Table 5.1 also reveals that agreement structures 1,4 and 9 and 
agreement structures 5 and 7 yield the same welfare gains. This implies that tariff 
coordination is irrelevant for countries that are already coordinating the use of 
export subsidies. 
Comparing the welfare gains obtained under alternative agreement structures, 
we obtain the following result: 
Lemma 5.1 In the case of hoTnogeneous goods, the welfare ranking is always as 
follows: W1. 
,2 
W5,7 > 12 > 
Wkl, 4,9 > W3 > W6 > W2 > k 1,2 k 
W6 > 5,7 > W8 3 
M3 
2' This can also be seen from Figures 5.3 and 5.4 in Appendix C. The analytical results presented 
in Appendix C show that, as n --+ oo, optimal tariffs and subsidies in all agreement structures 
tend to zero. 
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Wk = 0.4922 
Table 5.1: Agreement Structures and Countries' Welfare (Homogeneous Goods) 
(0 = 1) 
Agreement Structure Countries' Welfare 
nn=5n 
1) 
f ftli t27 t3ji IS17 S2) S311 Wk = 0.5 
Wk 0.5 Wk= 0.5 
2) 
f ftl I) ft217 ft3j) f Sl I if S21i 
f S311 Wk= 0.4339 
3) 
If t1i t21 t3ji IS11) I S21i IS311 
4) 
Ift1j) jt217 jt3j) ý81) 82) S311 
5) 
f ftl 17 ft2j) jt3j) fSl) S21) fS311 
6) 
f ft17 t2ji ft317 f8117 18217 fS3jj 
7) 
ýftl) t2ji ft3ji f Sl) S21) f 8311 
8) 
f ftl) t2) t3ji f8li S21i fS311 
9) 
f ftl, t2ji ft3li f Sli 82) S311 
Wk=: 0.5 
WI, 2 :: = 0.51 
W3 = 0.4 
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Wk = 0.4902 
Wk= 0.4994 
Wk=: 0.5 
Wk= 0.4952 
Wk= 0.4997 
Wk= 0.5 
Wl, 2 = 0.5007 Wl, 2 = 0.5003 
W3 = 0.4871 W3 = 0.4941 
Wl, 2 =: 0.4873 WI, 2 =: 0.4989 
WI, 2 = 0.4995 
W3= 0.4229 W3= 0.4891 W3= 0.4948 
WI, 2 = 0.51 Wl, 2 = 0.5007 WI, 2 = 0.5003 
W3= 0.4 W3= 0.4871 W3= 0.4941 
WI, 2 = 0.5625 Wl, 2 = 0.5208 WI, 2 = 0.5139 
W3= 0.3437 W3= 0.4549 W3= 0.4707 
Wk= 0.5 Wk= 0.5 Wk= 0.5 
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PROOF: See Appendix C. 
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Therefore, relative to the Nash Equilibrium, all preferential trade agreements 
will always increase the welfare of the member countrtes and decrease the welfare 
of the non-member country. 
Compared to the Joint Global Agreement, two countries will always loose by 
coordinating tariffs only (structure 6) and gain by coordinating the use of export 
subsidies (structures 5 and 7 and 8). The reason behind this result is that, by 
forming a preferential trade agreement on subsidies, two countries are able to shift 
rents from the firms located in the non-member country to their domestic firms 
and treasury. 26 
5.3.2 The Case of Heterogeneous Goods 
We now turn our attention to the case of differentiated goods. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
report the welfare gains obtained in the nine agreement structures, under different 
assumptions about the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms 
located in each country. 27 
From Tables 5.2 and 5.3, we can see that welfare gains increase with the degree 
of product differentiation (i. e. decrease with 0). The reason behind this result is 
that, since individuals enjoy variety, an increase in product differentiation implies 
an increase in consumer surplus. 
By comparing the welfare gains obtained in the nine agreement structures, we 
obtain the following result: 
Lemma 5.2 In the case of heterogeneous goods, the welfare ranking of alternative 
agreement structures depends on the degree of product differentiation and on the 
number of firms located in each market. 
PROOF: from Tables 5.2 and 5.3, we can see that countries' preferences over 
alternative trade arrangements vary with n and 0. For example, in Table 5.2 
26 This can be seen by comparing the equilibrium policies reported in Appendix C. It is easy 
to verify that, relative to the JGA, in structures 5,7 and 8, countries 1 and 2 always choose 
to subsidize less their exports to country 3 and to subsidize more their exports to each other's 
markets. 
27The analytical expressions for the equilibrium policies and welfare functions used to derive 
the results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 can be obtained upon request. 
Agreement Structures and Welfare 116 
Table 5.2: Agreement Structures and Countries' Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods) 
(n = 1) 
Agreement Structure Countries' Welfare 
0= 2/10 0= 1/2 0= 8/10 
1) 
I ýtl) t21 t3j) I Sli S21 S311 Wk= 1.0088 Wk= 0.7222 Wk= 0.5655 
2) 
f ftl 17 ft2ji ft3j) f 811) fS2 I if S311 Wk-0.7551 Wk= 0.5907 Wk= 0.4856 
3) 
fftl7t21t317 fSl I) fS21i fS3jj Wk= 0.8907 Wk= 0.6817 Wk= 0.5526 
4) 
f ftl I) ft217 ft317 fS17 S2) S311 
5) 
f ftl I) jt2ji ft3j) fSl) S21i fS311 
6) 
f ftl) t2j) ft3j) f Sl I) f S21i f 8311 
7) 
I ftli t2ji ft3j) fSl) S21) f S311 
8) 
f JtI7 t2, t317 IS17 S217 ýSffl 
9) 
f ftl, t2ji ft3ji f8li 827 S311 
Wk = 1-0088 Wk= 0.7222 Wk= 0.5655 
W1,2 = 0-9101 WI, 2 = 0.6903 
WI, 2 = 0.5574 
W3 = 0.0.6957 
W3 = 0.5203 
W3 = 0.4329 
WI, 2 = 0.8306 WI, 2 = 0.6491 WI, 2 = 0.5356 
W3= 0.7334 W3= 0.5650 W3= 0.4672 
WI, 2 - 0-9101 Wl, 2 :: = 0.6903 WI, 2 =- 0.5574 
W3=- 0.6957 W3= 0.5203 W3= 0.4329 
Wl, 2 = 0.9788 Wl, 2 = 0.7426 Wl, 2 = 0.6068 
W3= 0.7987 W3= 0.5500 W3= 0.4072 
Wk = 1-088 Wk = 0.7222 Wk = 0.5655 
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Table 5.3: Agreement Structures and Countries' Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods) 
(n = 8) 
Agreement Structure Countries' Welfare 
0= 2/10 0= 1/2 0= 8/10 
1) 
f JtI7 t2) t3j) ISI) S27 S311 Wk= 1.0683 Wk= 0.7485 Wk= 0.5760 
2) 
f ftl Ii ft217 ft3j) f 811) fS2 Ii fS311 Wk= 0.9320 Wk= 0.6973 Wk= 0.5585 
3) 
f ft17 t27 t3ji f 8117 f S21) f S311 
4) 
Iftl1i ft2j) jt3j) 181) S2) S311 
5) 
ýJtlj) ýt2j) ýt3j) ýSli S21i f S311 
6) 
f ftl) t2ji ft3ji f Sl I if S21) 
f S311 
7) 
I Itli t2ji jt3j) f Sli S217 fS311 
8) 
f ft17 t21 t3j) f Sl) S21i fS311 
9) 
f ftl, t2j) ft317 fS17 821 8311 
Wk= 0.9547 Wk= 0.7140 Wk= 0.5705 
Wk = 1.0683 Wk = 0.7485 
Wk = 0.5760 
Wl, 2 = 1.0242 WI, 2 -0.7440 
Wl, 2 = 0.5766 
W3 = 0.8606 W3 = 0.6320 
W3 = 0.5291 
Wl, 2 = 0.9531 Wl, 2 = 0.7148 Wl, 2 = 0.5694 
W3 = 0.8926 
W3 = 0.6639 
W3 = 0.5449 
Wl, 2 =- 1.0242 WI, 2 = 0.7440 Wl, 2 = 0.5766 
W3 = 0.8606 
W3 
-- 0.6320 W3 = 0.5291 
Wl, 2 = 1.0356 Wl, 2 = 0.7542 Wl, 2 = 0.5867 
W3 = 0.8793 W3 = 0.6401 
W3 = 0.5278 
Wk- 1.0683 Wk= 0.7485 Wk= 0.5760 
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countries I and 2 obtain higher welfare gains in structure 8 than in structure 1. 
if 0= 1/2 and 0= 8/10 but not if 0= 2/ 10.28 This implies that multilateral 
cooperation is more attractive when the traded goods are more dissimilar. Also 
notice that in Table 5.2 countries I and 2 never gain by moving from structure 1 
to structure 7; in Table 5.3, however, this move is profitable for the case in which 
0= 8/10. Therefore multilateral cooperation is more attractive when the industry 
is more concentrated. Q. E. D. 
5.4 The Outcome of the '11-ade Negotiations 
Having examined the welfare implications of alternative trade arrangements, we 
can now turn to the analysis of the first stage of the game, i. e. countries' agreement 
choices. As a solution, we use the concept of Stable Agreement Structure developed 
in the previous chapter. Here we just recall the two key definitions: 
Definition 5.1 A Stable Agreement Structure is a structure which cannot be 
blocked. 
Definition 5.2 A coalition of one or more players constitutes a blocking objection 
to a proposed agreement structure if and only if. - (i) it is profitable, z. e. at least one 
member of the blocking coalition gains from the deviation and no member loses; 
and (ii) it is immune from further deviations. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the stability definition is recursive: to be 
stable, a structure must not be blocked; and to block, an objection must involve an 
arrangement that is itself stable. This consistency requirement rules out coalitional 
deviations which are not themselves immune from further deviations. 
Applying Definitions I and 2 to the case of homogeneous goods, we obtain the 
following result: 
Proposition 5.1 In the case of homogeneous goods, 'impure' CUs are the only 
stable negotiation outcome. 
28jt is easy to verify that, when n=1,11" 
1,4,9 > IV8 if and only if 0<0.1305. k 1,2 
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PROOF: from Lemma 5.1, we know that agreement structure 7 is welfare im- 
proving for countries I and 2, relative to all other agreement structures, except 
structure 8. However, the latter is not stable, since country 3 will always object 
to it by leaving the tariff agreement. Structure 7, on the other hand, cannot be 
blocked by country 3. It follows that the 'impure' CU structure is the only stable 
negotiation outcome. 29 
Therefore 'impure' CUs are stumbling blocs against the attamment of multi- 
lateral trade cooperation. Since world welfare is always lower in the case of an 
'impure' CU than in the JGA, Proposition 5.1 supports the concern that the world 
as a whole will be hurt more than helped by the formation of regZonal trading blocs. 
Moving to the cases of heterogeneous products, we find: 
Proposition 5.2 W`hen the goods are nationally differentiated, international trade 
negotiations will result in the formation of the JGA or of an 'impure' CU, depend- 
ing on the degree of Zndustry concentration and on the extent of product differen- 
hation. 
PROOF: from Table 5.2, we can see that the welfare gains achieved in structure 
I (and in the equivalent structures 4 and 9) are larger than the gains obtained in 
any other agreement structure. This suggests that, when goods are differentiated 
and the industry is extremely concentrated (only 3 national firms are competing in 
each market), the JGA will be the only stable outcome. In this case, the members 
of an 'impure' CU gain more (in terms of product variety and increased domestic 
competition) by including the third country than they gain (in terms of profit- 
shifting) by excluding it. Table 5.3 shows that, if the industry is more competitive 
(24 firms are competing in each market) and traded goods are characterized by a 
low degree of product differentiation (e. g. 0= 8/10), countries I and 2 can gain by 
putting forward structure 7, which country 3 will not be able to block. Therefore, 
if the product variety and pro-competitive effects of trade luberalization are small, 
'impure' CUs represent a threat to multilateral trade cooperation. Q. E. D. 
Notice that the rather pessimistic results obtained in our analysis are in contrast 
with the more optimistic conclusions of Yi (1996) who, assuming that import tariffs 
'9Structure 5--which is equivalent to structure 7--is also a stable outcome. 
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are the only available policy instrument, finds that free trade is the only stable 
outcome of the tariff negotiations between three ex-ante symmetric countries. 30 
5.5 An International Ban on Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies are prohibited by GATT rules. " However, governments are often 
able to use indirect forms of export support. These include: more favourable 
credit conditions (the difference between these and the normal conditions applied 
to producers for the home market is paid by the government); insurance of certain 
risks (for example, that the foreign imported defaults) paid by the government; 
and promotional activities (such as trade fairs, advertising, etc. ) organized by 
public agencies. For this reason, the WTO has recently attempted to strengthen 
the rules against the use of export subsidies (see Laird, 1999). " 
In this section, we examine how the introduction of an effective ban on ex- 
port subsidies would affect the outcome of the trade negotiations between three 
ex-ante symmetric countries. When import tariffs are the only available policy 
instrument, there are only five possible agreement structures, which, given the 
symmetry assumption, can be restricted to the following three: 
30yi (1996) employs a multi-country extension of Brander ans Spencer (1984a)'s tariff game 
and focuses on the case in which only one firm is located in each country (n = 1). He computes 
the critical number of countries such that free trade is a stable outcome under both the open 
regionalism and unanimous regionalism rules. This is an increasing function of the degree of 
product differentiation. For example, for 0=0.1, free trade is a stable outcome if there are less 
than 15 countries, while for 0=1, the critical value is 4. 
"In the original GATT agreement in 1947 there was very little discipline on subsidies. The 
first substantial obligations regarding the use of export subsides were introduced in 1955 (see 
Article XVI, paragraphs 2-5). A Subsidies Code was adopted at the Tokyo Round and revised at 
the Uruguay Round by the "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures". The latter 
distinguishes between prohibited, actionable and nonactionable subsidies. See Jackson (1998) for 
a discussion of the evolution of the rules on subsidies and countervailing duties. 
32 A panel adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in February 2000, requires, for 
the first time, a company to repay in full an illegal member subsidy from a member government. 
This case involves a dispute brought against Australia by the US over AW million in export 
subsidies to a producer of automotive leather. Two other recent cases involve export subsidies 
worth billions of WS: one rules against US tax exemptions for exporters; the other rules that 
Brazil has failed to lift the export subsidies to its jet aircraft industries, as required in a previous 
panel. 
An International Ban on Export Subsidies 
I. Global Free Trade: 
ff tl) t2) t3l 1; 
2. Nash Equilibrium: 
f ftlb ft217 ft3jj; 
3. Partial tariff agreement ('pure' CU): 
f ftl) t2j) ft311- 
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Tables 5.4-5.6 report the welfare gains obtained in the tariff-only agreement 
formation game, for the same parameter combinations considered in Tables 5.1- 
5.3.33 
Comparing the welfare gains obtained in the three alternative agreement struc- 
tures, we find: 
Lemma 5.3 When governments are banned from using export subsidies, the wel- 
fare ranking is always as follows: WI k > W3 > W2 > W3. 1,2 k3 
PROOF: This result emerges from the analysis of Tables 5.4-5.6. Numerical sim- 
ulations show that Lemma 5.3 holds for any degree of product differentiation and 
industry concentration, i. e. V0<0<1, n>1. The reason behind this result 
is that the gains associated with multilateral trade liberalization (i. e. the increase 
in domestic competition, product variety and export profits) always outweigh the 
corresponding welfare costs (i. e. the fall in domestic profits and government rev- 
enues). Q. E. D. 
The result in Lemma 5.3 can also be seen from Figures 5.1 and 5.2, where we 
plot the welfare functions corresponding to the three agreement structures for the 
case of homogeneous goods (0 = 1) and the case in which each country has only 
one firm (p, = 1). 
This result follows directly from Lemma 5.3: 
Proposition 5.3 When govemments are bannedfrom ustng export substdies, global 
free trade Zs the only stable negotiation outcome. 
33The analytical expressions for optimal policies and equilibrium welfare functions for the 
tariff-only game can be obtained upon request. 
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Table 5.4: Agreement Structures and Countries' Welfare (Homogeneous Goods) 
(0 = 1) 
Agreement Structure Countries' Welfare 
n-In=5n=8 
1) fjt17t27t3jj Wk = 0.4688 Wk == 0.4981 Wk = 0.4992 
2) f ftl Ii ft2ji 1611 Wk = 0.42 Wk = 0.4893 Wk 0.4949 
3) f ftl) t2j) ft3jj WI, 2 = 0.4574 W1,2 = 0.4967 W1,2 0.4986 
W3 = 0.4055 W3 = 0.4880 W3 = 0.4944 
Table 5.5: Agreement Structures and Countries' Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods) 
(n = 1) 
Agreement Structure Countries' Welfare 
0= 2/10 0= 1/2 0= 8/10 
1) jjtl7t21t3jj Wk= 0.8854 Wk= 0.6667 Wk= 0.5324 
2) fftl I) ft2j) ft311 Wk - 0.7517 Wk = 0.58 
Wk = 0.4710 
3) If tl i t2j) 
f t3jj W1,2 = 0.8262 W1,2 = 0.6356 W1,2 = 0.5151 
W3 = 0.7297 W3 = 0.5523 W3 = 0.4491 
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Figure 5.1: Welfare Gains (Homogeneous Goods) - 
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Table 5.6: Agreement Structures and Countries' Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods) 
(n - 8) 
Agreement Structure Countries' Welfare 
2/10 1/2 8/10 
1)f ftl 
i 
t2) t3l I 
W11i ft2j) ft3jj 
f ftli t2ji ft3jj 
Wk 
=1.0642 
Wk = 1.0492 
Wk= 0.7474 
Wk 
Wl, 2:::::::::::: 1.0581 WI, 2 
0.7384 
Wk= 0.5757 
Wk-0.5677 
0.7449 Wl, 2= 0.5743 
W3 = 1.0435 W3 = 0.7315 W3 = 0.5611 
PROOF: since global free trade (structure 1) yields larger welfare gains than any 
other tariff arrangements, no country will ever want to deviate from it. Q. E. D. 
Combining Propositions 5.1-5.3, we can thus conclude that, in the case of 
three ex-ante symmetric countries, the introduction of an effective ban on subsi- 
dies would make multilateral trade cooperation sustainable when it would not be 
otherwise. 
Proposition (5.3) is in line with the results obtained by Yi (1996) for the case of 
three ex-ante symmetric countries. Notice, however, that his optimistic conclusion 
about the sustainability of free trade would be misleading if countries were able to 
use export subsidies. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have studied the formation of trade blocs when markets are im- 
perfectly competitive and governments can alter the strategic interaction between 
oligopolistic firms through the use of import tariffs and export subsidies. 
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Using a simple model of intra-industry trade between three ex-ante symmetric 
countries, we have obtained the following results: 
e Three factors determine whether preferential trade agreements pose a threat 
to the multilateral trading system: which policy instruments are at gov- 
ernment disposal, the degree of industry concentration, and the extent of 
product differentiation-, 
* When both import tariffs and export tariffs are available, and the traded 
goods are homogeneous, 'impure' CUs-involving the coordinated use of both 
policy instruments-are always stumbling blocs towards multilateral trade 
cooperation; 
* When both policy instruments are available and firms sell nationally differ- 
entiated products, multilateral cooperation is sustainable if the degrees of 
product differentiation and industry concentration are large enough; 
9 When countries are banned from using export subsidies, global free trade is 
the only stable negotiation outcome. 
These findings provide a rationale for the recent attempts to strengthen inter- 
national rules against the use of export subsidies. 
A more general point emerges from our analysis: when governments can use 
different trade policy instruments, trade bloc formation should be described as a 
mulh-dimensional agreement formation game; focusing on one policy dimension 
only might result in drawing incorrect conclusions about the negotiation outcomes. 
We conclude by pointing out three directions of further research. First, it would 
be important to employ a multi-country version of our model to examine how 
the trade negotiation outcome are affected by changes in the number of parties 
involved. Second, it would be interesting to look at the case of heterogeneous 
countries; this would require the analysis of intra-agreement bargaining problems, 
in order to understand how agreement members divide total surplus. Finally, the 
strategic trade policy literature has shown that governments can use a wide range of 
instruments (import tariffs, export subsidies, domestic subsidies, voluntary export 
restraints, R&D subsidies, competition policy, etc. ) to shift rents from 
foreign 
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to domestic firms. One could consider how the availability of different policy 
instruments can alter the process of trade bloc formation. 
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Appendix C 
In what follows, we report the optimal policies and the corresponding welfare 
functions for the nine feasible agreement structures. We focus on two market 
structures: one in which n firms are located in each country, selling homogeneous 
products (0 = 1); and one in which there are three firms, one in each market 
(n = 1), selling differentiated products (0 < 1). We use subscripts to denote 
countries and superscripts to indicate the agreement structures. 
Notice that, due to the quasilinearity of the utility function and to the assump- 
tion of market segmentation, a country's optimal policies are always independent 
on the policies of the rest of the world, i. e. there i8 no strategic interdependence 
between countries. 
The Case of Homogeneous Products 
I- If tl7t27 t317 ISli S27 S311: 
ilk =: 
o7 
I-1 
Sik - 2n' 
Wkl:::::::::::: 
I, 
(5.12) 
2 
ftl I) ft2ji ft3ji fSl b f821) fS3 I I: 
2+n 
ik I+ 7n + lln2 + 3n3l 
21+ 3n + 3n 
2 
Sik 
1+ 7n + lln2+ 3n 3 
2 n(6 + 49n + 136n 
2+ 154n 3+ 66n 4+ 9n 5) (5.13) w lln2 + 3n3) 2(l + 7n + 
If ftl) t27 t317 f 8117 f S21, fS311: 
ik 
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31+n Sik = 
2(3 + 5n)2' 
8+ 30p, + 25p, 
2(3 + 5n, )2 
1) f t2 1) jt3 1) fSI) S2) 83 11: 
t4-I 
ik - 2n' 
4 
Sik 
w4 
2 
I) ýt2j) ft3ji fSli 821) ýSffl: 
t5 = t5 -1 12 21 - 2' 
t5 = t5 = 85 = 85 31 32 31 31 
t5= t5 -I 
+2n +3n 2 
13 23 -I+ 7n + 9n2+ 3n2l 
552 
S12 = S21 
n 
s5= 85 -In 13 23 -I+ 7n, + 9n2+ 3n2 
(5.14) 
(5-15) 
I+ 13p, + 58n' + 78p, 3+ 45n 4+ 9n 5 (5.16) 
1,2 2(l + n)(I + 6n + 3n2)2 
5 n(6 + 31n + 69n 
2+ 45p, 3+ 9n 4) (5.17) 
2(l + n)(I + 6n + 3n2 
)2 
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tl 17f t27 t3ji f Sl I If S21) 
f S311: 
t6= t6 -= 0 12 21 
t6 == t6 -I+ 
4n + 6n2 
31 32 -2+ 14n + 29n2 + 18n3' 
t6= t6 -1+ 
3n+3n 2 
13 23 -I+ 7n + lln2+ 3n3 
s6= S6 _I 
+4n+3n 2 
12 21 2n + lOn2+ 9n3 
86= S6 -1+n 13 23 -I+ 7n + lln2 + 3n 
s6 86 -1+n3 31 31 -2+ 14n + 29n2 + 18n , 
w6 
1 ý3 
+ 82n + 974n 2+ 6568n 3+ 27733n 4+ 76516n 5+6 1,2 
o- 
139835n 
+167990n 7+ 128832n 8+ 59418n 9+ 14661nlo + 1458n" I 
(5.18) 
W6 ýn(24 + 472n + 4024n 2+ 19476n 3+ 58930n 4+ 115793n 5 3 
+148298n 6+ 120462n 7+ 58122n 8+ 14661n 9+ 1458nlo 11 
(5.19) 
where o- = 2(l + 2n)(2 + lOn + 9n 
2)2(l + 7n + lin' + 3n 3)2 
ftli t2 Iý ft3ji f SI, 821ý f S311: 
7 t12 : --": 
t2l 
7= t7 = 85 = 85 t3l 32 31 31 
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t7t71+ 2n + 3n 
2 
13 23 1+ 7n + 9n2+ 3n2 
s772 12 S21 -1 
TI 
873= 87 -In 1 23 -I+ 7n + 9n2 + 3n2l 
w7 
_I+ 
13n + 58n 2+ 78n 3+ 45n 4+ 9n 5 
1,2 - 2(l + n)(1 + 6n + 3n2)2 
(5.20) 
7_ n(6 + 31n + 69n 
2+ 45n 3+ 9n 4) 
Wý 
2(l + n)(1 + 6n + 3n2)2 
8.1 Itl) t2 i t3 811 S2 
1) f S3 11: 
t8 t8 t8t8=t8= t8 = S8 S8 =0 12 21 31 32 13 23 31 31 
8 
88 S12 21 
n 
88= S8 _IP, 13 23 4, o. (l + P, )' 
W18,2 -5+ 
4n (5.22) 
8(l + n)' 
W3c8 -I 
+6n+4n 2 (5.23) 
S(I + n)2 
9- f ýtl 
i 
t2 t3 1) f8l) S2) S311: 
t9 =t9=0 12 21 
9=t9=t9t9= S9 = S9 =I t3l 32 13 23 12 21 2n' 
99=: S9 = S9 -1 13 23 31 31 n) 
Wk9 
I. 
(5.24) 
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Proof of Lemma 5.1 
From the analysis of equations (5-12)-(5.24), it straightforward to verify that, 
V0< 0<1, n> 
w8 
- 1,2 
w7,5 >o 1,2 
7,5 Wý, 
2 - 
1,4,9 w>0 
k 
W 1,4,9 wý >0 -k 
W3_ 
k 
W6 >O 1,2 
W6 
_ 1,2 
W2>0 
k 
w 2_ W6>0ý 
3 
W6 
- 3 
W5 > 01 3 
5 wý 
- 
7> (). wý 
The welfare ranking of Lemma 5.1 emerges also from the analysis of Figures 
(5.3) and (5.4) in the next page, in which we plot the welfare gains obtained by 
the three countries under alternative agreement structures. 
Q. E. D. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
In this thesis we have examined different aspects of international relations on 
trade and environment. In the first part of the thesis, we have employed a com- 
mon agency model of politics to examine how the existence of organized green and 
producer interest groups affects the political determination of trade and environ- 
mental policies. To our knowledge, ours is the only attempt to examine the role 
of interest groups on the I. otnt determination of trade and environmental policies. 
We have focused our political economy analysis on two large countries linked 
through trade and transboundary pollution. In this setup, unilateral efforts to 
reduce pollution by one country shift the comparative advantage of producing 
'dirty' goods in favor of the other country. This implies an increase in foreign 
emissions, which the domestic residents dislike as well. The magnitude of these 
ýpollution leakages' depends on the extent of the emission spillovers and the terms 
of trade effects. 
In Chapter 2, we have investigated the influence of green lobbies on the national 
and supra-national determination of trade and environmental policies. We have 
shown that the existence of 'pollution leakages' reduces the incentives of environ- 
mental groups to lobby for higher domestic pollution taxes. The main result of our 
analysis is that the impact of green lobbies on the comparative efficiency of uni- 
lateral and cooperahve enwonmental policZes depends on the type of trade regime 
and on the magnitude of pollution leakages. In the absence of pre-existing inter- 
national trade agreements, the presence of green lobbies always biases pollution 
taxes upwards. In this case, if the size of the lobbies is large enough, uncoordinated 
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pollution taxes are closer to the efficient Pigouvian solution than internationally 
coordinated taxes. If, however, governments are bound by international trade 
rules, and the leakage effects are large enough, green lobbying could bias unilat- 
eral pollution taxes downwards. In this case, environmental policy coordination is 
unambiguously efficiency enhancing. 
In Chapter 3, we have extended our analysis to examine the case in which both 
environmental and producer interests are politically organized. We have shown 
that the nature of the relationship between the two lobby groups depends on three 
factors: the type of policy regZme, whether the dectsZon-making process is centralized 
or decentralized, and the magnitude of the pollution leakages. 
Our analysis predicts that, when trade and environmental policies are selected 
unilaterally and in isolation and the leakages effects are large enough, environmen- 
tal and producer groups will be allied against a unilateral increase in domestic 
pollution taxes and in favor of protectionist trade policies. 
In a regime in which both policy instruments are available, governments can 
eliminate 'pollution leakages' by combining the use of pollution taxes (to reduce 
domestic emissions) and import tariffs (to avoid increasing foreign emissions). In 
this case, green and producer groups will unambiguously be allied over trade policy 
and competing over environmental policy. 
We show that the interests of green and producer lobbies will always be diver- 
gent in international environmental negotiations and they will be convergent in 
international trade negotiations if these are unaccompanied by efforts to reduce 
pollution. 
In the second part of the thesis, we have examined the endogenous formation of 
trade and environmental agreements. In Chapter 4, we have developed a model 
of multt-dimensZonal agreement formahon, where countries can enter into selec- 
tive and separate binding agreements with different partners along different policy 
dimensions. We have described international relations as a two-stage game, in 
which agreements are formed in the first stage and policies are selected in the 
second stage----cooperatively among countries participating in an agreement and 
non- cooperatively between countries belonging to separate agreements. In this 
model, a stable agreement structure is reached if no subset of countries can credi- 
bly object to it. 
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We have then used this model to examine the implications of negotiation tie- 
in-the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction- 
for the viability of multilateral cooperation, when countries are linked by emission 
spillovers and international trade under perfect competition. Our analysis has 
shown that, while in some cases a tie-in constraint has no effect or makes multi- 
lateral cooperation more viable, in others it makes a viable Joint multilateral agree- 
ment unstable. 
In Chapter 5, we have employed the model of multi-dimensional agreement for- 
mation developed in the previous chapter to study the formation of international 
trade agreements, when markets are imperfectly competitive and governments use 
two policy instruments (import tariffs and export subsidies) to affect the interac- 
tions between oligopolistic firms. We have used a simple three-country model of 
intra-industry trade to examine whether preferential trade agreements are stepping 
stones or stumbling blocs towards the attainment of multilateral trade coopera- 
tion. We have described international trade relations as a three-stage process. In 
the first stage, countries decide whether or not to form cooperative trade agree- 
ments. In the second stage, tariffs and subsidies are selected--cooperatively among 
countries participating in an agreement and non- cooperatively between countries 
belonging to separate agreements. In the last stage, firms compete in quantities. 
From the analysis of the welfare implications and the stability of alternative 
agreement structures, we have obtained the following results: (i) three factors 
determMe whether preferential trade agreements pose a threat to the multilateral 
trading system: which policy instruments are available, the degree of industry con- 
centratton, and the extent of product differentiation; (ii) when both import tariffs 
and export tariffs are available, 'impure' CUs-involving the coordinated use of 
both policy instruments-can be stumbling blocs towards multilateral trade coop- 
eration; (iii) if countries are banned from using export subsidies, the only stable 
negotiation outcome is global free trade. Thus our results provide a rationale for 
the recent attempts to strengthen international rules against the use of export 
subsidies. 
Three broad themes emerge from the thesis. The first theme is that in 
representative democracies governments do not act as benevolent servants of the 
public interest. Instead, they shape their policies in response not only to the 
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concerns of the general electorate, but also to the pressure applied by special 
interest groups. Therefore, international relations involve two distinct stages of 
strategtc Mterachon: in the first stage, political competition between the different 
interests determines the government's policy preferences; then the negotiations 
between national governments determine the international equilibrium. 
The second theme is that international relations involve not only the extremes 
of full cooperation and no cooperation, but also the possibility of partial cooper- 
atton. Policies are selected cooperatively among members of an agreement and 
non- cooperatively between countries belonging to separate agreements. 
The third theme emerging from our analysis is that international relations are 
characterized by multiple dimensions of strategic interactions, since they involve 
different policy issues (e. g. trade and environment) and policy instruments (e. g. 
import tariffs and export subsidies). Even when these dimensions are not directly 
interdependent-in the sense that the effects of choices along one dimension are 
dependent on choices along the others-there can still be cross-issue negotiation 
linkage: by exchanging concessions across different policy dimensions, two coun- 
tries may be able to achieve cooperation in situations where there would otherwise 
be no scope for mutual gains to be attained. 
Much of the literature on international policy cooperation has separately ex- 
amzned cooperation over trade policZes and over environmental policzes. 1 and has 
primarily been concerned with whether single-issue multilateral agreements are 
immune from the possibility of deviations by a subset of countries. The results ob- 
tained in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis point out that focusing on a single policy 
dimension might lead to drawing incorrect conclusions about the sustainability of 
multilateral cooperation. 
The research carried out in this thesis suggests three lines of future research. 
First, more work is needed to examine how economic policies-including trade 
and environmental policies-are determined by political and economic interests. In 
particular, to shed more light on the role played by interest groups in the domestic 
'For example, Riezman (1985), Krugman (1991), Bond and Syropoulos (1993), and Yi 
(1996), 
among others, have focused on the creation of customs unions (CUs), while Carraro and 
Siniscalco 
(1993a, 1994), Barrett (1994b) and Chander ad Tulkens (1992), among others, have focused on 
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). 
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and international political arenas, two crucial issues should be incorporated in our 
analysis: the formation of lobby groups, to explain why only some groups of citizens 
can overcome the free-rider problem of collective action described by Olson (1965) 
and get politically organized; and the underlying electoral process, to explain the 
objective function of the policy-makers. 
Second, throughout our analysis we have assumed that the negotiating coun- 
tries were ex-ante symmetric. This simplification has allowed us to abstract from 
the conflicts that would normally arise in the determination of cooperative poli- 
cies. As hard as it may be, more attention should be devoted to the study of 
the bargaining problems among heterogeneous agreements' members. As shown in 
Chapter 4, alternative bargaining solutions would imply a different payoff division 
within agreements' members and might affect the negotiation outcome. 
Finally, our model of multi-dimensional agreement formation could be applied 
to study the linkages between trade liberalization and other policy issues, such as 
competition policy or labor standards, which are included in the agenda for the 
new GATT/WTO negotiation round. 
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